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This thesis presents Chains of Trust, a reputation system for Vehicular Ad-hoc
Networks (VANETs) where users share information about Points of Interest (POIs)
(restaurants, hotels, etc.), which relies on the use of asymmetric cryptography and
requires no roadside infrastructure. Then it introduces poiSim, a new simulation
tool completely developed in this thesis that will allow us to accurately simulate
VANET scenarios: poiSim realistically simulates the interaction between almost
260,000 vehicles distributed over a map of Switzerland with a high level of detail.
In addition, this thesis proposes Anonymous Chains of Trust, a protocol that goes
one step further in the protection of user privacy by allowing users that trust
each other to exchange their identities. Finally, it explores the future of VANET
communication with the use of Visual Light Communication (VLC) to provide a
secure link between nodes since VLC has the remarkable property of being resilient
to jamming and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks.
Keywords: Security, Chains, Trust, POI, Reputation, Vehicular Ad hoc Net-
works, VANETs, Privacy, Certificates, Pseudonyms, Anonymity, Data Aggrega-
tion, Simulation, VLC, Visual, Light, Communication.
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Preface
In the next few years Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) will revolutionize our
driving experience, possibly to the point where our driving skills are not required
anymore. Vehicles will be able to communicate with each other and with other
networks, i.e., the Internet, thus laying the foundations for vehicular applications:
intelligent driving systems, safety related applications, parking spot finders, peer to
peer content and advertisements distribution, etc. Implementing security measures
to protect users and their privacy will become of paramount importance.
A thorough review of the state of the art will reveal that most VANET ap-
plications rely on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which uses user certificates
managed by a Certification Authority (CA) to handle security. By doing so, they
constrain the ad-hoc nature of the VANET imposing a frequent connection to the
CA to retrieve the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and requiring some degree of
roadside infrastructure to achieve that connection. Other solutions propose the us-
age of group signatures where users organize in groups and elect a group manager.
The group manager will need to ensure that group members do not misbehave,
i.e., do not spread false information, and if they do punish them, evict them from
the group and report them to the CA; thus suffering from the same CRL retrieval
problem.
In this thesis we present a fourfold contribution to improve security in VANETs.
First and foremost, Chains of Trust describes a reputation system where users dis-
seminate Points of Interest (POIs) information over the network while their privacy
remains protected. It uses asymmetric cryptography and users are responsible for
the generation of their own pair of public and private keys. There is no central
entity which stores the information users input into the system; instead, that in-
formation is kept distributed among the vehicles that make up the network. On
top of that, this system requires no roadside infrastructure. Precisely, our main
objective with Chains of Trust was to show that just by relying on people’s driving
habits and the sporadic nature of their encounters with other drivers a successful
reputation system could be built.
The second contribution of this thesis is the application simulator poiSim.
Many’s the time a new VANET application is presented and its authors back
their findings using simulation results from renowned networks simulators like ns-
2. The major issue with network simulators is that they were not designed with
that purpose in mind and handling simulations with hundreds of nodes requires a
massive processing power. As a result, authors run small simulations (between 50
and 100 nodes) with vehicles that move randomly in a squared area instead of using
v
real maps, which rend unrealistic results. We show that by building tailored appli-
cation simulators we can obtain more realistic results. The application simulator
poiSim processes a realistic mobility trace produced by a Multi-agent Microscopic
Traffic Simulator developed at ETH Zurich, which accurately describes the mo-
bility patterns of 259,977 vehicles over regional maps of Switzerland for 24 hours.
This simulation runs on a desktop PC and lasts approximately 120 minutes.
In our third contribution we took Chains of Trust one step further in the
protection of user privacy to develop Anonymous Chains of Trust. In this system
users can temporarily exchange their identity with other users they trust, thus
making it impossible for an attacker to know in all certainty who input a particular
piece of information into the system. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
time this technique has been used in a reputation system.
Finally, in our last contribution we explore a different form of communication
for VANETs. The vast majority of VANET applications rely on the IEEE 802.11p/
Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) standard or some other form
of radio communication. This poses a security risk if we consider how vulnerable
radio transmission is to intentional jamming and natural interferences: an attacker
could easily block all radio communication in a certain area if his transmitter is
powerful enough. Visual Light Communication (VLC), on the other hand, is
resilient to jamming over a wide area because it relies on visible light to transmit
information and ,unlike WAVE, it has no scalability problems. Consider a traffic
jam, where vehicle density is higher than in any other situation, in WAVE vehicles
will struggle to get their information across because they will all be competing
for the transmission medium, whereas in VLC they will all be able to transmit
continuously. In this thesis we show that VLC is a secure and valuable form of
communication in VANETs, and we are the firsts to provide realistic results that
back this theory.
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With the massive deployment of wireless technologies on motorized vehicles, auto-
motive industries have opened a wide variety of possibilities for drivers and their
passengers. Theoretically, anything from finding out the road conditions ahead to
watching a movie through streaming is possible. Different kinds of applications
will need different requirements. As mentioned in [1] and in [2] applications can
be categorized as follows:
1. Safety related:
(a) Traffic information messages: used to disseminate traffic conditions in
a region and thus affect public safety only indirectly - they are not
time-critical.
(b) General safety-related messages: used by public safety applications such
as cooperative driving and collision avoidance - they should satisfy an
upper bound delay.
(c) Liability-related messages: they are only exchanged in liability-related
situations such as accidents - time is not an issue, but the messages
should be able to reveal the senders’ id to the law authorities.
2. Others:
(a) Toll applications: electronic toll collection systems like AutoPASS in
Norway allow drivers to continue driving without having to stop at
tolls.
(b) TV and other multimedia content: used to provide users with entertain-
ment and information (movies, newspapers, etc.).
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(c) Advertisements: businesses along the road (such as gas-stations and
restaurants) could advertise themselves to drivers before they reached
the businesses location, giving them enough time to compare different
offers.
As far as safety applications requirements are concerned, the integrity and the
non-repudiation of the messages has to be ensured, albeit maintaining at the same
time the user’s privacy, as will be discussed in section 2.1. Other applications,
e.g., multimedia content distribution, may also need to encrypt their traffic to
avoid eavesdropping from non-registered users. The use of Certification Authorities
(CAs) and public key cryptography to protect Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle
to Infrastructure (V2I) communication fulfills most security requirements.
Architecture wise, applications can also be divided in two groups. On one
hand, there are Zero-infrastructure applications where the only hardware require-
ment is the installation of On Board Units (OBUs) in the vehicles. OBUs provide
the vehicles with sensing, processing and wireless communication capabilities for
V2V communications, like in [3]. On the other hand, there are applications that
also need Road Side Units (RSUs) to provide a V2I link, generally because they
use Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and they require access to a CA outside the
network or to an Internet Service Provider ([4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11]). How-
ever, with the recent development of cellular technologies like GPRS and UMTS
the V2I link could by provided by the OBU itself, minimizing the dependency on
road side infrastructure.
The vast majority of applications in Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs)
use PKI, because it provides confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-
repudiation and because it is a well known and reliable system. However, VANETs
have their own peculiarities and if PKI does not adapt to them security issues arise.
For instance, a vehicle continuously sending messages signed with the driver’s pri-
vate key becomes traceable, and thus the user’s privacy is violated. As explained
in section 2.1.5, another major issue comes from managing Certificate Revocation
Lists (CRLs). CAs include revoked certificates in CRLs, which have to be dis-
tributed across the network. This poses a difficult challenge, particularly in the
early stages of a VANET deployment, if the vehicles do not have permanent (or
frequent enough) access to a CA. Furthermore, with millions of users in the system
the potential size of the CRLs is huge.
This thesis presents Chains of Trust, a secure Zero-infrastructure reputation
system focused on the distribution of Points of Interest (POIs) information. This
reputation system relies on human driving patterns, i.e., the sporadic encounters
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between vehicles, to transmit information. One user will trust another if they both
give POIs similar reviews, and those POIs could be anything from road conditions
to museums or restaurants. The main objective is to take advantage of those
patterns and build a system, whose knowledge is distributed among the users’
vehicles, which they can query for POIs information.
Our work is strongly focused on reputation systems because we believe that
they can help people in their everyday decision making process and therefore im-
prove their quality of life. We live in a world that produces massive amounts of
information every day and in order to thrive we need to process them and make
the best decisions we can. We rely on friends and family to deal with this complex
problem, i.e., whether we are trying to decide where to go for dinner or making
a career choice we rely on the experience of other people to help us make a good
decision.
This concept lies at the foundation of reputation systems. Since it is not
possible to experience everything first hand, a user of a reputation system shares
his own knowledge with other system users and relies on some of them, preferably
ones with a good reputation, to help him make decisions.
A user’s reputation will grow with every good decision he helps others make.
Naturally, people have different tastes so what may be a good recommendation
for somebody may not be so good for somebody else. This leads to the creation
of groups of users that trust each other because they have a similar taste, what is
called a Web of Trust. On the other hand, entities with too different views will
recognize each other as not trustable and disregard each other’s recommendations.
Since what is being shared is subjective information, two people may trust each
other today and have different views tomorrow. In addition, they may not trust
each other in one area of expertise and at the same time they may share similar
views on others.
Reputation systems are increasingly being used nowadays. They are a very
good way to bring some order into the chaos that can be a network of users
sharing information.
They can be found almost everywhere, in P2P networks, in movie rating web-
sites, in sites like eBay or YouTube, etc. They can be as simple as the one used
by eBay -in which after each pair of users conducts a transaction they rate each
other and a user’s reputation is the count of positive and negative ratings- or they
can be extremely complex ones.
Reputation systems, however, are vulnerable to several kinds of attacks [12, 13],
one of the most serious being the breach of users privacy. By definition, in a
reputation system every user has an identity to which all the opinions he makes
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public can be traced to. For this reason, an attacker with the appropriate tools
should be able to profile all the users in the system: knowing which restaurants
they go to, the books they like, having an accurate idea of the area the users live
in and even mapping their online identity to their real one.
This thesis presents Anonymous Chains of Trust, a solution to preserve users
privacy in reputation systems. In particular, we apply this solution to the rep-
utation system for VANETs Chains of Trust, although it may well apply to any
reputation system. In a nutshell, users that trust each other are allowed to borrow
each other identities to disseminate information over the network, thus making it
impossible for an attacker to determine with all certainty who created a particular
piece of information.
Finally, this thesis looks into VANET communication. Vehicular communica-
tion technologies comprise cellular (GPRS/UMTS), Direct Short Range Commu-
nication (DSRC) and the IEEE 802.11 technology family. Cellular communica-
tions can be used as a basis for long-range communications at low data rates (i.e.,
less than 2 Mb/s), mainly for V2I communication. Alternatively, WIFI IEEE
802.11a,b,g may provide short-range access (i.e., less than 100 m) to RSUs at
medium-high data rates (i.e., between 1-54 Mb/s). Finally, Wireless Access in Ve-
hicular Environments (WAVE) standards allow short-range communications (i.e.,
less than 1000 m) at data rates between 3-27 Mb/s. IEEE 802.11p WAVE, [14],
is defined to allow both V2V and V2I communications. WAVE comprises IEEE
802.11p and IEEE 1609.x standards. WAVE units support multichannel opera-
tion: primary management frames and WAVE Short Messages (WSM) use a fixed
Control Channel (CCH) while other management frames and data frames (e.g., IP
datagrams) use a Service Channel (SCH). SCH exchanges require the devices to
be members of the WAVE Basic Services (WBS) that act as the corresponding
service sets in IEEE 802.11. At higher layers, the WAVE stack allows the transport
of TCP/UDP using IPv6 datagrams. In this way, legacy TCP/IP connectivity is
ensured. Besides, WAVE also defines a WAVE Short Message Protocol (WSMP)
to accommodate high-priority, time-sensitive traffic. It should also be considered
that the WAVE 1609.2 standard defines security services for the WAVE stack,
which include confidentiality, authenticity, integrity and anonymity services.
Radio communication, however, is inherently vulnerable to jamming attacks:
anyone with a powerful enough radio device can transmit in the same channel
used by vehicles and distort communication over a wide area (the radius of which
depends on the power of the radio device), thus causing a Denial of Service (DoS).
The impact of such an attack ranges from a minor inconvenience for content dis-
tribution applications, like Chains of Trust, to a potential car accident for safety
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applications. In addition, WAVE does not scale well, in high density environments
vehicles have to compete for the transmission medium.
Recent research has begun to focus on Visual Light Communication (VLC) [15,
16] as an alternative form of communication. In VLC, the communication takes
places between a Light Emitting Diode (LED) used as a transmitter and photo-
diode that acts as a receiver. In the past few years, there has been significant
progress in this area, e.g., in [15] the authors were able to reach a transmission
speed of a 100Mbps in indoor conditions. Extensive research still needs to be
conducted before the technology becomes available to the general public. Efforts
in that direction are backed by the recently created IEEE 802.15.7 Visible Light
Communication Task Group [17] and the Visible Light Communications Consor-
tium [18].
LED illumination is becoming widespread for indoor lightning due to its lower
power consumption compared to the regular light bulb. In addition, it is also
becoming increasingly popular in the automotive industry for indicator, tail and
even headlights, as well as being used in traffic lights and signs. By the time
VLC technology is mature enough to be used outdoors, LED illumination will be
widespread and a great range of possibilities will open for VANETs.
In this thesis experiments for Chains of Trust, Anonymous Chains of Trust and
VLC, we use our application simulation tool poiSim to process the mobility trace
produced by the realistic Multi-Agent Traffic Simulator (MMTS) developed by
K.Nagel at ETH Zurich [19]. This trace defines realistic mobility patterns for a 24
hour scenario with 259,977 vehicles distributed over regional maps of Switzerland.
Our objective is to show that using a customized application simulator yields
more realistic results than using a general purpose network simulator like many
researchers do.
In order to study the behavior of applications in VANETs extensive research
has been performed in mobility and network simulation fields. Vehicular traf-
fic simulators can be classified in macroscopic and microscopic simulators. The
macroscopic perspective considers system parameters as traffic density (number of
vehicles per km per lane) or traffic flow (e.g., number of vehicles per hour crossing
an intersection) to compute road capacity and the traffic distribution in the road
net. In contrast, microscopic simulators determine the movement of each vehicle
that participates in the road traffic.
As far as network simulators are concerned, there is a wide variety of available
options: ns-2 [20, 21, 22, 23], GloMoSim [24, 25, 26, 27], OPNET [28, 29], etc.
They are essential tools to simulate network aspects like communications, routing
protocols and wireless propagation models. However, as far as we know, they are
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not able to handle the simulation of hundreds of thousands of nodes, unlike our
application simulation tool poiSim.
In most research articles [30, 31, 32, 33], the authors are aware of network
simulators limitations and simulate a low number of vehicles (in the order of a
hundred), moving randomly or following a statistical distribution. In this thesis we
show that VANET applications simulation should be divided in two layers: the first
will deal with network specific aspects such as the Medium Access Control (MAC)
layer, which can be simulated by network simulators like ns-2 with a comparatively
small number of nodes (in the order of a hundred) without affecting the general
results, and the second will be application specific, which can be simulated by
poiSim with a large number of nodes (in the order of hundreds of thousands) while
using a realistic mobility trace. We believe that this approach will yield more
accurate and realistic results than directly using a network simulator to simulate
the application and the network specific behavior.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the required
background in the topics related to the thesis: security, reputation systems, net-
work simulators, etc. Section 3 describes the problem being addressed by Chains
of Trust, followed by a description of the simulation tool poiSim in section 4.
Section 5 explains in detail Anonymous Chains of Trust, followed by our VLC







Simulators and Visual Light
Communication
2.1 Techniques to Achieve Privacy
In the near future, Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) are going to change the
way people drive and it will solely depend on the security measures that are imple-
mented if they do it for the better or for the worse. The creation of VANETs can
help improve traffic management and roadside safety. Unfortunately, a VANET
also comes with its own set of challenges, particularly in security and privacy. As
a special implementation of mobile ad hoc networks, a VANET is subject to many
security threats, which can lead to attacks and service abuses. For instance, an
attacker could tamper with traffic applications and make its users believe there is
a traffic jam in a particular road making them take an alternative way, thus freeing
the original road for the attacker’s benefit. A more dangerous example would be
for an attacker to sign liability messages with a fake identity so that he could not
be linked to a car accident scene. Furthermore, network applications could also be
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used for more subtle and equally illegal objectives such as tracking people on their
vehicles. Therefore, there is a real demand for security mechanisms, specially for
those that protect the user’s privacy.
The security architecture developed by the Vehicle Safety Communications
Consortium (VSCC) and subsequently submitted to IEEE P1609.2, [34], defines
a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)-based approach for securing messages sent in
Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) communication. The
standard, however, does not address privacy issues. In [35], the authors propose
different mechanisms for certificate revocation and discuss privacy issues in vehicu-
lar networks. Conditional privacy preservation must be achieved in the sense that
user-related private information, e.g., driver’s name, license plate, position, etc.,
has to be protected, while at the same time authorities have to be able to reveal
the identity of message senders in case of a traffic event dispute, such as a car acci-
dent. Therefore, it is critical to develop a suite of elaborate and carefully designed
security mechanisms to achieve security and conditional privacy preservation in
VANETs before they can be deployed.
Among the proposals to achieve privacy, different techniques can be identified:
• Anonymous Certificates
• Group Signatures
• Pseudonyms and Pseudonyms Certificates
Table 2.1 summarizes the privacy schemes and classifies them according to
whether a scheme uses (i) anonymous certificates, (ii) group signatures or (iii)
pseudonyms to achieve privacy. Table 2.1 also indicates if a work considers prob-
lems as group formation, traceability, revocation or message linkability. The dy-
namic column shows if the scheme dynamically changes the message signature
keys.
Although the problem of certificate revocation is commented when needed
throughout the whole section, we add at the end a specific subsection to point
out other references in that field and discuss the most relevant mechanisms to
reduce the size of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).
2.1.1 Achieving Privacy through Anonymous Certificates
One solution to the privacy problem is to use a list of anonymous certificates for
message authentication, where the relationship of the list of anonymous certificates
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Table 2.1: Taxonomy of privacy and certificate revocation schemes.
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Table 2.2: Taxonomy of privacy and certificate revocation schemes (continued).
Revocation Traceability Dynamic Linkability
[2] X X X
[36] X
[37] X
[38] X X X
[8] X
[39] X X
[40] X X X
[34]
[41]
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with a vehicle’s driver is stored in a Transportation Regulation Center (TRC). For
instance, in [2], the authors introduce a security protocol based on anonymous
certificates. With a pool of approximately 43 800 certificates, every time a vehicle
wants to communicate with the network it randomly chooses one of the available
certificates to sign a particular message and then discards it. In this way, the
driver’s privacy is guaranteed, since there is no way for an attacker to tell if two
messages were sent by the same user.
To achieve conditional traceability, a unique electronic ID is assigned to each
vehicle by which the police and authorities can verify the identity of the owner
in case of any dispute. Although this scheme can effectively meet the conditional
privacy requirement, it is far from efficient and can hardly become a scalable and
reliable approach. Since the ID management authority stores all the anonymous
certificates for each vehicle in its administrative region (province or country), once
a malicious node is detected, the authority has to exhaustively search in a large
database (probably 43 800 certificates × millions of cars) to find the ID related to
the misbehaving anonymous public key. Besides, if a node needs to be revoked all
its anonymous certificates have to be included in the CRL, which will then grow
very fast.
In [38] a similar solution is proposed. They also use short lived certificates,
although they are blindly signed by the Certification Authority (CA). The Escrow
Authority (EA) is responsible for maintaining the link between the anonymous
certificates and the vehicle’s real identity using a linkage marker, in order to deal
with the “insider” attack. Still, they suffer from the same problems, because in
order to revoke a vehicle all of its non-expired anonymous certificates have to be
included in the CRL.
In [42] the authors devise a scheme following a very different approach from the
ones described above. In a nutshell, all the nodes share a Network Authorization
Key (AK), which grants the privilege of broadcasting messages in the VANET. In
addition, every vehicle has a secret key (SK) only known by the CA and itself.
Whenever a node wants to broadcast a message it needs to ask the CA for the AK,
which as we will see below needs to be a short lived key. In order to enable the
revocation of rogue vehicles their identifier is included in the message, although
for privacy concerns it is encrypted with the CA’s public key. Let us define the
OBUid of an anonymous node A as:
{IdA, HSKA(IdA|HAK(M))}CA (2.1)
The OBUid is added to any message A wants to broadcast to prove its au-
thorization to transmit a broadcast message M by hashing it with the network
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authorization key to produce a message digest HAK(M).
{M,HAK(M), CA,OBUid} (2.2)
It should also be noted that the scheme relies on CRLs to revoke nodes from the
network and the CA is the only one qualified to include them in the list. However,
the AK is not updated until it has expired. Hence the need for a short lived AK,
since nothing keeps the rogue node from broadcasting bogus messages until the
AK expires (vulnerability window). On the other hand, if we consider a scheme
where information messages are transmitted from On Board Units (OBUs) to Road
Side Units (RSUs), validated at the CA and then issued back from the RSUs as
trusted messages to the vehicles (to which they would respond diminishing speed
or stopping) the vulnerability window disappears, because the CA has permanent
access to the CRL and can discard any message coming from a revoked node.
However, safety message applications would suffer a great delay in comparison to
schemes where the information is actually collected and delivered directly by the
vehicle’s neighbors. Therefore, this solution is not the best suited for these kind
of applications.
2.1.2 Achieving Privacy through Group Signatures
The main feature of the group signature scheme is that it provides anonymity
to the group members, because any node inside the group can verify if a certain
message was sent by a group member without knowing the sender’s real identity
inside the group.
In [39], the authors integrate the techniques of Group Signature [50] and
Identity-based Signature [51] to solve the issues on security and conditional pri-
vacy preservation. They divide that problem in two parts: communication coming
from an OBU and communication coming from a RSU. The main idea is to use
group signatures to address the first part of the problem, so that messages are
anonymously signed, while the identities of the senders can still be recovered by
the authorities. In order to address the second part of the privacy problem they in-
troduce a signature scheme that uses Identity-based Cryptography [52] to digitally
sign each message sent by an RSU to ensure its authenticity.
1. Communication from an OBU: the main issue is how to solve the con-
tradiction between making the messages anonymous and at the same time
traceable by the authorities. A secure group signature must be correct (hon-
estly generated signatures can be verified), anonymous and unlinkable to the
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original identity although traceable under some circumstances [39]. By using
a group signature scheme such as the one described in [50] a verifier can judge
whether the signer belongs to a group without actually knowing the signer’s
real identity in the group. Besides, if the situation ever requires it, the CA,
which serves as a group manager, can reveal the signer’s true identity. In
[39], the authors propose a role separation between the authority that pro-
vides the keys for the group and the law authorities that may need to trace
a group member’s real identity. Therefore, the role of the group manager is
divided into a Membership Manager (MM), whose task is to assign private
and group public keys to the vehicles, and a Tracing Manager (TM), i.e., the
law authorities.
2. Communication from a RSU: messages sent from RSUs do not need to
remain anonymous. Therefore, the identifier string of each RSU can be used
as the public key to sign its messages. The provably-secure identity-based
signature scheme described in [53] is the one chosen in [39], since the length
of the signature is greatly reduced thanks to the use of bilinear pairing.
Figure 2.1: Secure Communication System
In Fig. 2.1 we can see depicted how the system works. Three types of network
entities are identified: the TM, the MM and the mobile OBUs. The main idea is
that all vehicles need to be registered with the MM and pre-loaded with the group
public key and their own private key before they can join the network. When the
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vehicles are on the road, they regularly broadcast routine traffic related messages
(position, speed, etc.). Should an accident occur (or any other kind of event that
required the vehicles’ real identities to be revealed) police officers would submit
the messages collected at the time of the accident to the TM, who is responsible
for the authorization of revealing the real identities of the wanted vehicles. The
TM would then forward recovered clues and evidences to the MM which would
search the real identity in its membership database.
In the article, the authors emphasize the need for a system that has the ability
to selectively revoke the group membership of a compromised vehicle either by
updating the group keys or by releasing a customized version of the Revocation
Lists (RLs). If the group keys are updated, the private keys of the revoked vehicles
are distributed in a RL so that unrevoked vehicles can locally update their private
and group public keys, whereas the revoked vehicles cannot due to the signature
scheme being used (Strong Diffie Hellman in groups with a bilinear map) [54].
However, this option introduces significant overhead due to the periodic changes of
keys. Alternatively, a Verifier-Local Revocation (VLR) scheme [55, 56, 57], similar
to the traditional CRL, is very efficient (as long as the number of compromised
vehicles is low) since only message verifiers are involved in the revocation check-up
operation. In [39], a hybrid scheme is proposed, which in general terms consists
in using VLR until the number of revoked vehicles reaches a certain threshold T
and then switching to key updating.
Some aspects remain unclear in [39]. For instance, the authors do not cover
how the groups are formed, or if there is communication among them, so that if
a node is revoked from a group it is revoked from all groups. Besides, if VAR
relies on the fact that only the verifiers deal with revoked nodes, that means that
most of the group nodes are just dummy nodes (they do not interpret the message
information) or even all if the verifier is the MM, which makes the whole scheme
unsuitable for safety information applications. In our view, the authors should
specify what VANETs applications can take advantage of their scheme.
In [8] the authors present a technique for secure group formation. Although
the paper is centered on secure data aggregation it provides some insights in group
formation techniques that could be used to increase privacy.
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2.1.3 Achieving Privacy through Group Signatures: How
Groups Are Formed
There are many ways to form groups in VANET applications. For example, all
public transport buses can be members of a preset group. This is the easiest and
most efficient way of group formation, but it requires prior knowledge of all group
members, as well as a common authority over them. This is not the case when
individual drivers on a highway decide to join a platoon in order to improve their
driving experience. This requires on-the-fly group formation where a group leader
is elected and group membership is managed dynamically. This latter category of
groups is the most useful due to its flexibility, but it is also the most difficult to
implement due to several issues, such as group leader election, group overlap, and
the related security hurdles.
[8] introduces the concept of location-based groups, where the roads are di-
vided into small area cells that define the groups. In this fashion, a vehicle will
automatically know to which group it belongs, the group leader will be by defi-
nition the closest vehicle to the center of the cell and naturally, it will be elected
dynamically. It should be noted that, in the leader election process, vehicles do
not broadcast their real identities but rather pseudonyms for privacy purposes, so
the authors combine the use of groups with the use of pseudonyms for intra-cluster
privacy.
On the plus side of this proposal, the group formation process is simplified and
when using geographic routing determining which groups should relay messages is
straightforward. However, for an attacker to always be elected group leader will
suffice to place himself in the center of the cell permanently.
Vehicles periodically broadcast their public keys, so upon the formation of the
group or whenever a new vehicle A joins the group, the leader L broadcasts the
group key encrypted with the node’s public key followed by its signature.
L→ A : {K}PuKASigPrKL [{K}PuKA ] (2.3)
This technique leaves room for improvement if the vehicles travel together in
platoon formation, since the platoon may span over more than one cell.
Also in [8] the authors propose another solution named Dynamic Group Key
Creation. The key idea is that once the leader and members of the group are
identified, the leader creates a key request message that transmits to the CA.
The CA will use that information to generate an asymmetric group key pair and
broadcast it to all the group members. The key pair will be encrypted with the
symmetric group key included in the key request message. In addition, the CA
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assigns to each group member a unique ID for non-repudiation purposes. Finally,
once the asymmetric group key is established, any group member can send a
message signed on behalf of the group (although accompanied by its certificate
issued by the CA to allow the receivers to verify the signature). The message also
includes the unique ID assigned by the CA to the group member that sent the
message, which implies that the privacy of the individual vehicle is broken. Note,
however, that the objective of the work reported in [8] is to reduce the overhead
with data aggregation and does not explicitly address the problem of privacy.
2.1.4 Achieving Privacy through Pseudonyms
Pseudonymous authentication is widely accepted in the VANET community [40,
34], [6, 41], specially as an alternative to anonymous authentication, which can
incur in additional overhead [2, 38].
The work reported in [40] presents a security architecture organized in layers.
While the lowest layer is concerned with vehicle application registration and iden-
tification, higher layers are concerned with proper system operation, appropriate
security measures and user privacy protection. In this group of higher layers we
can find the pseudonym and the revocation layer.
The pseudonym layer provides a basic level of anonymity by introducing the
possibility to use changing pseudonyms that cannot be linked by unauthorized
parties. As pointed out by the authors, pseudonyms shall perform the same roles
as the certificate issued for the node. This scheme uses dynamic pseudonyms to
provide privacy, while at the same time an Escrow Authority (EA) is responsible
for revoking and uncovering the user’s real identity, if required.
The revocation layer is responsible for excluding nodes from the system. It
contains a database of revoked pseudonyms and distributes this data to all nodes
in the system if necessary, depending on the scale of the revocation decision, which
can range from only node-local to system-wide.
We should note that when a node is revoked, all its pseudonyms are included
in the revocation data. The authors do not specify how frequently pseudonyms
should be changed or how large the pool of pseudonyms should be, however it is
clear that there is a scalability problem.
From the system architecture perspective, the following entities are required:
• the vehicle manufacturer and the registration authority for the registration
of nodes.
• the inspection site for test and certification of nodes.
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• the “Escrow Authorities”, entities with the authoritative power (e.g., police
and courts) to identify and revoke nodes.
• the communication security infrastructure, which includes the communica-
tion systems, processing and databases necessary to carry out online testing,
pseudonym provision for nodes, revocation of nodes and infrastructure based
data assessment and intrusion handling.
As far as operation is concerned, vehicles use the certificate issued at the inspec-
tion site to request pseudonyms, which will be used to sign application messages. It
is important to note that the scheme assumes sporadic access to the infrastructure.
Some modules, such as the pseudonym provider may need reliable and on-demand
connectivity, which could be provided by cellular technologies. As discussed in
[35], distributing revocation information can also be achieved by simple terrestrial
broadcast.
The authors in [6] go a step further and combine the use of pseudonyms and
group signatures. They describe a scheme which relies on the concept of pseudony-
mous authentication, which they name Baseline Pseudonyms (BP). The novelty
with respect to previous works presented in this section is that it allows on-the-
fly generation of the nodes own pseudonyms using Group Signatures, which in
combination with the BP approach they term Hybrid Scheme.
By BP we understand a system where each node (vehicle) V is equipped with a
set of pseudonyms, that is, public keys certified by the CA without any information
identifying V, where each pseudonym is used at most for a period τ and then
discarded. For the i-th pseudonym Kiv for node V, the CA provides a certificate
CertCA(K
i
v), which is simply a CA signature on the public key K
i
v. The private
key kiv is used by the node to digitally sign messages. To enable message validation,
the pseudonym and certificate of the signer are attached in each message. With
σkiv() denoting V’s signature under its i-th pseudonym and m the signed message






The CAmaintains a map of the long-term identity of V to theKiv set of pseudonyms
provided to a node. When required, the CA can extract the signer’s identity from
a message.
Assuming the general availability of the public key of the CA, upon the recep-
tion of Msg.(2.4) a node validates CertCA(K
i
v). It makes use of a CRL, assumed
to be distributed to vehicles via the infrastructure, as described in [58]. If Kiv is
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not included in the CRL and the CA signature on Kiv is valid the node validates
σkiv(m).
The main idea behind the Hybrid Scheme mentioned above is that each node V
is equipped with a group signing key gskv and a group public key gpkCA. Instead
of protecting messages with the group signature, a node generates its own set of
pseudonyms Kiv (and corresponding private keys k
i
v), and uses gskv to generate a
group signature ΣCA,V () on each pseudonym K
i
v.
Basically, the nodes generate and ”self-certify” Kiv using ΣCA,V (), hence pro-
ducing CertHCA(K
i
v). The H denotes the Hybrid scheme differentiating it from the
BP certificate and the CA subscript confirms that the certificate was generated by








Upon the reception of a Msg.(2.5) the group signature is validated using the gpkCA
and the CRL. In this case, in order to disclose the identity of a message sender an
open operation on the CertHCA(K
i
v) group signature is necessary ([59, 60]).
In the article, the pseudonym lifetime τ is also considered. On one hand, it
makes the vehicles less traceable as it decreases. On the other, it negatively impacts
on the size of Revocation Lists (RLs) and the revocation process performance.
Varying τ from 60 down to 3 seconds the signing and verification costs are 4.6e-3
and 2.3e-3 s/msg respectively. Even though those timings may seem low at first
glance, in a densely populated area with over 100 nodes within range it may be a
problem for a safety messaging application, as they themselves remark.
Figure 2.2: Attack scenario
In [2] the authors present an intuitive method to compute how often should an
anonymous key or pseudonym be changed, adapting to the vehicle speed. Con-
sidering a tracking scenario where an attacker controls stationary base stations
separated by a distance datt and captures all the received safety messages. As-
suming that the attacker can correlate two keys if the sender moves at a constant
speed in the same direction on the same lane between two observation points.
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Assuming the speed of the target V is vt, its transmission range dr and dv
is the distance over which a vehicle does not change its speed and lane (hence,
the vulnerability window). As illustrated in Fig. 2.2, the vehicle’s anonymity is
vulnerable over a distance equal to dv + 2dr. Which means that it is not worth
changing the key over smaller distances since an observer can correlate keys with
high probability. This defines the lower bound on the key changing interval Tkey





However, if datt > dv + 2dr, V can avoid being tracked by changing its key as long
as it does not use the same key for a distance equal or longer than datt. This in





Since V does not know datt, but knows dr and dv, it can choose a value of Tkey that
is a slightly larger than min(Tkey). If we denote by rm the message rate, one key
should be used for at most:
Nmsg = ⌈rm × Tkey⌉messages (2.8)
For instance, assume datt = 2km, rm = 3.33 msg/sec (1 message every 300 ms), dv
= 30 sec ×vt (i.e. V does not change its lane and speed over 30 sec), dr = 10 sec
×vt (according to Direct Short Range Communication (DSRC), the transmission
range is equal to the distance travelled in 10 sec at the current speed), and vt =
100 km/h. Then min(Tkey) = 50 sec and max(Tkey) = 72 sec. V can choose Tkey
to be 55 seconds; as a result, Nmsg = 184 messages.
In [43] the authors elaborate on the idea of using a pseudonym for a trip
and then deriving several pseudonyms from it to use in the messages (sample
identifier). They explicitly want the sample identifiers to be relatable to the trip
identifiers, and at the same time different trip identifiers should also be relatable
among themselves if a trip becomes interrupted by events like pauses or leaving
and entering the highways with rural roads in between.
In [36, 37, 44] the authors introduce the idea of a silent period between key
changes, although each one with their own particular approach.
For instance, in [44] the authors claim that in order to maximize anonymity, a
moving vehicle V needs to continually observe the number of neighbors that are
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communicating in its vicinity. Then, after a pseudonym update a vehicle does
not actually change its pseudonym and start sending messages with it for a short
fixed period of time. After that period V observes the number k of communicating
neighbors and only if k is greater than a predefined threshold τ V transmits with
the updated pseudonym. Otherwise, it remains silent.
The approach above is not suited for safety message applications. If the vehi-
cles in the VANET need to periodically broadcast safety messages for cooperative
navigation, then the period between those broadcasts will be the maximum time a
vehicle can remain silent, which needs to be quite small (order of hundred millisec-
onds [36]) regardless of the number of neighbors. In [36] the authors introduce the
use of a random silent period between the update of pseudonyms. They propose
that vehicles form groups and that a group leader is elected. That group leader
acts as a proxy for the rest of vehicles in the group for V2I communications, so
that the rest of nodes in the group can remain silent for a longer periods of time.
Nevertheless, they direct this scheme to Location Based Services (LBS)1 and not
to safety message applications.
Opposed to the use of silent periods between pseudonyms update are the Mix-
Zones (MZs) described in [61]. Basically, in a MZ all the vehicles in a certain
zone agree to change their pseudonyms at the same time, which according to the
author makes any attempt to trace a certain vehicle V nearly impossible (provided
that enough nodes are in that particular zone). However, this technique is also
faulted for safety message applications for the very same reasons described for the
previous technique.
Similarly, [40] introduces Context Mixes, where vehicles only change their pseudonym
if they consider it is safe, i.e., they have enough neighbors.
Contrary to the widespread belief that changing pseudonyms protects vehicles
privacy, in [49], the authors conclude that use of multiple pseudonyms may not
be enough. Using Multiple Hypothesis Tracking (MHT) [62] and considering an
attacker model where the attacker has the capability to capture all beacons sent
to the network, they conclude that in a scenario with vehicles sending beacon
messages at 1 Hz, changing their pseudonyms every 10 seconds and considering
a equipment rate of 20% (rate of vehicles equipped with OBUs) an attacker can
effectively track vehicles with an accuracy of almost 100%.
1LBS make use of the vehicle position to provide a service, for instance finding the nearest
hospital
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2.1.5 Achieving Privacy through PKI: Managing Certifi-
cate Revocation
PKI is a widely accepted solution [35, 39, 6, 45] as stated by the IEEE 1609
family of standards for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) [63].
Vehicles in the network need the appropriate certificates in order to participate in
the system operation. Nevertheless, the certificates should only be valid for limited
periods of time after their generation and the CA should reserve the right to revoke
any nodes’ certificates, essentially evicting them from the network. In several
articles, [2, 35, 64], it is accepted that vehicles will carry a trusted component or
Tamper Proof Device (TPD) where the keys and certificates for network operation
are stored and protected.
One of the main concerns of using PKI systems is managing the CRLs, with
millions of users in the system, the potential size of the CRL is huge. In [35,
64] the authors present a way to compress CRLs using Bloom filters [65]. The
main characteristic of Bloom filters is that they return a configurable rate of false
positives, but there are no false negatives (if the Bloom filter claims that an element
is not in the set, we can be sure it is not). A Bloom filter (Fig. 2.3) consists of
Figure 2.3: Bloom filter.
a sequence of m bits, initially all set to zero. A key or element can be included
in the filter by hashing it with a specific number k of independent hash-functions
(each ranging from 1 to m) and by setting to 1 the vector bits that are set to 1
in the result. After having added several keys to the filter, it is certainly possible
that one bit is set to 1 multiple times. To check if an element is contained in the
filter, the element is hashed and the status of the corresponding bits are checked.
If at least one bit that should be one is not, one can surely affirm that the element
is not contained in the filter. On the other hand, if all necessary bits equal 1,
with high probability the element is included. However, it may also be possible
that the bits were set to 1 by a combination of several other keys, as explained
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before. Therefore, the more elements added to the set, the larger the probability of
false positives. Alternatively, in [45] the authors take advantage of the multi-tier
(regional) CAs set-up to decrease the size of the CRLs. Regional CAs will only
manage the certificates of vehicles in their region.
Authors in [46] propose a scheme based on Temporary Anonymous Certified
Keys (TACK), used to authenticate messages sent by the vehicles, whose CRL
size is linear in terms of the number of revoked vehicles and unrelated to the size
of the vehicle anonymous certificate set. There are three main entities:
• M : managing authority that acts as the root of trust.
• R: set of valid Regional Authorities (RA). RAs act as intermediary author-
ities and can grant vehicles temporary region-specific certificates. M issues
certificates to RAs and certifies them to be valid intermediary authorities.
• V : set of valid vehicles or OBUs. Any vehicle with a valid certificate fromM
or a region-specific short-lived certificate from R (while in the proper region)
is considered part of V.
• ¬V : set of expired or revoked vehicles.
The main idea is to apply group signatures considering a group which comprises all
of the above described entities. M is defined as the group manager. It initializes
the group signature scheme to generate a group public key gpk and a group master
key gmk. It publishes gpk and retains gmk for itself. Each valid OBU has a group
user key guki, issued by M, which is installed during annual vehicle inspections. It
should be noted that M maintains a history of all key/OBU pairs it has issued, so
that it can later trace misbehaving vehicles. When a vehicle enters a new region
it needs to update its TACK following these steps:




2. Use the group user key guki to sign K
+
S and send it to the RA.
3. RA verifies that the user is not in the RL. If it is not, the RA signs a certificate
for the OBU’s TACK public key K+S using the RA’s secret signing key K
−1
RA.
4. RA waits for δ seconds to queue up all certificate requests for that region
and broadcasts the certificates.
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Whenever a user wants to send a message it signs it with its TACK private key
K−1S and periodically broadcasts the RA signed certificate of its TACK public key
K−1S . Whenever a user misbehaves, to determine which OBU generated a signature
ψ the group manager tests ψ against the group user keys of OBUs in V . Once M
identifies Vi it is added to the RL and distributed to the RAs.
Similarly, in [47] the authors try to achieve the same small CRL size with a
pseudonymous authentication scheme. The network architecture is composed by a
Trusted Authority (TA), RSUs and vehicles or OBUs. The TA issues a certificate
CertTA,Rx for a certain RSU Rx, and a series of pseudonymous certificates for a
vehicle Vi to be installed during periodic vehicle inspections. It should be noted
that the identities in the pseudonyms certificates are derived from two random
seeds using a one-way hash function. The TA divides the maximum time between
vehicle inspections into time windows. For every window, the TA chooses a random
secret key to sign the vehicle’s pseudonymous certificates, so that in every window
the vehicle has to request Rx to re-sign the pseudonymous certificate for that
window. In this scenario, a RSU can be revoked by including its only certificate
in a CRL. To revoke a vehicle it would suffice for the TA to release the random
seeds from which Vi’s pseudonymous identities are computed, so that the RSUs do
not issue the re-signature key to Vi in following windows. At the same time the
valid pseudonymous certificate of Vi should be revoked.
In [48], the authors defineMost Pieces Broadcast (MPB) technique to distribute
CRLs. The first step is to break the large CRL file down into small pieces, taking
into consideration the coding rate (rate of pieces generated from a file) and the
code overhead (number of pieces needed to recover the original file). MPB ensures
that only the node with the largest number of pieces broadcasts in a certain area
to maximize the use of the wireless channel. It should be noted that RSUs will
always be selected as the node with most pieces. The authors show that MPB is
more effective than letting all OBUs broadcast their CRL pieces without control,
which results in a broadcast storm of unneeded CRL pieces that slows down the
CRL distribution.
2.2 Detection and Eviction of Misbehaving and
Faulty Nodes
In the previous section we have focused on schemes that provide a secure and
reliable network and try to keep attackers from disrupting its normal operation.
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However, due to the attackers ability or just to the devices aging process at some
point in time there will be misbehaving or faulty nodes in the VANET. That is
why in this section we outline several techniques to detect and evict them from
the network.
Table 2.3: Taxonomy of misbehavior protection schemes.
Tamper Proof Requires Certification Honest Sybil Attack
Device Authority Majority Protection
[66] X X
[67] X X X
[64] X X X
[9] X X
[68] X
In [66] the authors develop an heuristic called adversarial parsimony, which in-
formally means finding the best explanation for corrupted data. The first step is to
enhance the vehicles sensing capabilities giving them physical means to distinguish
its neighbors, for instance with cameras or exchanging information in the infra-red
light spectrum to verify that a vehicle is where it claims to be, thus preventing
sybil attacks. That information needs to be exchanged between vehicles, and once
enough evidence has been collected the heuristic will find inconsistencies, if any.
For instance, if there is a group of nodes that are linked to the rest of the network
by only one node then that link node is probably impersonating all the others.
In [67] the authors present a solution to reliably detect sybil attacks based on
radio signal strength analysis and on the fact that a vehicle cannot be on different
places at the same time. For clarity of description, they define three categories or
roles:
1. Claimer: each node periodically broadcasts a beacon message at beacon
intervals tb for the purpose of neighbor discovery. In the beacon message,
it claims its identity and position. The goal of the scheme is to verify its
claimed position.
2. Witness: all neighboring nodes, within the signal range of the claimer,
would receive the previous beacon message. They measure the signal strength
and save the corresponding neighbor information in their memory. Next time
they broadcast a beacon message, they will attach their neighbor list includ-
ing the signal strength measurements.
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3. Verifier: after receiving a beacon message, a node waits for a verifying in-
terval tv during which it collects enough signal strength measurements con-
cerning the previous beacon message from neighboring witnesses. With the
collected measurements, the node can locally compute an estimated position
for the claimer, for instance, by performing Minimum Mean-Square Error
(MMSE). However, to be as accurate as possible, before actually making the
computations to locate the sender of a message the node needs to discard all
the signal strength information that comes from sybil nodes.
Figure 2.4: A scenario with roadside infrastructures.
In order to discard sybil nodes information they rely on two principles or rules.
1. Rule 1: a RSU or Base Station (BS) issues a position certification for each
vehicle passing by. The position certification contains a time stamp and a
location information of the BS and therefore can prove the presence of the
vehicle near the base station at a certain time.
2. Rule 2: all witnesses for a claimer should consist of vehicles in the opposite
traffic flow.
With Rule 1, we can ensure where a certain vehicle comes from. Looking at Fig. 2.4
node a can get a position certification from BS2, when passing by BS2, and node b
also get one from BS1. When a and b meet each other, it is easy for them to prove
that they come from opposite directions by exchanging certificates. With rule 2,
we can ensure that each witness in the opposite traffic flow is a physical vehicle
instead of a sybil one. For instance, suppose that a malicious node m fabricates
seven sybil nodes, in which s7 is traveling in the opposite direction and the rest in
the same. When trying to verify the positions of s1, ...s6, node s7 would be ignored
because it cannot prove that it comes from the upstream of the road.
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On the whole, with the help of roadside infrastructure, dishonest sybil nodes
can be detected through position verification.
In [64] the authors rely on the vehicle’s TPD to execute their protocol and
even revoke itself if it detects it has been tampered with. They also assume the
existence of a honest majority in the attacker’s neighborhood. Unfortunately,
TPDs usually end up becoming just Tampered Devices, as shown in [69, 70, 71].
Therefore, an attacker could just modify their programming to impersonate several
vehicles (Sybil attack) [72], rendering the honest majority hypothesis invalid. And
even if the TPD remained tamper-proof nothing can stop an attacker from actually
stealing the physical device from another car and once again mount a Sybil attack.
Nevertheless, the authors devise a Misbehavior Detection System (MDS) as well
as a Local Eviction of Attackers by Voting Evaluators (LEAVE) protocol to detect
and exclude misbehaving nodes.
MDS basically consists in each node using its own sensory inputs, messages
received from its neighbors and a set of evaluation rules to classify the received
safety messages from a given node as faulty or correct. Messages that are outdated,
received beyond their theoretical area of propagation or contradictory to the node’s
own state are considered false. Their senders, as long as they are neighbors of the
node running MDS are tagged as misbehaving and their identity is passed on to
LEAVE.
The main principle of LEAVE is simple: the neighbors of a misbehaving vehicle
should temporarily evict it. It should be noted that the system does not require a
permanent connection to the CA to work, as we will see below. It is not a revoca-
tion protocol, but rather a collective warning system against misbehaving nodes.
Upon detecting an attacker, vehicles broadcast warning messages to all vehicles in
range, so that the sharing of information improves the effectiveness of the stand-
alone detection system. Besides, those warnings can be very valuable when vehicles
receive them even before being able to observe the misbehaving node themselves.
Any vehicle receiving a warning message adds the warned device to an accusation
list, and once enough warning votes against a node are collected, its identifier is
added to a local blacklist. After entering the blacklist, disregard messages are re-
peatedly broadcasted to the local neighborhood to ignore the attacker’s messages.
The eviction is temporarily limited to the duration of the contact between the
attacker and its neighbors running LEAVE. However, once the connection to the
CA is re-established a global-scale revocation protocol can be initiated.
In [9] the authors devise another scheme based on suicide attacks ([73]) called
Stinger, which also relies on a honest majority. In a nutshell, should a node believe
another one has misbehaved it will send a message that will evict them both from
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Figure 2.5: Multiple stings for misbehaving node M as it moves over time.
the network. The idea is to make the sacrifice of future participation so costly
that discourages false accusations. Stinger deviates from a suicide attack in the
following aspects:
1. Stinger temporarily prohibits devices from transmitting messages,
but allows them to continue to receive and forward messages. Tem-
porary removal could be used to rapidly ignore an errant transmitter. The
authors assume that most interactions are short-lived and therefore tempo-
rary removal is as effective as permanent removal in tackling misbehavior.
While the sting instruction prevents the bad and the good device from send-
ing out additional warnings, both will still receive safety instructions from
other cars. The authors claim that this solution minimizes the noticeable
impact on the sacrificing vehicle while still penalizing a malicious device.
However, in our view, when considering safety message applications the no-
ticeable impact is indeed noticeable since the accusing nodes will not be able
to send the information collected by their own sensors.
2. Stinger does not allow more than one node to sacrifice itself for
a misbehaving one (in a local context). Fig. 2.5 illustrates how the
protocol works as the cars move. Misbehaving node M is detected by A,
which broadcasts stingA,M to indicate vehicles near A to ignore M . Hence,
nodes B and C add both A and M to their local blacklists, while D and E
do not because they did not receive the sting message. As M moves into
range of D and E, E issues a new removal for M , stingE,M . D adds E and
M to its local blacklist, but C does not because it has already ignored M
from A’s sting.
3. Stinger permits good devices to continue to accuse bad ones even
after having issued one sting. The authors claim this last condition to be
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necessary to prevent the so-called motorway attacker who widely broadcasts
misbehavior and moves around quickly to attract many stings and prevent
good nodes from excluding subsequent attackers. However, we think the mo-
torway attack is still possible just by doing the exact opposite. Since good
nodes are always allowed to accuse misbehaving ones, it would suffice for
the attacker to move around accusing good nodes instead of misbehaving
himself. By using scheme like MDS (described at the beginning of the sec-
tion) which had only local visibility (a node only gathers information about
its neighbors), there would be no possible way for a group of nodes that
encountered the attacker for the first time to identify him as such because
of something he had done in the previous group. This could be solved by a
misbehavior detection system which had a global vision on all the groups in
the network.
[68] presents a system, which just like MDS, uses its sensory input to detect
misbehavior. After receiving an alert message, a vehicle V compares the sensed
behavior of the surrounding cars with a model of expected behavior under that
kind of alert and analyzes how it deviates. For example, if the vehicles ahead of V
start slowing down after he has received an alert message claiming there has been
accident that will match the expected behavior. This kind of techniques could
help an OBU determine whether alert messages are true or not, but they require
fine tuned models of expected behaviors for each of the possible alerts. Something
we believe to be unfeasible given the large number of possible alert situations.
2.3 Techniques for Secure Data Aggregation
One way to use available bandwidth more efficiently is to aggregate the information
of several vehicles into a single message or record, as done in the V2V traffic
information system described in [74], where vehicles share information about each
other. Data aggregation shall be able to aggregate events according to temporal
and spatial dimensions. Moreover, filtering old reports is an essential part of any
aggregation scheme. Thus, any aggregated record has to include an expiration
time after which the information is no longer valid. More difficult is the definition
of spatiality. In terms of aggregation, the key question is how far a primary record
(i.e., an original record) can participate in an aggregation process.
Authors in [75] prove that any successful aggregation scheme must reduce the
bandwidth at which information about an area at distance d is provided to the
cars asymptotically faster than d2. In their scheme, data aggregation is originated
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at measurement points, [75], and goes to destinations (i.e., set of vehicles that
are interested in information from a measurement point). Many data aggregation
schemes consider measurement points as specific areas that can be fixed (e.g.,
a road segment) or dynamic (e.g., based on the location of a set of vehicles).
Other schemes consider groups of vehicles called clusters with a specific vehicle,
the cluster-head, in charge of aggregating the primary reports. Clusters can be
organized based on their fixed geographical area or can be dynamically formed
by mobile vehicles. Furthermore, according to [7] data aggregation in VANETs
can be classified as syntactic and semantic. Syntactic aggregation compresses data
from multiple vehicles in order to fit the data in an unique record or frame. For
example, an application that extracts a subset of each individual record and adds
it to a single record is reducing the original information. Semantic aggregation
means that the data from individual vehicles is summarized. For example, an
application that instead of sending the location of each vehicle, only reports the
number of vehicles in a given area.
Aggregation however, aggravates the security problem. A malicious aggregator
may send aggregated records that do not correspond to real data. For instance,
it may falsely report a congested road by pretending to have aggregated more
records than it has actually received from cars ahead of it. Secure Data Aggre-
gation (SDA) aims to ensure the integrity of the data aggregation mechanisms
in the presence of malicious nodes that can alter the result of the aggregation.
Forging or suppressing a single record can have low impact in both syntactic and
semantic aggregation. Thus, the main threat, [8], in SDA is the generation of false
aggregation information. Secure data aggregation is a topic well studied in sensor
networks. However, due to the mobility nature of vehicular ad hoc networks and
the fact that nodes move following specific paths, the re-use of wireless sensor
network SDA mechanisms is not possible in VANETs.
Authors in [76] propose the following generic aggregate structure for SDA
schemes:
A = [(a1, b1), ..., (an, bn)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
index−dimensions







where the index dimensions indicate the area and time about which an ag-
gregate contains information. The values are the information and the meta-
information contains that additional information used in security mechanisms. In
general, most of the SDA proposals found in the literature follow similar structures,
although there is not a consensus in a well defined aggregated structure.
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Table 2.4 summarizes the SDA schemes covered in this section and classifies
them according to whether a scheme (i) performs syntactic or semantic aggrega-
tion, (ii) is cluster-based (cluster-head responsible for aggregating reports and (iii)
is defined for fixed or dynamic geographical areas.
Table 2.4: Taxonomy of Secure Data Aggregation (SDA) schemes.
Syntactic Semantic Cluster Fixed/Dynamic
based Areas
[7] X X D
[8] X X F
[77] X F




The authors of [7] propose a technique to probabilistically detect malicious
vehicles that generate false aggregated information. In particular, they focus on
validating speed and location information using syntactic aggregation although
their solution is also applicable to certain cases of semantic aggregation. The pro-
posal targets aggregated information from a measurement point to a destination,
without the need of creating groups or clusters of vehicles. The main idea behind
this scheme is to challenge the aggregator to provide a proof that can be used
to probabilistically validate the aggregated record. An aggregated record is cre-
ated by combining and compressing information contained inside several individual
records. To validate the aggregated record the aggregator is asked to provide a
randomly-chosen original signed record (whose information was included in the
aggregated record) after the aggregated record has been sent. If the corresponding
record was made up it will not be possible for the aggregator to produce the origi-
nal signed record, and he will be caught. It should be noted that the probability of
a misbehaving node being caught is directly proportional to the amount of bogus
information it includes in the aggregated record and that for the system to work
the penalty needs to be severe enough to discourage misbehavior (e.g. permanent
eviction from the network).
In order to avoid a two-phase protocol, vehicles are equipped with a TPD which
acts as a proxy for the receiver. As a proxy, it first provides a transmit buffer (data
placed on this buffer cannot be tampered with and will be transmitted) and second
it challenges the application (aggregator) to provide a randomly chosen original
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Figure 2.6: Secure aggregation using the TPD as a proxy for the receiver.
signed record to be sent with the aggregated data. The whole process can be
observed in Fig. 2.6. The application extracts the data and car ID. from each
regular record (a) and places it in the transmit buffer where the TPD appends a
secure time-stamp and the randomly generated number 83 (b). The application
takes the regular record corresponding to entry i=(83 mod 3)=2 (i.e., the third
entry) (c) and appends it to the transmit buffer. Finally, the TPD signs R1+R2
(d) and broadcasts the contents of the transmit buffer (e).
Even though this method may indeed prove itself to be effective against ma-
licious aggregators who try to insert false information in the network, it leaves
the vehicles unprotected from malicious aggregators that leave out information
from the aggregated records. In our view, the TPD could also serve as the entry
point for received records and it should keep track that the vehicle identities in
the received messages at some point before an upper bound τ are included in an
aggregated message to be broadcasted.
The authors of [8] claim that bandwidth efficiency can be achieved using com-
bined signature techniques. The authors address secure group formation, where
each group is composed by those vehicles in a specified geographical area or cell.
The group leader is chosen as that one closest to the center of the cell. Thus, the
group leader is in charge of aggregating and disseminating data. Group leaders
receive signed reports from vehicles creating a new message with a combined sig-
nature. Therefore, combined signatures is a semantic SDA mechanism since there
is only one message m signed by the combination of all vehicles that participate
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in the event detection. The following combined signatures are proposed:
Figure 2.7: Three different types of combined signatures. n is the total number of
signers. Ci is the certificate of i-th user
1. Concatenated Signatures: the idea behind this scheme is that whenever a
vehicle receives a message if it agrees with the message information (based on
its own sensors input) it appends its signature. This form of source aggrega-
tion results in a smaller data verification delay than destination aggregations
where the receiver collects messages from different sources and then cross-
checks them. Another advantage is that an invalid signature does not affect
the whole message, in contrast to the next scheme.
2. Onion Signatures: the signature sizes are constant, since each message is
hashed before being signed. Instead of simply appending a new signature,
a vehicle signs the signature of the previous transmitter, although before
retransmitting the new message, it should also include the last signature,
i.e., the one it received, so that the vehicle at the next hope can verify the
previous signature. The improvement in signature size comes at a cost. In
this case, a single invalid signature will affect the whole message and the
message needs to be verified at each hop, increasing the overall verification
time. In our view, this last feature if correctly exploited could lead to a
denial of service attack.
3. Hybrid Signatures: consists of several concatenated onion signatures, each
of a given depth. The signature depth representing the number of layers it
includes. This solution looks for a compromise between the previous two,
both on their advantages and their drawbacks.
We find that Hybrid Signatures are a very interesting possibility to explore
when considering safety message applications. We propose that the different kinds
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of safety messages of the application be assigned a degree of time criticality and
needed trust and depending on those values the appropriate depth of the Hybrid
Signature be chosen. For example, if a vehicle is on a crossing with no visibility on
the right side of the road we can safely assume its driver will not mind waiting a
few seconds before it can safely traverse. Therefore, in that case the better suited
solution would probably be a Hybrid Signature with depth 0.
In Catch-up [77], the authors propose an aggregation scheme for applications
where a delay of tens of seconds is acceptable, not suited for safety messaging
applications but perfectly valid for general traffic information. Aggregation is
performed in road sections for the same frame interval of time. Their objective is to
perform semantic aggregation by generating a single secure report with aggregation
functions such as MAX, MIN, AVG. Any vehicle can aggregate the data and thus
there is not any cluster structure created. The basic idea in this scheme is to insert
a delay before forwarding a report to the next hop. However, their scheme makes
this delay more controllable in order to increase the probability that a report can
be merged with reports ahead or reports behind. Intelligent delay control policies
are made based on local observations of individual vehicles. They also design a
future reward model to define the benefits of different delay-control policies, and
then establish a decision tree to help a vehicle choose an optimal policy from the
perspective of long-term rewards.
CASCADE, [78], is a cluster-based syntactic SDA scheme. Each vehicle presents
location information based on its difference from the location of the cluster’s center
and its speed based on its difference with the median speed of those vehicles in the
cluster. The primary record is signed by the vehicle using ECDSA and includes
a timestamp to prevent replay attacks and the vehicle’s public key. Each vehicle,
then builds its own local view from primary records. Records are grouped based
on their distance from the receiving vehicle. First each data record is compressed
using differential encoding. Second, an aggregated cluster record is built which
is the concatenation of compact data records (syntactic aggregation). The signa-
ture is calculated by the aggregating vehicle over all fields of the aggregated frame
except the certificate which is signed by the CA and the sender’s location that
represents the last location of the last vehicle that broadcasted the record.
The authors in [79] argue against fixed segmentation of roads because it con-
tradicts the real situation. They propose a completely structure-free aggregation
mechanism, which enables to aggregate data purely based on their correlation. On
a conceptual level, all aggregation systems have the following basic components:
• Decision criteria: decide if two pieces of information are similar enough to
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be aggregated.
• Information fusion: once the decision to aggregate two data items has been
reached, a defined method is require to combine them.
• Dissemination mechanism: having aggregated to data items, the new infor-
mation is only available to the aggregator. Thus, the node needs to dissem-
inate the new data into the network.
The authors propose a fuzzy logic scheme to be used for the decision criteria, which
allows a dynamic fragmentation of the road. First, all influences on the aggregation
decision, i.e. location difference of two aggregates or a maximum standard tolerable
deviation of the average speed values, are fuzzyfied by applying fuzzy set theory.
Then, they use fuzzy logic operations to reason about the influences and reach a
decision.
In [76], the authors present a syntactic SDA scheme. The mechanism chooses a
subset of all atomic primary reports to generate an aggregate report. The authors
employ a list of criteria to selectively choose which primary reports contribute
to the aggregate report. The criteria includes the identification of those primary
reports that led to an aggregate current maximum and minimum in time and
space, defining a specific location area. The scheme is a cluster-based mechanism
where the cluster borders are defined by the location of a subset of primary reports
and those reports corresponding to vehicles inside the borders of the area will be
selected to produce an evenly distribution that represents the whole area.
In [80], the authors introduce the concept of soft-state sketches for proba-
bilistic hierarchical data aggregation, which derive from Flajolet-Martin sketches
(FM sketches) defined in [81]. A FM sketch is a data structure for probabilistic
counting of distinct elements. It represents an approximation of a positive integer
by a bit field S = s1, ..., sw of length w ≥ 1. The bit field is initialized to zero
at all positions. To add an element x to the sketch (an observation), it is hashed
by a hash function h with geometrically distributed positive integer output, where
P (h(x) = i) = 2−i. The entry sh(x) is then set to one. In soft-state sketches, the
authors use small counters of n bits instead of single bits at each index position.
These counters represent a time to live (TTL) for a certain bit. Therefore, the
operation of setting a bit to one after an observation is replaced by setting the cor-
responding counter to the maximum TTL. An approximation C(S) of the number
of distinct elements added to the sketch can be obtained from the length of the
initial, uninterrupted sequence of ones, given by
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Z(S) := min(i ∈ N0|i < w ∧ si+1 = 0 ∪ {w}) (2.10)
by calculating
C(S1, ..., Sm) := m ·
2
∑m





with ϕ ≈ 0.77351, K ≈ 1,75 and using m sketches.
Locally stored sketches are periodically broadcasted to the vehicle’s one-hop
neighbors, which upon reception merges them with its own. For example, consider
an application where the number of free parking spots on a road segment is dis-
seminated in the network. Two cars, A and B, make independent observations on
the same road segment (with ID 7). A observes four free parking places and thus
hashes the tuples (7,1), ..., (7,4) into its sketch for road 7. B observes five free
parking places, and consequently adds (7,1), ..., (7,5). If A and B meet they will
exchange sketches, as depicted in Fig. 2.8 and perform a position-wise maximum
operation. Previously inserted elements die out after their TTL has expired, unless
they are refreshed by a newer observation.
Figure 2.8: Aggregation of soft-state sketches
2.4 Information Dissemination Techniques
This thesis introduces an information dissemination technique, which to the best
of our knowledge is the first one to build a reputation scheme using user signatures
to distribute Points of Interest (POIs) information in a VANET.
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Nevertheless, there are other works that consider the distribution of content in
VANETs. For instance, in [82] the authors describe a protocol for the distribution
of advertisements. They propose a virtual cash scheme where the following actors
are involved:
• CA: every vehicle is loaded with a pair of keys (public and private) issued
by a CA and with the CA’s public key.
• Vehicular Authority: entity that approves every advertisement to be loaded
in an Ad Distribution Point.
• Ad Distribution Point: broadcasts advertisements to the vehicles passing by.
• Virtual Cashiers: users are rewarded with virtual cash for forwarding adver-
tisements. They sign each other receipts to prove the message forwarding.
Later on, that cash can be exchanged for other services at the Cashiers.
• RSUs: provide a link to the CA for keys revocation purposes.
In [83] the authors present Roadcast, a popularity aware P2P content sharing
scheme. Their technique relies on the idea that by ensuring that popular data is
widely shared with other vehicles the overall query delay can be improved. If users
request popular data, which is densely disseminated in the network, their queries
can be answered in much shorter time than a request for rare data, because the
chance of meeting another vehicle with that particular piece of information is much
higher. In the opportunistic and unreliable VANET, the authors expect users to
be more willing to receive data which approximately matches their request with a
short delay than waiting for a longer time to receive exactly what they requested.
Thus the need to forward the popular information with higher priority.
Chains of Trust distinguishes itself from the other solutions presented in this
section by using broadcast in a completely ad-hoc network as a mean of infor-
mation dissemination, by not using a CA and therefore not having to deal with
the distribution of CRLs and by performing data aggregation through the use of
concatenated signatures.
2.5 Reputation Systems
In this section we intend to analyze the current state of the art in reputation
systems and point out the different schemes benefits and drawbacks.
2.5. REPUTATION SYSTEMS 37
The authors in [30] propose a reputation system to manage traffic warning
events while preventing the spread of false messages. In their proposal, users/ve-
hicles are divided into different categories according to their proximity to a traffic
event and play different roles: (i) Event Reporter (ER) is the vehicle that witnesses
an event, (ii) Event Observer (EO) is any node within one hop distance of an ER
and (iii) Event Participant (EP) is any node beyond the one hop distance from
the ER. Whenever an ER witnesses an event he assigns a local trust to it based on
the information gathered by the vehicle’s sensors. If that value is greater than a
certain threshold then he transmits that information to all neighbors in one hop
(EOs). When an EO receives a traffic event from an ER he stores it and observes
the behavior of the ER. If the ER’s behavior matches a model related to the traffic
event reported the EO sends this message withing a certain ∆T time, which is
enough for him to receive information from other EOs and EPs. At the end of the
process every event is assigned a global trust based on the ER’s behavior and on
the global trust information sent by other nodes weighted by their role in the event.
It should be noted that EPs will base their global trust solely on the information
gathered from EOs and other EPs since they cannot directly observe ER.
The authors, however, do not take security into account. In their simulation
scenario they consider a single vehicle forwarding false messages, which is not
realistic since an attacker could easily report the same false event several times
with different identities and successfully spread false messages. In addition, their
system considers events reputation but not ER’s; every role has a fixed reputation
or weight assigned to it, which is what is taken into consideration when computing
the event’s global trust. As a result, there is no way to decrease the trust deserved
by an ER who always reports false events.
Similarly, the authors in [84] introduce a scheme to report traffic events in
VANETs that respects user privacy by using groups and offers security through
trust and reputation. Their idea is to use group membership to provide individual
users with privacy outside of the group while the Group Manager (GM) is respon-
sible for adding new vehicles and evicting attackers or misbehaving members. A
GM is identified by a certificate issued by a CA. Every group has a reputation (as
a whole) in the network and every user contributes to it by sending group messages
reporting traffic events. The GM has to be able to identify the real identity of
the sender of a group message in order to protect the group’s reputation against
repudiation attacks. The regular flow of events is as follows:
1. Users periodically exchange messages with information of the state of the
road.
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2. Each receiver verifies that the message has a valid signature from the sender’s
group.
3. Each receiver computes how much he can trust the message based on the
group’s reputation and act accordingly, i.e., if he receives a trusted traffic
jam alert he will take another route.
4. After taking a decision, the receiver vehicle may be able to know the real
state of the road through direct observation. In that case he will update
his level of trust on the group or groups that sent him information about
this event. False messages are collected and eventually reported to the CA,
which forwards them to the responsible GM to take appropriate measures.
Even if the authors do not mention it in their article, we believe that users
require access to the CA every time they receive a group message because if a GM
is revoked they need to be able to check if his identity is in the Revocation List (RL).
In addition, the authors do not mention any mechanism for the group members
to see if their GM is misbehaving by not evicting misbehaving nodes. We believe
a lot of trust is placed on GMs, which could disclose the group member’s identity
to third-parties. Moreover, in the event of a traffic jam, only those vehicles which
do not heed the warning and have the opportunity to make a direct observation
will know the truth. If all users believed an attacker’s warning he would be able
to completely redirect the traffic on a road and he would not be punished because
no other vehicles would be able to directly observe the event. Finally, it should be
noted that there is no security mechanism to prevent a user A from lying about an
event reported by another user B, which would make B’s group manager punish
B.
In [31], the authors propose a general information scheme (not necessarily
directed towards traffic events) where every user is not only responsible for the
events that he reports but also for the information that he forwards. In this
scheme every vehicle is uniquely identified through the use of cryptographically
self-generated addresses [85] and the authors assume that their scheme is immune
to Sybil attacks. Information can be sent by anchored sources (trusted by default)
and by mobile devices (whose level of trust is determined by a reputation system).
Mobile devices are accountable for verifying data before propagating it. Therefore,
whenever a user receives a message or segment he checks if it was originated at
one of his trusted sources, if so that information is automatically trusted. If
the segment is received from a source classified as malicious (by reputation) it is
immediately discarded. Every time a segment from an unknown source is received
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a verification session starts. If the number of received segments from unknown
nodes reporting the same event reaches a threshold value all reporting nodes are
promoted to trusted. Similarly, if an unknown user reports the same event than a
trusted user, he becomes trusted as well.
We believe that this scheme fails to protect the users’ privacy since they always
use the same identity (an attacker could easily profile their routes). The authors
do not take into consideration that even a trusted originator of an event may be
interested in spreading false information at some point. In addition, their proposal
heavily relies on anchored resources that only distribute reliable information, which
may not be realistic. Finally, the idea of only forwarding information after it has
been verified is not without its risks considering the ephemeral nature of a VANET.
The authors in [32] present another solution to distribute safety related infor-
mation by broadcasting events (traffic jams, accidents and vehicles braking) which
uses a reputation system to detect and isolate malicious nodes. Their algorithm
is divided into the following phases:
1. Neighbor discovery: whenever a node S needs to forward an event received
from one of its neighbors, it sends a neighbor discovery request to which
its surrounding nodes reply with their identities. Each of the receivers R
of that discovery request will check in its trusted nodes table if it trusts
S and respond to the discovery request only if it does. If the identity of
S is unknown to R then R adds S to its trusted nodes table with a trust
level (MAX TRUST −MIN TRUST )/2. Similarly, when S receives the
discovery responses it will update its trusted nodes table following the same
criteria.
2. Data dispatching: once a node has discovered its neighbors it broadcasts the
event information.
3. Decision making and trust updating: packets reporting events beyond a cer-
tain distance d are discarded (far away events are considered irrelevant). The
next step is to see if the node itself is in the detection range of the event: if it
is, the node will be able to judge if this event is true or false and update his
trust on the reporting node accordingly; if it is not in range, it collects infor-
mation from other neighbors for a time t and only if the number of reporters
exceeds a certain threshold the event is considered true (either way, after t
expires the level of trust on the reporters will be updated accordingly).
4. Neighbor monitoring: the authors assume that a genuine packet will always
be broadcast, whereas false information will be unicast towards a certain
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node. Based on that, nodes should monitor the network observing its neigh-
bors behavior.
The authors are not clear on whether they use Public Key Infrastructure with a
CA. If they assign to unknown nodes levels of trust greater than what misbehaving
nodes have, it will always be easy for attackers to change their identity once they
are discovered. A CA would be able to prevent that by linking the identity if the
vehicle’s license plate, for example. However, if they use a CA vehicles need to be
in permanent connection with it to receive updates on the CRL, which requires
a heavy road-side infrastructure. In addition, using always the same identity
introduces a tracking vulnerability for the users.
In [33] the authors present a scheme to distribute traffic events information.
They define a two tier approach: vehicle sensors first have to detect an event a
certain number of times TS before reporting it to the driver and if they have not
detected the event for themselves, they need to receive the event warning from TV
vehicles before trusting it. Every time an event is detected TS times a message
including how many times the vehicle’s sensors have detected the event and the
identity of vehicles detecting it is send to the vehicle’s neighbors. The receiving
nodes will use this value and the number of vehicles that detected the event to
determine if it is true or not.
We believe that the major problem with this scheme is that it does not address
security at all. The authors do not consider the possibility of misbehaving nodes
(intentionally or just due to the usual degradation of components). In addition,
this solution is an event reputation system, but not a user reputation system, which
means that the system has no memory over previous events recommended by a
certain user and therefore all users can be equally trusted, which is a unrealistic
assumption.
[86] presents a solution to manage a reputation system in the early stages
of VANETs. The authors consider a scenario where the density of smart vehicles
equipped with wireless communications is too low to allow for V2V communication.
As a result, their scheme relies on the distribution of RSUs to handle the reputation
scheme. Ideally, vehicles will always follow the same route (to work places, schools,
superstores, etc.) and therefore be periodically in contact with the same RSUs.
Depending on the desired deployment cost, the authors distinguish between two
different designs:
• Isolated RSUs: if RSUs are not directly connected to each other, they need
smart vehicles to forward their messages. This format of communication
is called Delay Tolerant Network (DTN) [87]. In a nutshell, every vehicle
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is assigned an Agent RSU which keeps track of its reputation and provides
the vehicle with a certificate with its updated reputation. The other RSUs
will monitor the vehicle behavior, i.e., forwards messages between RSUs,
correctly reports traffic accidents to the RSUs, etc. Each RSU will use smart
vehicles to forward this information to the vehicle’s Agent RSU so that it
can update the vehicle’s reputation.
• Internet-accessible RSUs: in this scenario there is no need to distinguish
between the Agent RSU and the others. Since they are all communicated, a
vehicle can obtain its reputation update from any of them.
The authors also take into account the possibility that a user might take a different
route which does not pass by any of his usual RSUs, e.g., he goes to work from
Monday to Friday but Saturday and Sunday he drives to a different location.
The solution they propose is to increment the validity period of the reputation
certificate, so that on Friday the user receives a certificate valid until Monday.
We believe this is an interesting approach to the initial stage of a VANET.
However, there are several drawbacks. For instance, road condition alerts will not
be delivered immediately upon detection because there is no V2V communication.
Secondly, the authors consider a scenario where a user takes an alternative route,
although they need to plan ahead so that the RSU can give him an extended
reputation certificate. In our opinion, this is not realistic since people are only
predictable up to a certain point. Finally, the Internet-accessible RSUs model
brings out the problem of having a network of connected devices which register
every move made by every user, which poses a threat to user privacy.
2.6 Vehicular Traffic Simulators
The main goal of these simulators is to generate a trace which accurately portrays
how vehicles behave on the road.
The Multi-agent Microscopic Traffic Simulator (MMTS) developed at ETH
Zurich [88] is capable of simulating public and private traffic over real regional road
maps of Switzerland with a high level of realism2. MMTS models the behavior
of people living in the area, reproducing their movement (using vehicles) within
a period of 24 hours. The decision of each individual depends on the area it
lives in. The individuals in the simulation are distributed over the cities and
villages according to statistical data gathered by a census. Within the 24 hours of
simulation, all individuals choose a time to travel and the mean of transportation
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according to their needs and environment. For example, one person may take a
car early in the morning to go to work while another goes shopping using public
transportation in the afternoon.
The street network that is used in MMTS was originally developed for the
Swiss regional planning authority. The major attributes of each road segment are
type, length, speed, and capacity. The simulation’s result is a 24 hour detailed
car traffic trace with almost 260.000 vehicles involved, with more than 25.000.000
recorded vehicles direction/speed changes in an area of around 250 km x 260 km.
Simulation of Urban Mobility (SUMO) [89, 90], is another example of micro-
scopic traffic simulation. It simulates how a given traffic demand which consists
of single vehicles moves through a given road network. The simulation allows to
address a large set of traffic management topics. It is purely microscopic: each
vehicle is modeled explicitly, has its own route, and moves individually through
the network. It should also be noted that it can extract road topologies from maps
obtained from the TIGER database [91, 29].
In VanetMobiSim [92] the authors take into consideration multiple factors to
produce detailed vehicular movement traces, e.g., obstacles, vehicles character-
istics, human driving patterns, intersection management, etc. According to the
authors, VanetMobiSim combines a macroscopic and microscopic approach to pro-
duce more realistic results. It should also be noted that, like SUMO, it can extract
road topologies from maps obtained from the TIGER database. The authors in-
clude as well some interesting results regarding the execution time on a an average
computer (Intel Core2 Duo at 2.2 GHz with 2 GB of RAM). VanetMobiSim can
simulate 5.000 vehicles in a 2 km x 2 km area in over 30 minutes.
For poiSim it was decided to use the MMTS traces, mainly because they contain
24 hours of over 260.000 vehicles moving over a realistic map of Switzerland and
because they are publicly available for download.
2.7 Network Simulators
The authors of [93] divide network simulators between commercial-based and open
source. In the first group we may find OPNET, QualNet [94, 95] and OMNet++
[96, 97]. They all contain a large number of network protocols for wired and
wireless networks.
In the second group we may find ns-2, its evolution ns-3 [98] and GloMoSim
as the most representative network simulators. ns-2 and ns-3 are discrete event
2Vehicular traces are publicly available from http://www.lst.inf.ethz.ch/research/ad-hoc
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simulators targeted at networking research, which provide substantial support for
simulation of TCP, routing and multicast protocols over wired and wireless (local
and satellite) networks. ns-3 is more efficient than ns-2 and offers new features
to help program simulations, although there is still an ongoing effort to port all
protocols supported by ns-2. GloMoSim has basically the same functionality as
ns-2, although it simulates fewer protocols due to the smaller GloMoSim support
community.
It should be noted that, to the best of our knowledge, none of these simulators
are able to handle simulations in the order of hundreds of thousands of nodes, and
therefore process the MMTS traces. In [88] the authors are aware of this limitation
and select smaller regions from the trace to run their simulations with ns-2. That
is precisely why we were inclined to design our own simulation tool, so that we
were able to process the entire trace.
2.8 Visual Light Communication
One of the goals of this thesis is to study how Visual Light Communication (VLC)
would impact VANETs. For that reason we first need to give a brief introduction.
The predecessor of modern VLC was the photophone invented by Alexander
Graham Bell and Charles Sumner Tainter [99]. The device consisted of a transmit-
ter which modulated a light beam with a person’s voice and a parabolic receiver
on the other end which converted the light back into sound. The transmitter used
a mirror which vibrated with voice, thus alternating between convex and concave
forms and dispersing and focusing the light. The receiver had selenium cells at
its focal point, which made possible to convert the light back into voice due to
its photovoltaic properties (its electrical resistance is higher when in the dark and
lower when exposed to light). The invention was successfully tested over a distance
of approximately 213m using plain sunlight as their light source.
VLC uses visible light, with a wavelength between ∼400nm (750THz) and
∼700nm (428THz), to transmit information. It is based on the usage of a white
LED emitter and a photodiode as a receiver.
The authors in [16], classify white LEDs into two types: (i) devices that use
separate red-green-blue (RGB) emitters and (ii) blue emitters used in combination
with a phosphor that emits yellow light. The former has a greater bandwidth while
the latter has lower complexity.
As far as data rate is concerned, in [16] the authors present their results building
a VLC link between an emitter and a receiver using a pre-equalized 45MHz band-
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width white LED, reaching a speed of 80Mbps with On-Off Keying Nonreturn-
to-zero (NRZ-OOK) over a link of 10cm (a distance which could be extended by
using an array of transmitters, according to the authors). Similarly, in [15] the
authors present their experiment using post-equalization, which reaches 100Mbps
over a 10cm link, although the range could also be extended by using an array of
transmitters.
The Visible Light Communications Consortium shows in [100] a wide variety
of applications for VLC:
• a prototype which transmits sounds through RGB lights, where each RGB
light has the sound of a different instrument: guitar, keyboard, etc.
• usage in restricted areas like aircrafts and hospitals.
• in a supermarket, product information could be acquired by the visible light
receiver installed on the shopping cart
• indoor navigation systems
• wireless LANs
As the technology matures it will be possible to extend optical wireless networks
to the outdoors. For instance, in [101, 102, 103, 104] the authors use lasers to
transmit information and, in particular, to solve a problem commonly referred to as
the first/last mile problem [101, 104]. In the early days of optical fiber deployment,
the fiber connected a telecommunication company’s different switching stations
while consumers connected to those stations through twisted-pair wiring, which in
effect limited the network access rates. Optical wireless proposed to bridge this
gap and connect consumers directly to their closest switching station with a laser
link, thus improving data rates and minimizing deployment costs.
In our view, in the next decade we will see vehicles transmitting information
with their headlights or receiving information from traffic signs, as envisioned
in [100, 105, 106]. However, there are several aspects that need to be addressed
first, like the low transmission speed over a long link (speed rapidly decreases as the
distance increases, from 100Mbps in a 2 meters link to 115Kbps for approximately 5
meters [100]) and how to transmit in movement. In addition, in order to succeed in
the open air it must overcome the interferences caused by meteorological conditions
(e.g., fog, rain, etc.).
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On the plus side, VLC has important advantages over radio communications
such as: practically unlimited bandwidth (unlike the hyper-regulated radio spec-
trum), a relatively low power consumption and resilience against jamming and
DoS attacks.
2.9 Conclusions
Three main techniques for achieving privacy have been discussed in this section:
anonymous certificates, group signatures and pseudonyms/pseudonymous certifi-
cates. All of these techniques have been widely studied throughout the literature
and from our point of view are mature enough. The use of these techniques (or
a combination of them, as we have seen) in VANETs is generally justified by the
fact that they contribute to the users’ privacy. However, by taking a closer look
at the methods described in this section we realize that in order to keep the users’
identity traceable under some circumstances those methods need PKI. Therefore,
the need for revoking certificates and managing large CRLs. It has been shown
that applications may face that particular problem in different ways. Some may
appoint certain nodes as message verifiers and they will be the only ones working
with CRLs. In the global picture, that could give the impression of efficiency (since
the amount of nodes repeating work decreases) although that is certainly not a
good idea for safety message applications because most of the network works blind-
folded. On the other hand, some other schemes may apply techniques to compress
the CRLs like Bloom filters or to directly reduce the amount of certificates that
need to be revoked, and thus included in the CRL. We believe extensive effort
will be dedicated to reduce the CRL size as done in [47, 46] and to study the most
efficient ways to distribute it ([48]).
Special mention deserves the work of [49] for considering the effectiveness of
pseudonyms change. Privacy is a major concern in VANETs security, and so far
the use of pseudonyms seemed to be a perfect solution for the traceability problem.
We believe that extensive research should be performed to verify if the authors
claim of complete traceability holds for equipment rates higher than 20%.
Several of the articles covered in this background section introduce schemes
designed to evict nodes from a VANET while there is no direct connection to the
CA, problem that could be easily solved using cellular technologies to establish
that link (as described in section 1). As seen in [67, 64, 68], roadside infrastruc-
ture and enhancing the vehicles sensing capabilities are valuable assets to verify
other vehicle’s messages and prevent Sybil attacks. In our view, preventing mul-
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tiple identity attacks is of paramount importance to protect the honest majority
hypothesis on which so many protocols rely. However, we foresee that approaches
following [68] will be very seldom used since the generation of models of expected
sensed behaviors for each of the possible alerts with a reasonably low rate of false
positives seems to be a daunting task if feasible at all.
As far as information aggregation is concerned, in our view it is a process of
paramount importance in VANETs. Hundreds of vehicles transmitting information
and relaying that very same information to other vehicles next to them in a multi-
hop network. Besides, considering the number of samples a vehicle takes every
minute is enough to make us realize of the large traffic load involved in VANET
applications (particularly in safety messaging). Therefore, if there is any way to
decrease the network traffic load it should be exploited.
We find particularly relevant the contribution of [75] where the authors give an
analytical measure of scalable data aggregation schemes. We also consider intel-
ligent delay control policies a field were extensive research needs to be performed,
since they can help optimize the use of the wireless medium.
SDA schemes are defined according to whether the aggregation is syntactic or
semantic and thus the proposed schemes are bounded on what kind of aggregation
is performed. Furthermore, most of the schemes are bounded on whether the
aggregation is performed in fixed or dynamic areas and who is the node that
aggregates the information. A general framework for both semantic and syntactic
aggregation would facilitate the definition of SDA for any kind of application
and network topology. In this direction, papers [7] and [76] are the ones that
contribute to more general specifications.
Some SDAs make use of TPDs, such as [7], and the whole aggregation process
depends on their correct behavior. As already discussed in this section, Tamper
Proof Devices are not always as tamper proof as they should be. Therefore, we
consider protocols that place their security on TPDs to be inherently flawed.
Moving on to the reviewed information distribution schemes, they were re-
viewed as a representative sample of information distribution applications. Most
content distribution applications rely on a heavy roadside infrastructure to handle
CRLs and access to the network information, which may not be realistic during
VANETs deployment and early stages.
As far as reputation systems are concerned, the presented solutions suffer from
the following drawbacks: [30] fails to take security into account, [84] relies heavily
on the CA and on the group manager, [31, 32] do not take into consideration users’
privacy and [86] makes users request their certificates when they are planning their
trips, which is inflexible.
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Regarding network simulators, as already mentioned in section 2.7 none of
the reviewed simulators are able to handle simulations in the order of a hundred
thousand nodes. Together with the need of a realistic network simulation, these
were the main motivations to design our own simulation tool in combination with
the MMTS vehicular traffic traces.
Finally, VLC is an emerging research topic and promising results have already
been shown in [100, 15]. Once data rates increase for long links (∼ 5 meters) the
potential of this technology will be fully exploited and VANETs will be resilient
to jamming and DoS attacks.
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Chapter 3
Chains of Trust: a Points of
Interest Dissemination Strategy
Now that the background on security and reputation systems has been provided,
we can introduce Chains of Trust, a reputation system that distributes Point of
Interest (POI) information while preserving user privacy.
3.1 Scheme Overview
In the reputation system, every vehicle needs to store information about other
vehicles and POIs (whether received from other users or reviewed by himself).
Every node in the network shall store:
• POI chains: they are a series of reviews of the same POI from different users.
As depicted in Fig.3.1 POI chains can be divided in:
(a) Unverified POI chains organization (b) Verified POI chains organization
Figure 3.1: POI chains organization.
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– Unverified POI chains: they contain POI reviews that the user has
received from other users but which he has not yet been able to verify
(by visiting and rating the POI himself), e.g., a traffic jam alert or the
review of a new restaurant. Every unverified chain is rated based on the
level of trust the user has in the known reviewers in the chain. When
a user queries his vehicle, the POIs information is displayed ordered by
that rate as defined in section 3.2.1.
– Verified POI chains: once the user has a chance to check if there really is
a traffic jam or how good that restaurant is, he evaluates the reviewers
in the unverified chain and updates his level of trust in them depending
on how truthful they were and marks the chain as verified. Verified
chains are an essential part of the exchange of information between
users, as will be explained in section 3.4.
• Trust levels in other users (per category): every node needs to remember
how much he trusts other users based on the verification of previous reviews.
Besides, nodes not only share information about POIs, but also information
about other nodes. For those recommended nodes several other properties
will have to be stored, as will be detailed in section 3.3.
• Information about the latest messages from every user, both about POIs
and nodes, should be stored for misbehavior detection, e.g., if the user is in
a misbehaving strike. Further details will be given in section 3.6.
Since there is no Certification Authority (CA), every user or vehicle will create
its own pair of public and private keys (of length L) and will be responsible for its
securing. Notice that Kpub is the user identifier, therefore L should be long enough
to ensure the statistical uniqueness of identities. That is why the scheme uses RSA
with 1024 bits long keys. The private key will be used to sign information about
POIs and about the levels of trust that a particular vehicle has in the others, while
the public key will be attached to that information so that the rest of the network
can verify the signatures correctness. For instance, consider the scenario depicted
in Fig. 3.2. Imagine that a user U1 goes to a restaurant A and he likes it. U1
will broadcast a message to the other users in the network saying that restaurant
A deserves a certain rate χ, signed with his Kpriv and attaching his Kpub. All
the other nodes that successfully receive the message store the unverified chain
for future reference. When another user U2 queries his own vehicle for a place to
have lunch the vehicle returns a list of places recommended by other users (among
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(a) U1 reviews Mike’s Dinner and broadcasts the
message.
(b) U2 queries his vehicle for a
restaurant.
(c) U2 follows U1 recommendation, adds his own opin-
ion to the chain and updates his level of trust in U1
according to how similar both reviews were.
Figure 3.2: General behavior of the Chains of Trust protocol.
which is U1’s recommendation). If U2 decides to go to A he will afterwards input
his review into the system and if he liked it as much as U1 his level of trust in
U1 will increase, or decrease otherwise. Regardless of how much he coincided
with U1’s opinion, U2 will append his signed review to the original, together with
his Kpub, and broadcast the message. In this way, every time a user follows and
verifies a recommendation he can update his level of trust in n other nodes (where
n is the length of the chain of signatures), thus increasing the speed at which the
reputation system develops.
In order to foster the development of Chains of Trust at an early stage vehicles
could be pre-loaded with a set of POIs at the same time the application is being
installed. In this way, users could benefit from the application since the very
beginning, even compensating for a low initial adoption rate. In addition, those
pre-loaded POIs could help users moving through a new area where they do not
know anybody else, as will be described in section 3.5.
As mentioned above, this technique does not require a CA, or any road side
infrastructure for that matter, since the network is completely ad-hoc and there is
no certificate revocation process to manage. Every user generates his own pair of
keys (the public key being his identity) and begins to play a part in the network
by signing information. In the beginning, his identity is unknown to the rest of the
users, therefore, he has to gain the others trust by telling the truth. That is how
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the scheme protects itself against misbehaving. If an attacker misbehaves from
the start he will not be able to inflict any real damage since all the nodes join the
system with the lowest level of trust, and his reviews will be mostly unnoticed. If
he tries to gain some credit and then misbehaves the Rewards and Penalties system
will recognize a misbehaving strike and punish it. Although nothing prevents the
attacker from creating a new identity he will not gain anything from it, since any
new identity has no credit on the network. It should be noted that the level of trust
of one user in another will decrease if the second either lies to him by misbehaving
or if he rates a POI significantly different than the first would. Therefore, the
terms lies and disagreements shall be used indistinctively throughout the thesis.
More details on misbehavior can be found in section 3.7.
As far as the application’s platform is concerned, we would like to elaborate
on why Chains of Trust is specifically a Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs)
application and not appropriate for other mobile platforms, e.g., smartphones,
PDAs, etc.. For starters, vehicles provide enough energy for the required periodic
exchange information and for a fast enough processor to handle RSA encryption
and decryption operations. Secondly, a larger amount of memory could be in-
stalled in order to store more data about the vehicles in the user’s Web of Trust.
Finally, vehicles allow for the installation of antennas with better gain, improving
message reception and giving us the possibility to extend the transmission range.
In addition, we believe that an application specifically conceived for smartphones
would require a completely different solution. With 3g network access, users could
connect to a remote server only when they needed to query for a POI category or
submit their own POI reviews, which would mean that this remote server should
have enough resources to store all the users’ information. In addition, a CA would
need to issue and distribute certificates to allow users to securely authenticate
with the server. This a completely different scenario from our ad-hoc network
proposal, which requires no infrastructure (remote server or CA) and where the
system knowledge is distributed among its users.
3.2 POI Categories and Records
Several POI categories shall be considered, and a different level of trust for each
category for each user shall be kept by each vehicle, i.e., a user may be a good
hotel reviewer and a terrible restaurant critic. The following is an example list of
what may be considered a POI category:
• Traffic conditions








For each category a validity period is defined, e.g., a hotel review may be valid
for months whereas a traffic jam alert may expire within hours or even minutes.
That validity period is necessary to prevent unfair punishments. For instance, if a
user identifies a traffic jam and sends a message alerting the network and several
hours later another vehicle passes by and sees no trace of it he should not decrease
his level of trust in all the users who signed the alert message.
Before POIs can be reviewed we first need to give them a unique identifier
consisting of common knowledge information:
Id = {Category||POI Name||Postal Address||GPSCoords} (3.1)
The Postal Address and the GPS Coordinates fields complement each other,
since it is difficult to give the postal address of a traffic jam or the GPS coordinates
of a restaurant (unless you position your vehicle right at the door). It should be
noted that the GPS coordinates will admit a certain margin of error due to the
devices positioning error.
Whenever a user wants to review a POI, he will assign a rate to it and assemble
a record R with the following information:
R = {Id||Rate||T imestamp} (3.2)
Each record has a timestamp so that users are able to keep track of the the validity
period per category. In addition, it could also be used to remove old entries from
the trusted nodes table.
Once the record has been prepared, the sender needs to sign it (by encrypting
the record’s hash with his private key) and attach his public key to it. At some
point in the future the vehicle will broadcast M.
M = {R1||{H(R1)}KprivA ||KpubA} (3.3)
54 CHAPTER 3. CHAINS OF TRUST
Afterwards, when a vehicle receives a message it stores it for future use. When
a user queries his vehicle for a recommendation on a POI category in a certain
area the system answers with a list of received POIs, the ordering of which follows
the criteria defined in section 3.2.1. If the user follows the recommendation he
will be able to write another review about the recommended POI. The idea is to
keep the previous reviews and attach the latest to the group, thus forming a chain
of signatures that grows until a parameter n. By keeping a chain of size n every
time that a user follows a recommendation he will be able to update his level of
trust in n other users. It should be noted that the new added records are a slightly
modified version of the first because they contain the hash of the original POI Id,
instead of the complete identifier.
R′ = {H(Id)||Rate||T imestamp} (3.4)
The Id field (or its hash to be more precise) needs to be included in each of
the added records to prevent a security vulnerability. Imagine that the messages
were shortened by removing the Id to decrease the transmission time and to save
storage space in the vehicles. Then, only the first record of the chain would be
bound to the POI. As a result, it would suffice for a misbehaving node to replace
that first record with another POI Id and broadcast that message over the network
to ruin the reputation of the other signers. A good alternative would be to use
Onion Signatures (as described in [8]) to preserve the message integrity every time
a new record is added. However, Onion Signatures do not take into account that
a message cannot grow indefinitely and at some point new records will replace old
ones which deems this scheme unfeasible since in order to preserve its integrity not
a single bit of information can be discarded.
A message containing a chain of length 2 is of the form:
M = {R1||{H(R1)}KprivA ||{R
′
2}KprivB ||KpubA||KpubB} (3.5)
It should be noted that the added records are not hashed and then signed,
but directly encrypted with the user’s private key. Since R′ includes the hash
of the POI identifier, it already is a short message. Therefore, the use of digital
signatures on it would make the hash function redundant.
3.2.1 POI Chains Grading
When a user Q queries his vehicle for a certain POI in its vicinity, the system needs
to display all received recommendations following a certain order. In the case of
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verified chains that order is determined by the rate the user assigned to a POI the
last time he was there. In the case of unverified chains the order is defined by the
trusted (and in some cases by the most trusted) nodes in the chain. Let us define
n as the number of reviews in a certain chain POI1, U1, ..., Un as the users whose
POI reviews are in the chain and Û1, ..., Ûn as the subset of those nodes known by
the user Q, χPOI1,U1 as the rate that U1 gave to POI1 and λÛi as the level of trust






















It should be noted that the rates assigned by unknown nodes are ignored as
long as there is a known reviewer in the chain. Otherwise, the chain’s rate is the
arithmetic mean of the POI rates assigned by the unknown reviewers. Similarly,
the reviews of the less trusted known nodes are ignored when there is a known
node that belongs to the group of Q’s k most trusted nodes. In order to prevent
misbehavior only Q’s most trusted users, i.e., the ones on the first k positions
of the list, are considered for grading the chain. Otherwise, an attacker could
create multiple low trusted identities and reduce the weight of legitimate reviews
in Eq. 5.1 to obtain his desired result. By prioritizing the opinions of a small group
of reviewers over the rest an attacker will first need to gain enough trust to belong
into that group and once he starts misbehaving he will rapidly lose his influence,
as described in section 3.6.
If k is too small some good and trustable reviewers’ opinion will never reach
the top of the list, and therefore their opinion will not count as much as it should
(according to their good behavior). However, if k is too large an attacker could
easily gain access to the top k reviewers group and start misbehaving. The idea
behind Alg. 1 is to start with a low value and build-up. If the top k reviewers as a
group gain more trust as the user reviews POIs the group can be expanded, which
means more reliable information, and the user can prioritize their opinions over
the rest of his trusted nodes. Otherwise, if one of the top k reviewers misbehaves
then his own reputation will suffer, as described in section 3.6, and k will decrease
to expel the misbehaving node and minimize the impact of his future reviews.
As a result, when a user queries his vehicle, the system replies with a series of
recommendations starting with verified chains, followed by unverified chains with
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Algorithm 1 How k is computed
//initial value
k := 1;
//every time a POI is reviewed by a user
for every POIReview
//compute the mean of the level of trust of the k most trusted users
previousMean := computeMean(trustedNodesList, k)
//process the POI review, update level of trust in other users or create a new
chain if this is a
//POI new
processPOIReview(POIReview, trustedNodesList, k)
//compute the mean of the level of trust of the new k most trusted users
currentMean := computeMean(trustedNodesList, k)
if currentMean > previousMean
//the user’s trust in the reviewers of the last POI has increased, therefore,
his list of k most
//trusted users can expand
k := k + 1
else if currentMean < previousMean
//one of the reviewers in the k-top has disagreed with the user, k needs to
be decreased to
//prevent misbehavior
k := k − 1
end if
end for
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Figure 3.3: User Q chains grading process.
reviews by its k most trusted reviewers, followed by unverified chains with the rest
of trusted reviewers and closing with unverified chains with unknown reviewers.
The chain’s rate establishes its position within its category. For example, Fig. 3.3
depicts the grading process of several chains by user Q and the order in which they
are presented to the user: POI2 (verified chain), POI4, POI1 (unverified chains
with the most trusted known reviewers), POI5 (unverified chain with the rest of
known reviewers) and POI6, POI3 (unverified chains without known reviewers).
3.3 Nodes and Records
The use of user chains has to be carefully crafted in order to avoid abuse and
misbehavior. Users in the network play two different roles: POI reviewers and
other users reviewers. As POI reviewers, every vehicle has to store his level of trust
in the other known users. As node reviewers, every vehicle needs to keep track of
the nodes every other node recommends to him and their levels of trust as POI
reviewer, because they impact on the level of trust the recommender deserves in
that role. If a recommended node misbehaves (as POI reviewer) its recommender’s
reputation (as recommender) will suffer, or improve otherwise.
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3.4 The Information Exchange
The application is designed to disseminate information about POIs among the
vehicles in the network, thus the need for that information to flow from one vehicle
to another. On one side there are POI chains (both verified and unverified) which
represent the new information that comes into the system in the form of reviews
of new POIs plus the re-evaluation of the already known. On the other, there are
user chains, which are lists of known nodes and their level of trust. Basically, once
two nodes know each other, besides exchanging information about POIs, they can
exchange information about other users, thus increasing the speed with which the
Web of Trust develops. The ideal way to exchange information would be for a
user to issue a request for information on a certain category and its surrounding
vehicles to answer it. However, it is not unusual that after having spent some
time in a platoon formation a vehicle is alone or only has a few trusted vehicles
in its vicinity at the time of sending the request. That is the reason why POI
information should be exchanged periodically as well, and when the user needs
a recommendation his vehicle still requests it to the nearby vehicles to complete
what has already been gathered. As a result, the system provides the user with a
satisfactory number of choices regardless of the trusted number of vehicles he has
nearby when the request is sent.
Some would identify this periodic exchange of information as a tracking vul-
nerability. However, provided that the period between message exchanges is long
enough (as explained in [2, 37, 36, 44]), if an attacker plans to track a user’s move-
ments he is going to need to physically follow him, since there is no road side
infrastructure to collect the messages he is going to need to be in range. Further
details on the period value are given in section 3.8.
Messages will include POI review chains from different categories. A smart
exchange of information is also considered, where depending on external factors
some categories will be more represented on the messages than others, i.e., gath-
ering information about restaurants will be prioritized at lunch and dinner time,
about gas stations when the vehicle is running low on gas, etc.
The following three types of message exchange are considered:
1. Requests: if a vehicle receives a review request he will reply with several
POI chains for the requested category. Preferably, reviews that he has veri-
fied himself and which have the highest rate in the category. If not enough
verified chains are available, he will reply with the highest rated unverified
chains (following the rating criteria described in section 3.2.1). When the
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requester receives the reply he considers all the chains in the message as un-
verified and stores them as such. Hence, the difference between verified and
unverified chains (in the response) becomes subtle: only the verified chains
have the sender’s signature, whereas the unverified are just being forwarded.
A user will not be penalized nor rewarded for forwarding unverified chains.
2. Periodic Exchange: vehicles should exchange POI chains periodically with
the better rated POIs in each category. Our scheme prioritizes the recom-
mendation of which POIs another user should visit over which POIs it should
not. We would like to avoid a situation where a user knows many POIs with
bad reviews and only a handful with good ones.
3. Recognition Exchange: if during a periodic exchange, one vehicle is rec-
ognized as a trusted user (from a previous encounter) then recognizer and
recognized will exchange user chains and verified POI chains, although they
will be marked as unverified by the receiver. Besides, the nodes and its level
of trust included in the node chains will be added to the list of the previously
known nodes, as explained below.
Requests and periodic exchanges of information are of vital importance for a
user that is traveling or moving through a new area. They will both provide the
user with unverified chains and once he reviews one POI in one of those chains he
will be able to establish a level of trust for each of the reviewers, thus staring a
new Web of Trust.
Figure 3.4: R’s known nodes table before and after processing a Recognition Ex-
change message.
Fig. 3.4 depicts a Recognition Exchange between a user S and a user R, in
which S sends a message M with his most trusted nodes.
RU = KpubU ||Level of TrustU(as POI reviewer) (3.7)
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M = RU1||...||RU5 ||T imestamp||{H(RU1||...||RU5 ||T imestamp)}KprivS ||KpubS
(3.8)
User R adds U1 and U4 to the list of known nodes, with S as their recommender,
λRS as the level of trust R has on S as recommender and with an initial level of
trust defined by the function:
T (Ui) = max(Trust
E
Ui




After R has had a chance to receive several reviews from U1 and U4, S will be
rewarded or penalized, depending on how similar is the level of trust that R has
on them related to what S recommended. All nodes recommended by the same
user are inextricably linked, i.e., the misbehavior of one may affect the others.
In order to deal with misbehavior, trust on a certain node Ui is divided in the
trust recommended by another user (TrustRUi) and the level of trust result of
R own experience with Ui (Trust
E
Ui
). In this way, when a node misbehaves its
recommender is punished and the λ factor (Eq. 3.9) is decreased for all nodes he
recommended. However, TrustEUi will not be affected, and as a result nodes that
have earned a reputation for themselves are no longer subject to the reputation of
their recommender.
Finally, it should be noted that for every user in the recommended nodes
message the receiver only processes those nodes he does not know: if a node
knows another user, it means he has followed one of his recommendations and
that is more important than a recommendation another user could make.
3.5 The Visitor Scenario
Whenever a user enters a new area and he requests a POI to the system, the system
will send a request message and will present the received information together with
the information received from periodic exchanges. If the user is in a completely
new area it may be possible that he does not know any of the reviewers who have
sent him POI recommendations for that specific region. Should that be the case,
the system (when queried) will present the user a list of POIs with unverified
reviews and a list of the pre-loaded POIs for that area. If the user chooses one
of the POIs with unverified reviews, when he inputs his review afterwards he
will update his level of trust on all the reviewers in the POI chain, thus gaining
information on other users and the POIs they signed. If the user chooses one of
the pre-loaded POIs he will start a new review chain with his review and he will
not gain information on other users. The visitor situation needs to be considered
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in detail, because it may closely match a tourist profile. On one hand, he will
be completely new in the area and most or all POI reviewers will be unknown to
him. On the other, precisely because he is a tourist he will input reviews more
frequently than the average user and that will allow him to fast develop a new
Web of Trust.
3.6 Rewards and Penalties
3.6.1 As POI Reviewers
Whenever a user U receives a recommendation and follows it, he can input his own
opinion in the system. Based on that, his vehicle evaluates the recommendation
chain updating the levels of trust in other users depending on the similarity of
their rates to U’s. If U has a positive impression of the recommended POI, all
the other users in the chain that gave a positive review to the POI are rewarded;
otherwise they are penalized. For this system to work, the penalty always has to
be greater than the reward; otherwise, a user could cause as much damage to the
system as much good he had previously done.
Even though it may seem like that the sole objective of this policy is the
punishment of all those users that spread lies and misbehavior in the system, that
is inaccurate. Misbehaving nodes is only a part of the problem, i.e., people tastes
vary from individual to individual, thus so will their POI reviews. The main goal
is not only to build a Web of Trust, but also a web of similar tastes, as previously
stated.
There are several requirements the penalties system should comply with:
1. If a user A has received only a few messages from a user B and B lies to or
disagrees with him, then his level of trust should be significantly decreased.
2. If a user A has received many messages from a user B and B lies to or
disagrees with him, then his level of trust should be decreased, but not dra-
matically.
3. The system should be able to recognize misbehaving strikes, after several lies
or disagreements in a row the level of trust in the misbehaving node should
plummet.
A very good candidate for the penalties function is the exponential curve be-
cause it has a slow growth at the beginning and a steep increase as the rate of
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lies or disagreements raises, which is appropriate to deal with misbehaving strikes.
It was decided that the level of trust should range from 0 to 15 and that after 5
consecutive bad reviews the evaluator level of trust in the evaluated should be set
to the minimum. Thus, ex was discretized from 0 to 15 into 6 elements (as depicted
in Fig. 3.5) to obtain the cumulative penalization function f(x), where x is the
number of lies. It should be noted that the rating system could easily be modified
to operate in another range of values, e.g., from 0 to 10 (which might be more
human friendly). The same can be said about the number of bad reviews. What
is important is that the penalization function follows the requirements described
















The value that will be subtracted from the level of trust in the beginning of the
misbehaving strike is f(strike length). As described in requirements 1 and 2 the
penalties function should take into account how many good reviews the evaluated
user has sent over time, understanding by good reviews those whose rate difference
with the evaluator’s does not exceed a maximum value defined in the system, which
is denoted by ∆Op. To that end β is included in the equation. It should be noted
that for recommended nodes, as described in section 3.4, the level of trust to be
decremented shall be both TrustE and TrustR.
In Alg. 2 the pseudocode of the rewards and penalties function is presented.
Consider χU1,A as the rate user U1 assigned to POI A. The first time that U1 finds
the difference between his rate and U2’s over a certain POI A is greater than ∆Op
it marks node U2 as misbehaving. The value of Trust
E is stored as the rate at the
beginning of the strike from which αlength strike will be subtracted. If a user is in a
misbehaving strike his level of trust will decrease faster. A misbehaving strike can
be broken after the evaluator verifies BREAK STRIKE good reviews from the
evaluated. However, breaking the strike does not mean that the evaluated user
goes back to its previous level of trust.
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Algorithm 2 Rewards and penalties pseudocode
if ¬misbehaving strike then
if |χU1,A − χU2,A| ≤ ∆Op then
TrustE := TrustE + 1
else
misbehaving strike := true






TrustE := TrustEpre strike − α
TrustR := TrustRpre strike − α
strike breakers := 0
end if
else
if |χU1,A − χU2,A| ≤ ∆Op then
TrustE := TrustE + 1
strike breakers := strike breakers+ 1
if strike breakers = BREAK STRIKE then
misbehaving strike := false
end if
else




TrustE := TrustEpre strike − α
strike breakers := 0
end if
end if
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3.6.2 As Node Reviewers
As node reviewers, a very similar system to the one described in the previous
section will be used. In order to be considered a good recommender in our system,
the proportion of good recommendations against bad needs to be at least 5 to 1.
If it is, then the user’s level of trust as recommender will be increased. If it is less,
it will be decreased by αn (Eq. 3.10 with β = 0) where




It should be noted that the timestamp in both types of reviews (POI and other
users) allows the system to discard old information and to avoid punishing the
user for events that occurred a long time ago.
Finally, as detailed in section 3.4, by decreasing the level of trust on the user
as recommender his recommended nodes level of trust becomes more dependent
on TrustE and less on TrustR.
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3.7 Misbehavior
In this section we will elaborate on the different mechanism Chains of Trust imple-
ments to protect itself from the most common misbehavior or third party attacks.
• False reviews spamming: an attacker spreads good POI reviews (e.g., to pro-
mote his restaurant) or bad (e.g., to harm his competition). If the attacker
is unknown to the rest of the users, then their level of trust in him will be 0
and as explained in section 3.2.1 his unverified POI chain will go mostly un-
noticed. On the other hand, if the attacker has previously worked on gaining
a certain reputation as POI reviewer, then the penalties system described
in 3.6 will deal with the attack. As depicted in Fig.3.5, we can see that a
few bad reviews are enough for a user to lose all his credit, e.g., after 3 bad
reviews its reputation is decreased by 5.08 units. As a result, it can be con-
cluded that the attack fails because the number of well intentioned reviews
the attacker needs to send to build a reputation is much greater than the
number of ill intentioned reviews he can send before he loses his reputation.
It should also be noted that even if the attacker tried to use multiple identi-
ties to increase the length of the chain the same reasoning would apply and
the attack would fail.
• Nodes recommendation: an attacker could create multiple identities, use one
to recommend the others and use the latter to implement the False reviews
spamming attack. As stated in section 3.4 only the nodes unknown to the
nodes recommendation message receiver are added into his list of known
nodes and they are added with a level of trust defined by Eq. 3.9. If the
attacker gains a good reputation as recommender and then recommends a
list of his own identities, thus constructing a web of misbehaving nodes,
after several incorrect messages all of its recommended nodes’ level of trust
as POI reviewers will be based on TrustE. Unless the recommended node
has earned a reputation for himself, his level of trust as per Eq. 3.9 will be 0
and it would be as if it had never been recommended, rendering the attack
unsuccessful.
In addition to what has been said above, the difficulty of launching an attack on a
mobile target should also be considered. Due to the lack of road side infrastructure
the attacker could not rely on compromised Road Side Units (RSUs) to help him
launch a global scale attack and would have to use his own resources.
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3.8 Analysis of Chains of Trust Scalability
The first step to determine if Chains of Trust can succeed in real life is to simulate
the data transmission protocol for hundreds of nodes. To that end, a simulation in
ns-3 [98] was implemented defining a vehicular scenario with 400 nodes arranged
in 4 lanes as depicted in Fig.3.6, connected through a Wireless Access in Vehicular
Environments (WAVE)-Direct Short Range Communication (DSRC) 27Mbps link
with a 120 meters range. WAVE-DSRC has the mechanisms to provide differ-
ent user applications with different channels while reserving certain channels for
safety applications, others for control and others for public safety [14]. It should
be noted that our simulation uses ns-3 YansWifiPhyHelper and YansWifiChannel-
Helper classes, as defined in [107].
Figure 3.6: Vehicle layout for the 400 nodes simulated in ns-3.
In Alg. 3 we can see the simulation pseudo-code. Basically, the program sched-
ules the broadcast of numPackets 1000 bytes packets at a randomly chosen time
between the start of the simulation and its ending point, defined as period. For
every scenario (numPackets/period combination) the number of broadcasts re-
ceived by each of the 400 simulated nodes is computed (resultsnumPackets,period)
and compared with how many broadcasts each of those nodes would have received
without packets loss (referencenumPackets), considering the mean as the scenario’s
result:
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Algorithm 3 Data transmission simulation pseudocode
period := 60, 120, 180, 240, 300 seconds
numPackets := 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800
for every element in numPackets




function runSimulation (numPackets, period)
setupWifi()
setupV ehiclesTopology()
time := random(0.1, period)
//schedules an event on time ’time’ to send ’numPackets’ packets of a 1000
bytes
Simulator :: ScheduleEvent(time, numPackets, 1000)
end function








Looking at the results in table 6.1 it can be seen that to ensure a delivery
rate over 90% while maximizing the amount of information being transmitted
400 packets is the best option for a 120 seconds period. For a larger number of
packets there is a drop in reception due to the MAC collisions. If a shorter period is
considered there is a slight drop in performance, although the major reason against
transmitting every 60 seconds is limiting the amount of information an attacker
can collect while following a target. We believe 120 seconds is more secure since
the attacker has to be in range twice as long, while at the same time Chains of
Trust can produce satisfactory results, as will be showed in the following sections.
3.9 How Will Chains of Trust Behave in a Realistic
Scenario?
Chains of Trust is designed so that every vehicle is pre-loaded with a selection
of a 100 POIs to provide information to users that have arrived to a new area
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Percentage of received broadcasts
Number of packets / Period 60 120 180 240 300
100 95.97 97.99 98.62 98.96 99.15
200 91.57 95.91 97.27 97.93 98.38
300 86.86 93.72 95.82 96.87 97.54
400 82.16 91.50 94.37 95.78 96.64
500 77.23 89.28 93.01 94.80 95.85
600 71.93 87.00 91.57 93.73 94.98
700 66.30 84.58 90.03 92.57 94.06
800 60.54 82.19 88.51 91.48 93.22
Table 3.1: Percentage of received broadcasts for every simulated scenario.
(as described in section 3.5). However, a user will not transmit a pre-loaded POI
unless he visits it for himself, at which point he starts a new chain with his review
and can be transmitted. Therefore, the pre-load will not impact in the results
presented in this section.
The first test should reveal if the scheme is feasible in a realistic scenario. The
application simulation tool poiSim (explained in section 4) will be executed for
different reviewing rates, i.e., every user will input a review into the system once
a day on average (1/1), once every two days (1/2), once every four days (1/4) and
so on until a review is input once every 10 days (1/10).
In Figs. 5.3a - 5.3b the evolution of the number and length of unverified POI
chains can be seen. After the first 5 days of simulation the number of unverified
chains and its length (number of POIs it contains) is very similar regardless of the
reviewing rate. The fact that the average number of unverified chains is over 90
and its length is almost 5 (considering a reviewing rate 1/6) means that there has
been interaction between the users and some have already started to build a better
reputation in the network. Considering the results after 30 days of simulation it
can be seen that they do not differ significantly.
As far as verified chains are concerned in Fig. 5.3c the direct relation between
the reviewing rate and the number of verified chains the nodes store can be ob-
served, which is logical considering that every time a POI is reviewed its unverified
chain moves on to the verified state. In the first 5 days of the simulation, the num-
ber of verified chains for reviewing rates 1/4 and 1/6 is 1.24 and 0.83 respectively.
Similarly, Fig. 5.3d shows that the progression of the length of verified chains is































(a) Number of unverified POI chains: for
every node the number of unverified POI



































(b) Length of unverified POI chains: for
every node the mean of its unverified POI
chains length is computed, the mean of
those means is the depicted result.
Figure 3.7: Evolution of the length and number of unverified and verified chains.
very close to the unverified depicted in Fig. 5.3b. Regarding the rate assigned to
the POIs in the verified chains, in Fig. 5.3e it can be observed that the rate of the
reviewed POIs varies until it stabilizes around 7, which is expected since the ran-
domly chosen rates are distributed around that value, as described in section 4.1.
The different simulated reviewing rates determine how fast the POI rate converges
to that value.
The measure of the system success is given by how many users every user knows
and what level of trust he has assigned to them. In Fig. 5.4a it can be observed
that after the first 5 days of simulation every user has several other users in his
known nodes list, going from 20.76 users on average for a review rate 1/1 to 2.11
users for a review rate 1/10. As expected, lower reviewing frequencies result in a
lower number of known nodes. If a middle ground scenario is considered, review
rates 1/4 and 1/6 yield 3.85 and 3.05 known users respectively. Results improve
significantly after the first ten days of simulation, where reviewing rates 1/4 and
1/6 result in every node knowing on average 33.24 and 26.37 nodes, respectively.
Regarding the rate or level of trust a user assigns to his known users, in Fig. 5.4b
it can be seen that after the first 5 days of simulation for all reviewing rates the
average level of trust is almost 1. As the simulation progresses, the level of trust
may oscillate (as it can be seen for reviewing rate 1/1) due to the randomness of
the simulation, although on the long run a larger number of chains are reviewed
and the level of trust increases due to the higher proportion of good reviews. After
the first 10 days, considering review rates 1/4 and 1/6 result in levels of trust of































(c) Number of verified POI chains: for ev-
ery node the number of verified POI chains



































(d) Length of verified POI chains: for every
node the mean of its verified POI chains
length is computed, the mean of those























(e) Rate in the verified POI chains: the
mean of the rates users assign to POIs.
Mean of the deviation σ
Simulation day 1 5 10 15 20 25 30
Rating freq. (review/days) 1/1 1/6 1/10 1/1 1/6 1/10 1/1 1/6 1/10 1/1 1/6 1/10 1/1 1/6 1/10 1/1 1/6 1/10 1/1 1/6 1/10
Num. Unver. POI chains 59.86 63.26 63.69 33.09 36.27 37.08 31.01 33.70 34.61 30.06 32.30 33.24 29.76 31.34 32.30 29.62 30.70 31.64 29.60 29.99 31.12
Length Unver. POI chains 0.30 0.17 0.14 7.21 8.55 7.94 30.84 29.78 30.50 40.39 40.25 40.42 41.11 43.32 44.13 40.74 43.08 44.44 40.78 41.76 43.10
Num. Ver. POI chains 0.00 0.36 0.30 0.14 0.83 0.66 0.30 1.17 0.95 0.47 1.44 1.16 0.62 1.67 1.34 0.79 1.87 1.50 0.94 2.05 1.64
Length Ver. POI chains 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.81 6.21 3.97 32.05 27.09 20.65 44.28 42.12 34.37 46.98 49.37 43.25 47.57 51.74 47.99 48.01 51.87 49.93
Rate Ver. POI chains 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.35 1.91 1.24 4.35 3.11 2.23 4.34 3.73 2.91 4.34 4.03 3.38 4.34 4.19 3.69 4.32 4.26 3.91
(f) Mean of the deviation table for (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e).
Figure 3.7: Evolution of the length and number of unverified and verified chains
(continued).
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1.31 and 1.45 respectively. In Fig. 3.8c we can see represented the level of trust in
the 25% most trusted nodes each user has. After the first 15 days it can be seen
how its progression differs from Fig. 5.4b, ending the simulation with a level of
trust slightly over 4 for review rates 1/4 and 1/6.
We believe this first experiment has proven that the system will in all likelihood
succeed in effectively disseminating POIs information and building a Web of Trust
among users in a real life scenario. Considering moderate reviewing rates of 1/4
and 1/6 we can see that just after the first 5 days of simulation every user has on
average more than 90 unverified chains containing 5 user reviews, almost 1 verified
chain with 5 reviews and more than 3 trusted nodes with trust levels over 1. It
should also be noted that results significantly improve after 10 days of simulation.
Therefore, it can be concluded that although the system will produce results from
the very start, depending on the reviewing rate the it may need from 5 to 10 days
(in the worst case scenario) to fully develop a Web of Trust. Users, however, will
be able to take advantage of the application from the start by using as well the
collection of pre-loaded POIs.
3.10 Chain Size Experiments
The length of POI chains is of paramount importance in the system because every
time an unverified POI chain is reviewed the reviewer updates his level of trust
in all its signers. Hence, the longer the chain the better the system should work.
Naturally, the messages cannot be allowed to grow indefinitely because vehicles
do not have an infinite amount of memory and the messages exchanged between
vehicles should be relatively short due to wireless communication limitations. In
section 3.9, poiSim was configured to allow chains up to a length of 225 reviews,
but we would like to observe how does the system behave with shorter chains
and verify if there is a certain frontier value where the benefits of increasing the
length begin to decrease. Thus, the simulator was executed with POI chains of
75, 150 and 225 reviews. In addition, for this experiment every user will input a
new review in the system every 1.800 seconds. Certainly, it is not very likely that
users will input one new POI review every half an hour. However, once we have
established the validity of the system, we would like to modify the reviewing rate
to study the system in the long run. In Figs. 3.9a - 3.9b, for both unverified and
verified POI chains there is a slight difference between using length 150 or 225
after 5 days of simulation. In a 5 days simulation both lengths are high enough to
not be a limitation, but in larger runs we would definitely see a bigger difference

































(a) Number of known nodes: mean of the






















(b) Rate or level of trust of the known
nodes: mean of the rates users assign to























(c) Rate or level of trust of the 25% most
trusted nodes: mean of the rates users as-
sign to other users as POI reviewers (only
for the 25% highest rated nodes).
Mean of the deviation σ
Simulation day 1 5 10 15 20 25 30
Rating freq. (review/days) 1/1 1/6 1/10 1/1 1/6 1/10 1/1 1/6 1/10 1/1 1/6 1/10 1/1 1/6 1/10 1/1 1/6 1/10 1/1 1/6 1/10
Num. Nodes 0.17 0.00 0.00 26.91 9.43 8.11 127.91 43.84 37.66 119.57 84.33 68.95 52.82 118.10 100.82 34.07 140.27 126.49 32.49 148.91 142.56
Nodes Rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 1.53 1.03 1.42 1.53 1.68 2.17 1.92 2.17 2.99 2.32 2.55 3.76 2.71 2.85 4.31 3.03 3.10
Nodes First 25% Rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 1.04 1.03 1.48 1.50 1.65 2.08 1.79 2.02 2.52 2.03 2.23 2.80 2.25 2.35 2.97 2.41 2.43
(d) Mean of the deviation table for (a), (b) and (c).
Figure 3.8: Number of known nodes and their levels of trust progress.
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in the length of chains the vehicles store. Therefore, from Chains of Trust’s point
of view chains should be as long as the wireless communication between vehicles
permits.
Fig. 3.10a shows a similar growth for the number of known nodes with the
three simulated chain lengths. That is because after the first day of simulation
most of this growth is a product of the exchange of recognition messages (which do
not depend on the chain length). As far as the rates are concerned, in Figs. 3.10b
- 3.10c there is a certain variation attributed to the randomness of the simulation,
rather than to the chain length. It should be noted that user opinions of POIs
are normally distributed with a mean µ that we termed its real rate. As a result,
the mean of the rates of 75 reviewers should not differ much from the mean of the
rates of 225.
In Figs. 3.10b - 3.10c the levels of trust progress as the simulation advances,
although it provides conclusive evidence that longer chains do not lead to more
trustworthy nodes. Therefore, in a scenario where recognition messages do not
play such an important role on conveying nodes information, POI chains assume
that responsibility. Mainly, because every time a chain is verified all the reviewers
levels of trust are updated in the verifier. As a result, the length of a POI chain
should only be limited by physical requirements such as the size of the message to
be transmitted.
3.11 POI vs. Nodes Experiments
The purpose of this experiment is to discern how much of the system performance
can be attributed to the exchange of recognition messages, or in other words, how
is the system performance affected when node reviews are not exchanged. To
that end, the simulation in poiSim was executed with 0, 25 and 50 node reviews
per transmitted message and with a reviewing rate of a new review every 1.800
seconds.
In Fig. 3.11a the results of those simulations are plotted. As expected, the
average number of users known by every user increases as the number of nodes
in the message increases as well. However, it should be noted that the maximum
number of nodes to be stored (500) is reached in the three cases during the third
day of the simulation. Therefore, the exchange of node reviews does not represent
a dramatic improvement in that aspect. On the other hand, Fig. 3.11b shows
that the rates of the 25% highest rated nodes improve as a result of increasing
the number of nodes in the message. This leads to the conclusion that recognition
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(a) Length of unverified POI chains: for every node the
mean of its unverified POI chains length is computed,
the mean of those means is the depicted result.
(b) Length of verified POI chains: for every node the
mean of its verified POI chains length is computed, the
mean of those means is the depicted result.
Mean of the deviation σ
Chain type Length Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5
Unverified POI chains
75 2.17 22.24 29.13 26.15 23.82
150 1.59 25.90 47.16 59.93 54.01
225 2.09 18.80 63.11 76.52 83.49
Verified POI chains
75 1.56 22.70 31.36 28.86 24.78
150 1.64 30.11 47.73 49.21 51.95
225 1.08 30.79 49.64 72.80 80.65
(c) Mean of the deviation table for (a) and (b)
Figure 3.9: Evolution of the lengths of unverified and verified chains.
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(a) Number of known nodes: mean of the number of
known nodes by every node.
(b) Rate or level of trust of the known nodes: mean of
the rates users assign to other users as POI reviewers.
Figure 3.10: Number of known nodes and their levels of trust progress.
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(c) Rate or level of trust of the 25% most trusted nodes:
mean of the rates users assign to other users as POI
reviewers (only for the 25% highest rated nodes).
Mean of the deviation σ
Data Length Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5
Nodes rate
75 2.08 4.91 5.29 5.40 4.94
150 2.11 3.94 4.51 5.02 4.14
225 1.44 3.05 3.20 3.59 3.37
Nodes first 25% rate
75 2.08 6.14 1.32 0.41 0.26
150 2.10 3.21 1.61 0.38 0.13
225 1.44 3.88 3.40 2.91 2.59
(d) Mean of the deviation table for (a), (b) and (c)
Figure 3.10: Number of known nodes and their levels of trust progress (continued).
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messages are not critic to the system performance, although they do provide a
considerable improvement.
3.12 Conclusions
This thesis presents Chains of Trust, a new POI information dissemination scheme
that builds a reputation system based on people’s traffic patterns. Unlike other
solutions presented in sections 2.4 and 2.5, Chains of Trust completely relies on
the ad-hoc network to function and requires no roadside infrastructure, protects
user privacy by allowing users to manage their own identities, it requires no CA,
and by keeping users’ information distributed among the vehicles in the network
and not centralized in a single entity that could be compromised. In addition, it
uses POI chains to accumulate POI reviews of the same POI, so that whenever a
user follows a recommendation he can update his level of trust in all the reviewers
in the chain, therefore increasing the speed at which the reputation system is built.
From the results presented in sections 3.9, 3.10, 3.11 several conclusions can be
drawn. First and foremost, Chains of Trust performs satisfactorily in a realistic
scenario by rapidly building a Web of Trust among its users, even for low reviewing
frequencies. Secondly, the length of POI chains is relevant in terms of the number of
nodes a user gains information of when verifying a POI review. However, regardless
of the length, the mean of the known nodes level of trust remained similar, hence
indicating that it does not help to improve the trustworthiness of those nodes.
Finally, user chains do help improve the development of the Web of Trust once a
primary structure of known nodes has been established.
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(a) Number of known nodes: mean of the number of
known nodes by every node.
(b) Rate or level of trust of the 25% most trusted nodes:
mean of the rates users assign to other users as POI
reviewers (only for the 25% highest rated nodes).
Mean of the deviation σ
Category #Nodes Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5
Nodes first 25% rate
0 0.94 1.90 3.49 4.46 4.21
25 0.97 4.39 2.22 2.15 1.58
50 1.78 1.99 3.89 0.98 0.94
(c) Mean of the deviation table for (b)
Figure 3.11: Number of known nodes and their levels of trust progress.
Chapter 4
poiSim: the Simulation Tool
Once Chains of Trust had been defined, it needed a realistic simulation tool to
estimate its success in the real world. Simulation tools like Glomosim or ns-2
were discarded because in order to simulate hundreds of thousands of nodes they
require a massive amount of memory. Thus, we were inclined to design our own
simulation tool. Like in [88], it was decided to analyze the realistic vehicular trace
produced by the Multi-Agent Traffic Simulator (MMTS) developed by K.Nagel at
ETH Zurich. All in all, with over 260.000 simulated nodes or vehicles in an area
of around 250 km x 260 km, this mobility trace suited the simulation needs.
According to the data in [108] and [109] there were 4.012.690 passenger vehi-
cles registered in Switzerland in the year 2008, which means that poiSim simulates
only 6,48% of them. Even if we took into account the number of registered ve-
hicles which are not used, we believe the simulated adoption rate would still be
considerably low.
4.1 General Description
In section 1 it was described how the scheme relies on people’s habits in order to
construct a Web of Trust. The main goal behind designing a specific simulator
is to discover if those habits suffice to ensure the application success in a real life
scenario. If so, passed the first several days each node in the network should have
several Point of Interest (POI) reviews as well as known nodes. poiSim will also
be used to analyze how the system behaves when modifying several parameters,
e.g., the length of POI chains, or to study how it performs when user chains are
not used. It should be noted that poiSim is a high level simulator, i.e., it simulates
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Chains of Trust but it does not simulate a Medium Access Control protocol for
example, it would be unfeasible to simulate wireless communication realistically
for hundreds of thousands of nodes in a reasonable amount of time. That is why
a separate experiment was conducted in section 3.8. In addition, the version of
Chains of Trust simulated by poiSim will be slightly different from the original
scheme designed in the previous section. The differences will allow the simulator
to improve its performance and will not affect the results. They will be explained
in this section.
These are several of poiSim’s features: it simulates 259.977 nodes and 15.000
POIs. Every node stores:
• Levels of trust on 500 other vehicles.
• 100 unverified POI chains with 225 POI reviews each.
• 150 verified POI chains with 225 POI reviews each.
And for every POI:
• 5000 reviews are stored in the system.
Every POI is assigned a random value ranging from 0 to 15 to be its real rate µ.
The rates the users assign to those POIs will be normally distributed around µ
with variance σ2 = 2 (as depicted in Fig. 4.1).
Communication wise, a range of 120 meters of coverage is considered and every
time a vehicle transmits all the vehicles within range receive the message. There
are two kinds of simulated messages: periodic and recognition.
1. Periodic Messages: every 120 seconds a vehicle will broadcast a message
with his 25 highest rated verified POI chains, adding unverified POI chains
to complete the message if necessary.
2. Recognition Messages: every time a vehicle recognizes another as a trusted
user it will send his 25 highest rated verified POI reviews and his 25 most
trusted nodes, together with his level of trust in them. Unverified POI chains
may be included as well to complete the message if necessary.
It should be noted that poiSim does not include request messages, as the original
scheme did. The reason is that their implementation would not have changed the
simulation experiments, since they are seldom used in respect with periodic mes-
sages (every 120 seconds). As a result, the quality of the system is measured by
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Figure 4.1: User’s rate distribution for the real rate µ = 7 and σ2 = 2
the number of nodes known to every user and the number and length of verified
POI chains every user stores at the end of every simulated day. Due to compu-
tational limitations, it was decided not to simulate user chains as explained in
sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.6.2, since their simulation would have required the execu-
tion of Alg. 4 for each of the 260.000 simulated nodes and each of the 225 reviewers
that unverified and verified chains store. Had user chains not been removed, they
would have added a large overhead on the simulation, thus extending the simula-
tion execution time to weeks or even months. As a result, poiSim does not simulate
misbehavior (since it would not be possible to penalize bad recommenders), hence
there is no need to keep track of the recommender-recommended relation and its
rewards and penalties policy. We believe misbehavior attempts will be dealt with
the mechanisms described in section 3.7 and will not affect the overall performance.
User chains still exist and are transmitted in recognition messages, but the rec-
ommender will not be rewarded nor penalized for it. In addition, recommended
nodes will be added to the known nodes list with a trust level of 1. In this way, it
can be established if the scheme performs satisfactorily or not, and if it does it can
be safely assumed that the implementation of user chains will be an improvement,
since recommended nodes will be added to the known nodes list with the level
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of trust with which they were recommended (always greater or equal than 1). It
should also be noted that our simulation only contains one POI category, which is
enough for the desired testing purposes.
Algorithm 4 User chains algorithm
//every time a POI is reviewed by the user
for every POIReview
//for every reviewer in the POI’s unverified chain
for every unverifiedChain.reviewer
//if the user and the reviewer’s opinion are too different
if |unverifiedChain.reviewer.rate− user.rate| ≤ ∆Op






In a nutshell, poiSim processes each line of the MMTS trace, which contains
a nodeID and its corresponding x, y, z, t coordinates and updates the vehicles
position. On every update it ensures that the vehicles send a periodic message
every 120 seconds, which is a long enough period to avoid causing a tracking
vulnerability, and a recognition message when needed. In addition, once a day at
most each user reviews a randomly chosen POI from his unverified POI chains,
or a completely random POI if there are no unverified POI chains available, as
described in Alg.5.
In order to better study the system, to observe how the POI reviews are ex-
changed between users, how users build a better reputation for themselves and
the effect of several configuration parameters on the simulation, such as the chain
length or the number of user reviews in a user reviews message, the 24 hours ve-
hicular trace is replayed to obtain a multiple days scenario. It should be remarked
that the only common element in every simulated day will be the MMTS trace,
because the POIs being reviewed are randomized, and hence will be different in
every run.
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Algorithm 5 POI review algorithm
if node.reviewedPOIToday() = false then
node.setReviewedPOIToday(true)
if random(0, 1) = 1 then








The simulator has been designed with efficiency in mind, with the emphasis placed
on memory rather than on reducing the computing time. The reason for this order
in priorities is simple if illustrated with an example. Every simulated node must
have a unique identifier and a level of trust, the first ranging from 1 to 260.000
and the second from 0 to 15. In order to store the nodeID the simulator is going
to use a 4 bytes integer, since 2 bytes fall short, and to store the level of trust a
single byte will suffice. However, when memory alignment is taken into consid-
eration that single byte turns into 4 (or even 8, depending on the architecture).
As a result, every node is now 8 bytes long. Looking at the bigger picture, every
node stores the level of trust of 500 other nodes (8×500 = 4.000) and over 260.000
nodes are simulated (260.000×4.000 =1.040.000.000). Had both fields been stored
in the same 4 bytes integer it would have been possible to save half that space.
It is of paramount importance to grasp the magnifying effect of changes deep into
the structure of the simulator. Certainly, by using the same region of memory for
both fields every time they are accessed an additional operation will need to be
performed to separate them, which will increase the access time; the alternative,
however, is not being able to run the simulation with average computational re-
sources. Fig. 4.2 provides a clear depiction of poiSim’s logical components and
processes. Basically, there is a thread that reads the mobility trace from a disk,
block by block, and places it in a double buffer from which another thread feeds
on. Those blocks are processed line by line, which are of the form nodeID, x, y,
z, time, command. During that processing, the command dictates if a node is
created, destroyed or updated. Besides, based on the time the simulator checks
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Figure 4.2: System processes map
if the node should review a POI or prepare a message to be transmitted. If the
node needs to send a message a group of threads is notified to look for nodes in
range and process the received message, if any are found. All of these processes
will be extensively detailed in the following sections. However, before any further
explanations, it should be remarked that even though memory management was
our first priority, we were also able to take full advantage of the multi core CPU
at our disposal, by dividing tasks into independent sub-tasks and implementing
them in multiple threads so that they could be parallelized.
4.3 Memory Snapshot
The mobility trace being used largely determined the memory structures depicted
in Fig. 4.3, and that is the reason why its understanding was so important. That
trace simulates the traffic patterns of 259.978 vehicles over 24 hours. In that period
of time trips began and were ended, hence not all vehicles were traveling at the
same time. Several tests were performed to study the trace and concluded that
55.197 is the maximum number of vehicles traveling at the same time. As a result,
the simulator is designed to store active vehicle’s information in memory while the
rest is kept on disk. It should be noted, that the exact number of nodes allocated
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Figure 4.3: Memory map
in memory is slightly larger (56.000) to account as well for the simulator’s internal
operations so that vehicles can be moved in and out of memory as required by the
trace without dragging down the performance.
The second improvement is derived from carefully examining the goal of the
application and it affects the way POIs are stored in chains. The main objective
is the dissemination of POIs information over the network, and that information
translates into POI chains which in their turn are an aggregate of POI reviews. In
other words, many nodes will have common parts of POI chains, i.e., repeated POI
reviews since what it is trying to accomplish leads to the repetition of information.
Therefore, a matrix is designed to hold every review ever created in the system
(Poi Reviews Matrix in Fig. 4.3) and instead of storing the reviews in the nodes,
they only store the indexes to the matrix. That allows the system to save half as
many bytes for every repeated review.
In addition, the system is designed to avoid the extra bytes lost to memory
alignment, when possible, by grouping pieces of information together. This tech-
nique was used in the Poi Reviews Matrix to store a user identifier and the rate
he assigned to a POI and in the Node reviews t table of every node to store levels
of trust and user identifiers. We would like to remark that the identifiers and the
rates (or levels of trust) are fields that had they not been grouped together, they
would have been accessed sequentially. Therefore, the extra selection operations




Unverified poi reviews t 45402 bytes
Verified poi reviews t 68100 bytes
Active Table (56000 nodes) 6.58 GB
Poi Reviews Matrix 300 MB
Opinions Table 3200 bytes
State Table 56000 bytes
Simulation data produced in each simulation (260000 nodes) 31 GB
Table 4.1: Size of the memory structures used by poiSim
are compensated by one less access to memory. It should also be noted that the
Node reviews t table always has to be ordered by the level of trust (so that the most
trusted nodes can be easily found and sent in recognition messages), hence the im-
portance of allocating the rate in the first byte and the identifier in the lower three.
Given two values a and b, a > b if and only if a.highest byte > b.highest byte.
Hence, the ordering operation can be performed disregarding the fact that those
bytes contain different bits of information.
The result of those optimizations is displayed in Table 6.4. It should be noticed
that the simulation uses over 6.9 GB of main memory (between Active Table and
Poi Reviews Matrix) and produces a volume of 31 GB of data in disk at the end of
the simulation, which contains the state of each individual vehicle when it is not
traveling.
As far as memory initialization is concerned, it is performed at the beginning
of the simulation, even before it starts to process the mobility trace. Most of the
memory is allocated dynamically (unverified, verified POI tables and nodes tables)
while the rest of the system is stored in static memory. However, nodes are not
allocated and freed every time they are created and destroyed. The Active Table
allocates dynamic regions when it is created and until the simulation finishes it
does not free them, mainly to avoid memory fragmentation.
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4.4 Processing the MMTS Trace
Once the memory has been allocated the simulator can begin reading the trace.
The file is read in blocks of 8192 bytes by a thread that copies them into a double
buffer. On the other side of the buffer another thread feeds on those blocks and
processes them. The idea is to minimize the wait of the Processor thread on
retrieving the data from disk by having another thread perform the task, while at
the same time keeping them both synchronized so that every block is processed.
To that end the double buffer is protected with what in pthreads notation are
called Condition Variables which is a combination of signals and mutexes: before
writing or reading a block from or of the memory structure each thread tries to
acquire a lock, if unsuccessful it blocks until the current lock owner sends him a
signal to indicate that the lock has been released.
/∗ Memory d e f i n i t i o n s ∗/
#define DISK BLOCK SIZE 8192
struct d i s k d oub l e bu f f e r {
char buf ferA [DISK BLOCK SIZE ] ;




struct d i s k d oub l e bu f f e r exchange bu f f e r ;
pthread mutex t bufferA mutex , bufferB mutex ;
pthread cond t bufferA cond , buf ferB cond ;
/∗ readerThread . c − f i l l s the b u f f e r wi th b l o c k s ∗/
r e s = f r ead ( block , 1 ,DISK BLOCK SIZE , fd ) ;
i f ( r e s > 0)
{
pthread mutex lock(&bufferA mutex ) ;
i f ( exchange bu f f e r . dataReadyA != 0)
{
pthread cond wait (&bufferA cond ,&bufferA mutex ) ;
}
memcpy( exchange bu f f e r . bufferA , block , r e s ) ;
exchange bu f f e r . dataReadyA = re s ;
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pth r ead cond s i gna l (&buf ferA cond ) ;
pthread mutex unlock(&bufferA mutex ) ;
}
/∗ managerThread . c − proce s s e s the b u f f e r ∗/
pthread mutex lock(&bufferA mutex ) ;
i f ( exchange bu f f e r . dataReadyA == 0)
{
pthread cond wait (&bufferA cond ,&bufferA mutex ) ;
}
. . .
p roces sB lock ( exchange bu f f e r . bufferA , exchange bu f f e r . dataReadyA
) ;
exchange bu f f e r . dataReadyA = 0 ;
p th r ead cond s i gna l (&buf ferA cond ) ;
pthread mutex unlock(&bufferA mutex ) ;
Listing 4.1: Code excerpt to illustrate how the double buffer works
The Processor thread reads the block line by line, translating each and every
line into a simulated step. Each of those steps indicate the simulator that one of the
following events has occurred: a trip has began, a vehicle’s position has changed or
a trip has come to an end. In the Node Management phase the Processor becomes
responsible for the interpretation of those instructions, i.e., it has to create and
destroy nodes as the trace dictates, bringing them from memory to the Active
Nodes table and back to memory once the trip finishes, besides updating their
position when needed. To speed up the process of looking for nodes in the table a
Dictionary was implemented using the nodeID modMAX ACTIV E NODES as
key. As in any other dictionary, the idea is to check if the key position is empty;
otherwise move forward to the next one and retry. Notice that, as depicted in
Fig. 4.2, the trace and the nodes are stored in separate disks in order to minimize
the access latency.
While updating the position and the time of the vehicle the simulator checks if
the user has to review one of his POIs, and if so the thread enters the POI Reviewer
phase. In this step of the simulation it has to select a POIID to be reviewed,
which can either be accomplished by randomly choosing one of the unverified
chains stored in the node or by randomly generating an identifier if no chains
are available. Should that last option be the case things simplify considerably, as
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detailed below.
• Random POI: it needs to create a review in the Poi Reviews Matrix and a
new verified chain in which to store that review.
• Unverified POI chain: it needs to create a review in the Poi Reviews Matrix
too, although in this case this is just the beginning of the process. In the
Chain Evaluation phase it compares that review with the other reviews in
the chain and increase or decrease the node’s level of trust on the reviewers
based on how much their opinions or rates differ. This rewards and penalties
policy follows the process previously described in section 3.6. Notice that
whenever the nodes level of trust is modified the Node reviews t table needs
to be reordered, which as described in section 4.3 can be done disregarding
the fact that two pieces of information are stored in that region of memory.
Finally, the Processor thread verifies if it is time for the user to transmit infor-
mation to the network. If so, it prepares the messages, otherwise the processing
of that parsed line finishes here. poiSim simulates two kinds of messages:
1. Periodic messages are made of 50 POI chains, the highest rated among the
verified POI chains the node stores. Should there not be enough, unverified
chains will be selected.
2. Recognition messages are made of the highest rated 25 POI chains and 25
Node reviews. Like in periodic messages, verified POI chains can be comple-
mented with unverified chains.
Both messages will be prepared and depending on the situation the receiving node
will select one or the other.
Once finished with the preparations, the Processor thread signals the Trackers
threads to wake up. The Active Table, where all the active nodes are stored,
is partitioned into 4 equal portions (one for each thread) and processed by the
Trackers, which search for nodes in range. When a node is found the thread
processes one message or the other depending on if the receiver previously knew the
sender. This is why it was of paramount importance that everything was prepared
beforehand, had it not been done that way each time a vehicle in range was found
its thread would have had to look for the information instead of processing it
directly from the message.
Since the messages contain different kinds of information, different paths will
be followed when processing them.
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• POI chains: when a POI chain is received it is marked as unverified and the
thread looks for its POIID into the node’s tables. If it is not found then the
received chain is stored in the unverified table. If it is found and the POI
chain has not yet been verified, then both chains are merged. Otherwise,
if it receives a chain for a POI that it has already reviewed then it reviews
the received chain assigning rewards and penalties to the reviewers, just as
it was done in the POI Reviewer phase, and merge the chains storing them
in the verified table (Chain Management).
• Node reviews: a node review is a nodeID and a level of trust assigned to that
node by the sender. The receiver of the message treats those reviews as if it
they were his own with two conditions:
1. the recommended level of trust for a certain node can never be greater
than the level of trust the receiver has on the sender.
2. the recommended level of trust is always decreased by 1, to signify one
link in the chain of trust.
Finally, when the Trackers have finished processing all active nodes they signal
back the Processor and the cycle can begin again.
4.5 Hardware Requirements
poiSim was executed in a PC running 64 bits Linux Fedora 12, with the following
hardware specifications:
• Quad Core CPU Q6600 at 2.40 GHz, with 128 KB of L1 cache and 8 MB of
L2 cache.
• 8 GB of DDR2 ram memory at 887 MHz with latencies 5-5-5-15 (tCL-tRCD-
tRP-tRAS)1
1
– tCL: column address strobe (CAS) latency; the number of clock cycles required to access
a specific column of data. (The initial t refers to time.)
– tRCD: row address strobe (RAS)-to-CAS delay; the number of clock cycles needed between
a row address strobe and a column address strobe.
– tRP: RAS pre-charge; the number of clock cycles needed to close one row of memory and
open another.
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• 32 GB SSD disk to store the OS and the mobility trace.
– 64 MB onboard cache.
– Read maximum performance: up to 210 MB/s.
– Write maximum performance: up to 75 MB/s.
• 96 GB SSD disk to store the simulation data.
– Read maximum performance: up to 285 MB/s.
– Write maximum performance: up to 275 MB/s.
– Sustained write performance: up to 250 MB/s.
With this hardware, a simulation of the 24 hours vehicular trace lasts approx-
imately 120 minutes.
4.6 Message Formats
In this section, the message formats and sizes for the simulation will be defined ac-
cording to the scalability results presented in section 3.8. Considering the following
format for a periodic message M as defined in section 3.2:







































Taking into account that the total amount of information has to be approx-
imately 400.000 bytes, information about 25 POIs will be sent, each containing
– tRAS: the number of clock cycles needed to access a specific row of data in RAM.
92 CHAPTER 4. POISIM: THE SIMULATION TOOL
107 user’s reviews adding up to a total of 390.300 bytes. It should be noted that
periodic messages are fragmented in a 1000 bytes packets including certain redun-
dancy, so that if a packet is lost the rest of the message can still be read.
Recognition messages will also contain an user reviews message M ′:
RNode i = {KpubNode i
︸ ︷︷ ︸
128 bytes





















Considering that M ′ contains information about 25 users the message size
amounts to 3.371 bytes.
4.7 Conclusions
In this section we have discussed the design and implementation of the application
simulation tool poiSim. Unlike state of the art network simulators like OPNET,
QualNet, OMNet++, ns-2, ns-3 or GloMoSim, poiSim is capable of simulating a
24 hours trace containing almost 260.000 vehicles in approximately 120 minutes.
We have shown that by separating the communications from the application layer
it is possible to build an application simulator which can execute simulations in the
order of hundreds of thousands of nodes. This approach will yield more realistic
results than using network simulators to simulate both the communication and
application layers, as done in the vast majority of research articles [30, 31, 32, 33].
Chapter 5
Anonymous Chains of Trust
Chains of Trust, as explained in section 3, may allow an attacker to profile users
and even link their public key to their real identity. If an attacker positioned
himself at a frequented crossroad, given enough time he would be able to gather
a large number of Point of Interest (POI) chains which he could analyze to know
in what area every user lives, what habits they have or even know who they are.
This is not a problem exclusive of Chains of Trust, this is a problem inherent to
reputation systems, where anyone can gather all the recommendations or reviews
made by a user. In Anonymous Chains of Trust we propose a solution to address
this vulnerability.
5.1 General Overview
In this section we propose a new mechanism to preserve users privacy based on
identity borrowing. In a reputation system, if two nodes trust each other it is
because they both have had similar views or opinions on the information they
have shared in the past. Particularly in Chains of Trust, if two users trust each
other it is because they have similarly rated POIs in a given category and therefore
have similar tastes. Since their rates for a certain POI category are similar, one
user A can ask another B, who he trusts, to issue a review message with a certain
rate for a certain POI with B’s own identity, much like if he had reviewed the POI
himself. For all intents and purposes, A will be borrowing B’s identity for that
single review.
Fig. 5.1 depicts in detail how the system works. Steps 1 and 2 are the first part
of the protocol where user A requests user B to issue a POI review on his behalf.
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Figure 5.1: Anonymous Chains of Trust.
The second part, steps 3 and 4, allows B to determine how reviewing that POI on
behalf of A affects his reputation.
User A reviews POI1 and the system decides to request another node to issue
the public review on his behalf. How often the system asks a user to review a POI
on behalf of another is based on the system parameter α. Whenever A meets one
of his trusted nodes (B) he sends a review request containing the POI identifier
(POI1), the rate he assigns to that POI and a timestamp, everything encrypted
with B’s public key (as we can see in step 1). In addition, he signs B’s Kpub with
his own Kpriv so that B can verify A’s identity. In step 2, if B recognizes A as one
of his trusted users he acknowledges the reception of the message by sending the
hash H of the received message encrypted with A’s public key KpubA . Should that
acknowledgement not reach A the system on A’s vehicle will request the review to
another trusted user. Once B has accepted to review POI1 on A’s behalf, he will
include this review in the list of messages he transmits periodically.
In step 3, B prepares a periodic message M containing a chain of reviews of
length 2 for POI1, which includes the review R1 he is issuing on behalf of A and
another review R2 he has received for that same POI from another user. For
the sake of clarity, in this example M contains information about just one POI,
i.e., one POI chain, although in reality periodic messages may include several
concatenated chains for different POIs. Once that information is compiled, B’s
vehicle broadcasts it to the network. It should be noted that R, which is the first
element of a chain of POI recommendations, contains a field named Inforeq. This
bit-field will be set to let the message receivers know that B would like to receive
their reviews of that POI. In step 4, the receivers of M reply with their own rate
for the requested POI. B will store this information, and once he has gathered
enough data he will evaluate the review A sent to him and adjust his level of trust
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in A accordingly (as explained in section 5.2).
It should be noted that nodes that receive the information request will reply
with their own reviews, with reviews from trusted nodes or with reviews they have
issued on behalf of other nodes. If they were only allowed to reply with their own
reviews, an attacker would only need to broadcast a POI request for multiple POIs
and gather all the information to profile the users.
Incidentally, in order to minimize the repetition of information in M , the POI
identifier is only used in the first review of a chain of recommendations (R), while
the rest use instead the hash H of that identifier (R′).
The idea behind this scheme is that if enough users request their trusted fellows
to review POIs on their behalf, then a user’s individual identity is hidden by the
identities of all the users he trusts. As a result, even an all-knowing attacker will
not be able to profile individual users because he will have no way of knowing the
identity of the real POI reviewers. This concept of privacy is somewhat similar
to what group signatures provide [8, 39, 50], although without the overhead of
specifically creating and managing a group.
Generally speaking, in a group signature scheme every user is part of a group,
either preset or dynamically created, and every group has a group manager in
charge of making public the information gathered by group members. In addition,
the group manager needs to monitor the group members for misbehavior and evict
them from the group if they misbehave.
5.2 Evaluation of Identity Borrowing
As seen in section 5.1, user B needs a mechanism to determine the impact that
reviewing a POI on behalf of A has on his reputation. Whenever a user reviews
a POI on behalf of somebody else he sets the Inforeq bit in the chain of reviews
for that POI in the periodic message. After having gathered n reviews from other
users (or if the time passed since he issued the review reaches a certain value
Tevaluation) B evaluates A’s review.
Let us define n as the number of reviews sent by different users regarding a
certain POI POI1, U1, ..., Un as the users who sent their POI review and Û1, ..., Ûn
as the subset of those nodes known by the user B, χPOI1,U1 as the rate that U1
gave to POI1 and λÛi as the level of trust that B has on Ui as a POI reviewer.
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It should be noted that the rates assigned by unknown nodes are ignored as
long as there is a known reviewer in the chain. Otherwise, the chain’s rate is the
arithmetic mean of the POI rates assigned by the unknown reviewers. Similarly,
the reviews of the less trusted known nodes are ignored when there is a known


























Figure 5.2: Progression of k/λA for different values of k.
Once B knows the value of G, he expects the rate A sent in his review of POI1
to be:
G− k/λA ≤ χPOI1,A ≤ G+ k/λA (5.2)
where k is a parameter defined by each user depending on how strict he wants
to be when lending his reputation. k can take any value considering that G +
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k/λA ≤ 15, 15 being the maximum value for a node’s reputation in the system,
and G−k/λA ≥ 0, 0 being the minimum. If χPOI1,A falls outside the limits defined
by (5.2) then B will stop transmitting A’s review and the level of trust B has on
A, i.e. λA, will decrease by half its value.
It should be noted that too high values of k will allow misbehaving users to
take advantage of the system and ruin the reviewer’s reputation in the network.
On the other hand, too low values will in all likelihood unfairly decrease the level
of trust B has in A. Regardless of the value assigned to k, in Fig. 5.2 we can
see that the allowed deviation from G decreases for high levels of trust between
users. This responds to the fact that users with high levels of trust assign the
most similar rates to the same POIs, and that should still be true when a user is
lending his identity.
In the same way that B needs to make sure that A is not lying to him, A needs
to know if B is really transmitting a review on his behalf. To that end A examines
the periodic messages he receives looking for a chain of recommendations for the
requested POI POI1. If he does not find it after a certain time Trequest, A will
request the review of POI1 to another of his trusted nodes. The level of trust that
A has in B does not need to be decreased because A’s reputation in the network
was not damaged by B’s inaction.
5.3 Scalability Analysis
In section 3.8 we determined with a ns-3 [98] simulation that in a 400 vehicles
scenario such as the one depicted in Fig. 3.6, every user can broadcast 400 packets
of a 1,000 bytes every 120 seconds yielding a 91.5% rate of successfully received
packets. It should be noted that in our system every node broadcasts periodic
messages to be received by all nodes within 1 hop distance.
The periodic message used in Chains of Trust has been modified to include the
changes described in section 5.1 with the goal of achieving a reception rate still
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Taking into account that the total amount of information has to be approx-
imately 400.000 bytes, information about 25 POIs will be sent, each containing
107 user’s reviews adding up to a total of 390.303,125 bytes. It should be noted
that periodic messages are fragmented in a 1000 bytes packets including certain
redundancy, so that if a packet is lost the rest of the message can still be read.
In addition, in order to avoid flooding the network when users reply to a POI
information request, it will only be allowed to set the Inforeq bit for a maximum
of 5 POIs in a message M .







In the best case scenario every user will have information of all 5 POIs and
reply with POIreqp, a 1125 bytes message.
5.4 Experiments
Once the system has been defined we need to determine how it will perform in
a realistic scenario. To that end, we have modified the simulation tool poiSim to
simulate Anonymous Chains of Trust.
In Anonymous Chains of Trust whenever a user reviews a POI the system
needs to choose between: (i) broadcasting that review,i.e., making it public, and
(ii) waiting until the user’s vehicle recognizes a trusted node and asking him to
review that POI on his behalf. As explained in section 5.1, this decision depends
on the system parameter α. In the early stages of the application deployment, that
delay can hamper the development of theWeb of Trust between users. Determining
the degree to which the system deployment is affected is our main goal.
In this experiment, every user inputs a new review into the system every 5 days
and we study different values for α: a user requests another user to review a POI on
his behalf once every 2 reviews (α = 1/2), 1 review of every 5 (α = 1/5), 1 review
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of every 7 (α = 1/7), 1 review of every 9 (α = 1/9) and a control sample where
users do not review POIs on behalf of other users (α = 0). The reviews or rates
users assign to POIs are between 0 and 15 and follow a normal distribution with
mean 7 and σ = 2. The evaluation of user misbehavior is outside the scope of this
simulation. It should be noted that the real measure of the system performance is
given by how many users every user knows and how much he trusts them, because
(i) the more users he knows the more information he has to choose a truthful
recommendation from and (ii) the more users he knows the more users he can ask
to review a POI on his behalf and make his identity harder to discover.
In Figs. 5.3a and 5.3b the evolution of the number and length of unverified POI
chains can be seen. After the first 5 days of simulation the number of unverified
chains and its length is very similar regardless of the reviewing rate. The fact that
the average number of unverified chains is over 90 (the simulator can store up to
100) and its length is approximately 5 (considering any of the α’s) means that
there has been interaction between the users and some have already started to
build a better reputation in the network. Moreover, considering the results after
20 days of simulation it can be seen that they do not differ significantly.
As far as verified chains are concerned, in Fig. 5.3c the direct relation between
the reviewing rate and the number of verified chains the nodes store can be ob-
served. After 20 days of simulation it can be observed that difference between
a α = 1/5 and the control group with α = 0 is almost 1, increasing to almost
2.5 for α = 1/2. Overall, the more often a user request another user to review a
POI on his behalf the lower his number of verified chains will be, which is logical
considering that highest request frequencies introduce a greater delay to informa-
tion transmission. Fig. 5.3d shows the mean of the length of verified POI chains.
It can be observed that is very similar to 5.3b, which is natural considering that
every time a POI is reviewed its unverified chain moves on to the verified state.
Regarding the rate assigned to the POIs in the verified chains, in Fig. 5.3e it can
be observed that the rate of the reviewed POIs varies until it stabilizes around
7, which is expected since the randomly chosen rates are distributed around that
value, as previously described in this section. The different simulated values for α
determine how fast the POI rate converges to 7.
Figs 5.4a and 5.4b present the user reputation results. In 5.4a we can see that
after 20 days of simulation, nodes in the control group (α = 0) know on average
160 users, while nodes with α = 1/5 know approximately 130 users and nodes
with α = 1/2 know slightly under 100. Regarding the level of trust in those users
depicted in Fig. 5.4b, we can say that they are very similar regardless of the value
of α, the maximum difference shown by α = 0 and α = 1/2.






























(a) Number of unverified POI chains: for
every node the number of unverified POI































(b) Length of unverified POI chains: for
every node the mean of its unverified POI
chains length is computed, the mean of
those means is the depicted result.
Figure 5.3: Evolution of the length and number of unverified and verified chains.
5.5 Conclusions
In this section we have presented a novel mechanism to preserve users privacy in a
reputation system. By allowing users to borrow each other’s identities an attacker
can never be sure of who was the real reviewer behind a given POI recommenda-
tion. In other words, users that trust each other form a virtual group where any
user can use anybody else’s identity, thus hiding behind the group. Moreover, this
technique should be transparent to the user reputation, since identity borrowing
can only occur between users that trust each other, which by definition implies
that their reviews for a given POI category are very similar and therefore inter-
changeable. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time this technique has
been applied to reputation systems.
The results of our simulation tell us that regardless of the value of α we have
used (how often a user reviews POI on behalf of another) the length of unverified
and verified chains and their rates remains very similar. Regarding the number
of users known by every node and his level of trust in them we have shown that
even if the known number of users is slightly lower for α = 1/5 the difference
when compared to the control group is not significant and does not constraint the
development of the reputation system. When we compare the control group with
α = 0 we can start to see a decrease in the system performance (it has a fewer
number of verified chains and knows less nodes).

































(c) Number of verified POI chains: for ev-
ery node the number of verified POI chains































(d) Length of verified POI chains: for every
node the mean of its verified POI chains
length is computed, the mean of those






















(e) Rate in the verified POI chains: the
mean of the rates users assign to POIs.
Figure 5.3: Evolution of the length and number of unverified and verified chains
(continued).






























(a) Number of known nodes: mean of the

















(b) Rate or level of trust of the known
nodes: mean of the rates users assign to
other users as POI reviewers.
Figure 5.4: Number of known nodes and their levels of trust progress.
about 20 other users which he trusts with a rate of approximately 1.5 tells us that
an attacker trying to profile a user will have to guess which of the 20 trusted nodes
he relies on really issued the review. This problem becomes increasingly harder as
the days go by. For instance, after 20 days of simulation an attacker would have
to find the real reviewer from a group of approximately 120 users.
All in all, the results show that reviewing POIs on behalf of other users with a
moderate frequency has hardly an impact on the system performance while their
privacy is protected. However, in a scenario where users review as many POIs
on behalf of others as they do for themselves the results point to the fact that
borrowing identities to preserve user privacy poses a constraint on how fast the
reputation system develops.
Chapter 6
Visual Light Communication in
Vehicular Ad-hoc
Networks (VANETs)
Chains of Trust and Anonymous Chains of Trust rely on radio communication
(Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE)-Direct Short Range Com-
munication (DSRC)) to transmit information. Radio communication, however, is
inherently vulnerable to natural interferences and intentional jamming. Further-
more, in areas with a high number of vehicles their radio devices compete for
access to the transmission medium, which means that some users may be able to
transmit while others may not. In this section we explore a different approach.
The last goal of this thesis is to determine whether Visual Light Communication
(VLC) could be an effective way to transmit information in a Vehicular Ad-hoc
Network (VANET) (either on its own or in collaboration with WAVE-DSRC).
However, the fact that the technology is not yet fully developed has to be taken
into consideration. In addition, current research is focused on indoor applications
because of its lower complexity. As a result, our experiments will only focus on
the transmission range and we will consider 5m to be the maximum VLC range,
because beyond that distance the data rate decreases dramatically. Notice how 5m
should be enough to allow a vehicle to at least communicate with its immediate
neighbors.
In the simulated scenario every vehicle is equipped with a set of VLC emitters
and receivers distributed as depicted in Fig. 6.1. Even though the emitter’s trans-
mission cone is yet to be defined by manufacturers, we do know that LEDs are
relatively inexpensive, which allows us to install several emitter-receiver sets in ar-
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ray to maximize the chance of a successful transmission regardless of the vehicles’
position.
Figure 6.1: Emitter-receiver sets positioned in a vehicle and their transmission
cone.
In order to determine how VLC would perform in a real VANET we need a
realistic simulation tool. Simulation tools like Glomosim or ns-2 were discarded
because in order to simulate hundreds of thousands of nodes they require a massive
amount of memory. Thus, we were inclined to use a modified design of our own
simulation tool [110, 111]. Like in [88], it was decided to analyze the realistic
vehicular trace produced by the Multi-Agent Traffic Simulator (MMTS) developed
by K.Nagel at ETH Zurich. The MMTS is capable of simulating public and private
traffic over real regional road maps of Switzerland with a high level of realism. It
models the behavior of people living in the area, reproducing their movement (using
vehicles) within a period of 24 hours. The decision of each individual depends on
the area it lives in. The individuals in the simulation are distributed over the
cities and villages according to statistical data gathered by a census. Within
the 24 hours of simulation, all individuals choose a time to travel and the mean
of transportation according to their needs and environment, e.g., one individual
might take a car and go to work in the early morning, another one wakes up later
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and goes shopping using public transportation, etc. All in all, with over 260.000
simulated nodes or vehicles in an area of around 250 km x 260 km, this mobility
trace suited our simulation needs.
The mobility trace roughly consists in a x, y, z position update for every node
every t seconds (different periods t for every node). It has 3 different types of
updates: node starts a trip, node updates its position and node finishes a trip.
Every time the trace provides an update on a vehicle’s position, the simulation tool
computes a rectilinear trajectory between the previous x, y, z and the new x′, y′, z′
coordinates for the updated node, as depicted in Fig. 6.2. Then, its trajectory
is compared to the trajectory of every active node (every vehicle currently on
the road) and it determines if their paths cross and should that be the case if
the crossing point falls within the segment delimited by the x, y, z and x′, y′, z′
coordinates. Finally, it also takes into consideration the speed of both vehicles
and the transmission range of VLC to determine if the vehicles are in range of one
another and if the transmission succeeded.
Figure 6.2: In range detection based on vehicles R, G, B trajectories.
In the next sections we present the results of our simulations. VLC can transmit
at 115Kbps at approximately 5m [100], although in order to account for future
improvements on the technology we will also consider ranges of 10m and 15m and
compare those results to the results yielded by the range of WAVE-DSRC (120m).
It should be noted that the vehicles or nodes being simulated spend an average
of 3,134.17s on the road (slightly less than an hour) and make 1.99 trips. Our
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simulations were designed with the following goals in mind:
• compute the mean of the number of packets received by each node and its
distribution.
• study the transmission of information over an area with a gossip protocol.
• identify the limitations of WAVE-DSRC on the usage of the physical medium.
6.1 Average Number of Received Packets
As depicted in Fig.6.3, the average number of packets received by every node is
computed. For ranges 5m, 10m and 15m it can be seen that a similar number of
packets was received (443.38 packets, 458.55 packets, 473.88 packets). However,
when compared with the 120m range of WAVE (1,491.60 packets) the difference
in performance is quite evident. If we look at the distribution of the mean, it can
be observed that the VLC ranges share similar results: over 150,000 nodes receive
between 0 and 499 packets, while over 300 receive 2,500 or more. With a range of
120m, over 70,000 nodes in the WAVE VANET receive between 0 and 499 packets,
























































Figure 6.3: Mean and distribution of the number of packets received by each node.
Solely looking at these results it can be firmly stated that VLC cannot replace
WAVE-DSRC without a decrease in the network’s throughput. That being said,
the results also show that even with a range of 5m 443 packets were received, which
means that VLC may be able to work together with WAVE to protect VANETs
from DoS attacks.
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Figure 6.4: Distribution of packets transmitted in the traveled area.
6.2 Received Packets over an Area
In order to find out how important the transmission range is to propagate a message
over a certain area another experiment was designed. Considering the results
from the previous section, a node which received an average number of packets
was selected as a representative sample of the network population. In the new
simulation, that node will broadcast a packet every time its position is updated,
at the same time the rest of the network will remain silent until they receive that
message. From that point onwards they too will broadcast the message to its
neighbors and so on until the simulation finishes.
In Fig. 6.4 we can see the result of the described scenario in the number of
packets that were transmitted. The three different ranges for VLC (5m, 10m and
15m) obtained very similar results both in number of packets and their distribution.
As far as WAVE is concerned, even though it produced approximately 300,000
transmissions more than VLC it did so with a very similar distribution. These
results show that shorter transmission ranges can be compensated by the use of
gossip broadcast protocols.
6.3 Analysis of WAVE Scalability
In order to analyze the scalability of WAVE-DSRC a simulation in ns-3 [98] was
implemented defining a vehicular scenario with 400 nodes arranged in 4 lanes
as depicted in Fig.3.6, connected through a WAVE-DSRC 27Mbps link with a
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Percentage of received broadcasts
Number of packets / Period (s) 10 20 30 40 50 60
100 71.82 87.08 91.48 93.66 95.03 95.93
200 36.23 71.79 82.08 87.04 89.71 91.46
300 15.77 54.50 71.75 79.71 84.06 87.05
400 9.45 36.71 60.52 71.88 78.14 82.21
500 6.83 23.43 48.62 63.59 72.13 77.26
600 5.28 15.89 36.77 54.55 65.24 71.99
700 4.28 11.88 27.18 45.53 58.29 66.44
800 3.64 9.51 20.41 36.85 51.05 60.65
Table 6.1: Percentage of received broadcasts for every simulated scenario.
120 meters range (like it was done in section 3.8). This scenario represents a
traffic jam, which is the worse possible situation for radio communication due to
the high density of vehicles. It should be noted that our simulation uses ns-3
YansWifiPhyHelper and YansWifiChannelHelper classes, as defined in [107].
In a nutshell, the simulation schedules the broadcast of numPackets 1000 bytes
packets at a randomly chosen time between the start of the simulation and its end-
ing point, defined as period. For every scenario (numPackets/period combination)
the number of broadcasts received by each of the 400 simulated nodes is computed
(resultsnumPackets,period) and compared with how many broadcasts each of those
nodes would have received without packets loss (referencenumPackets), considering
the mean as the scenario’s result:








Looking at the results in table 6.1 it can be seen that for 400 packets every
30s the percentage of received broadcasts drops to 60.52%; the general tendency
is that for a high number of packets transmitted over short periods the network
throughput decreases. It should be noted that in this simulation we considered
a scenario where every node broadcasts a message and there are no acknowledge-
ments or retries. Had we considered bidirectional communication between vehicles
and a road side unit the network throughput would have been even lower due to the
number of retries. We strongly believe that VLC could help improve the delivery
rate because in VLC users do not have to compete for the physical medium.
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6.4 Conclusions
In this section we have explored the future possibilities of VLC replacing or com-
plementing the current standard for communication in VANETs (WAVE-DSRC).
Several experiments were prepared, each with a different objective in mind: (i)
determine how many packets are received by each node (on average), (ii) how the
transmitted information is distributed when VLC and WAVE are compared and
(iii) analyze the success data rate of a worst case scenario (traffic jam) with WAVE.
To the best of our knowledge, we have been the first to realistically consider the
use of VLC in the VANET environment and provide realistic results that back our
theory.
The first experiment shows that every node receives at least three times as many
packets with WAVE as they receive with VLC in any of its different transmission
ranges. For the second simulation we choose a node which receives an average
number of packets and make him transmit in an epidemic way (at the beginning of
the simulation he is the only one transmitting, but once a node receives that packet
he starts transmitting as well). The results show that even though WAVE-DSRC
obtained a higher number of transmitted packets, i.e., infected more nodes, the
distribution in the x, y, z space was very similar. Which leads us to the conclusion
that the short range of VLC can be made up for with the use of epidemic or
gossip protocols. Finally, the third simulation shows at which point WAVE-DSRC
stops getting information through due to the high competition for the medium
and the resulting packet collisions. At that point, the network throughput could
be improved by using VLC to transmit as well, since in VLC nodes do not need
to compete for the physical medium due to the nature of light communication.
In addition, we also need to consider the fact that while WAVE, like all radio
communication, is subject to jamming VLC is not. WithWAVE, an attacker with a
powerful enough radio device could easily cause a blind spot in the network (which
would lead to a DoS) with dimensions depending on how good is his equipment.
However, in order to jam the transmission of information in VLC the attacker
would have to physically block the beam of light from the emitter to the receiver.
All in all, we believe that once VLC is ready to be deployed in the open air
it will be an important addition to VANET communication. Working together
with WAVE-DSRC, it will provide an extra link which can be used by public
safety applications and whenever the WAVE-DSRC performance is below a certain
threshold either due to the medium congestion or to an attack.
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Chapter 7
Final Conclusions
In this thesis we have presented the current state of the art in security and rep-
utation systems for Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) while examining each
proposal and discussing its benefits and drawbacks.
Following the required background, we have introduced Chains of Trust, a new
Point of Interest (POI) information dissemination scheme that builds a reputation
system, which unlike most current solutions is solely based on the vehicular ad-hoc
network, i.e., it requires no roadside infrastructure. Users manage their own iden-
tities and the information they input into the system is kept distributed among
the vehicles in the network, i.e., there is no central entity where all the information
is stored, thus protecting user privacy. In addition, it uses information aggrega-
tion techniques to accumulate POI reviews and increasing the speed at which the
reputation system is built.
In order to determine how Chains of Trust would behave in a realistic scenario,
we designed poiSim, our own simulation tool capable of handling a scenario with
over 260,000 vehicles. Our objective was to show that by separating the commu-
nications from the application layer it is possible to build an application simulator
which can execute simulations in the order of hundreds of thousands of nodes.
This approach will produce more realistic results than using network simulators
to simulate both the communication and application layers, as done in the vast
majority of research articles.
We have also presented a novel mechanism to preserve users privacy in a repu-
tation system. By allowing users to borrow each other’s identities an attacker can
never be sure of who was the real reviewer behind a given POI recommendation.
In other words, users that trust each other form a virtual group where any user
can use anybody else’s identity, thus hiding behind the group. Moreover, this
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technique should be transparent to the user reputation, since identity borrowing
can only occur between users that trust each other, which by definition implies
that their reviews for a given POI category are very similar and therefore inter-
changeable. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time this technique has
been applied to reputation systems.
Finally, we looked into the future of vehicular communication. Visual Light
Communication (VLC) solves one of the biggest problems of radio communication
by providing a secure communication channel resilient against jamming. VLC
would provide a one-hop transmission system which could be specially helpful in
case of an emergency, e.g., car accident, or whenever the radio channel was too
populated and transmission became virtually impossible.
Chapter 8
Future Work
This section outlines several methods to expand this thesis. In the future, mis-
behavior simulation should be added to the simulation tool poiSim, so that the
rewards and penalties system can effectively be evaluated. In addition, we would
like to develop a modified version of Anonymous Chains of Trust where users have
a direct link to an Internet Service Provider through cellular technologies, thus
incorporating a Certification Authority (CA) in our scheme and compare how it
performs compared to the ad-hoc version. Moreover, we would also like to explore
the possibility of adapting our application to pedestrian networks.
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a b s t r a c t
This article is a position paper on the current security issues in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs).
VANETs face many interesting research challenges in multiple areas, from privacy and anonymity to the
detection and eviction of misbehaving nodes and many others in between. Multiple solutions have been
proposed to address those issues. This paper surveys the most relevant while discussing its benefits and
drawbacks. The paper explores the newest trends in privacy, anonymity, misbehaving nodes, the
dissemination of false information and secure data aggregation, giving a perspective on how we foresee
the future of this research area.
First, the paper discusses the use of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) (and certificates revocation),
location privacy, anonymity and group signatures for VANETs. Then, it compares several proposals to
identify and evict misbehaving and faulty nodes. Finally, the paper explores the differences between
syntactic and semantic aggregation techniques, cluster and non-cluster based with fixed and dynamic
based areas, while presenting secure as well as probabilistic aggregation schemes.
& 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
With the massive deployment of wireless technologies on
motorized vehicles, automotive industries have opened a wide
variety of possibilities for drivers and their passengers. Theoreti-
cally, anything from finding out the road conditions ahead to
watching a movie through streaming is possible. Different kinds
of applications will need different requirements. As mentioned by
Reichardt et al. (2002) and Raya and Hubaux (2005a) applications
can be categorized as follows:
1. Safety related:
(a) Traffic information messages: used to disseminate traffic
conditions in a region and thus affect public safety only
indirectly—they are not time-critical.
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(b) General safety-related messages: used by public safety
applications such as cooperative driving and collision
avoidance—they should satisfy an upper bound delay.
(c) Liability-related messages: they are only exchanged in
liability-related situations such as accidents—time is not
an issue, but the messages should be able to reveal the
senders’ ID to the law authorities.
2. Others:
(a) Toll applications: electronic toll collection systems like
AutoPASS in Norway allow drivers to continue driving
without having to stop at tolls.
(b) TV and other multimedia content: used to provide users with
entertainment and information (movies, newspapers, etc.).
(c) Advertisements: businesses along the road (such as gas-
stations and restaurants) could advertise themselves to
drivers before they reached the business location, giving
them enough time to compare different offers.
As far as safety applications’ requirements are concerned, the
integrity and the non-repudiation of the messages have to be
ensured, albeit maintaining at the same time the user’s privacy, as
will be discussed in Section 3. Other applications, e.g., multimedia
content distribution, may also need to encrypt their traffic to
avoid eavesdropping from non-registered users. The use of
Certification Authorities (CAs) and public key cryptography to
protect Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I)
communication fulfills most security requirements.
Vehicles have to be equipped with On Board Units (OBUs) to be
able to communicate among them and with Road Side Units (RSUs).
RSUs compose the roadside infrastructure which connects the vehi-
cular network to a central system (e.g., a CA) or to the Internet.
There are a few published papers that survey the area of
security in vehicular networks (Parno and Perrig, 2005; Raya and
Hubaux, 2005b; Plobl et al., 2006). Nevertheless, they are quite
outdated since their most recent cited papers are from the year
2005 while most of this article’s references are from 2006
onward. In addition, they do not analyze more recent trends like
the use of group signatures and specific aggregation techniques.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
the communications architecture used in VANETs is introduced.
Section 3 explains how certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists
(CRLs) are used and what are its main advantages and drawbacks and
how the use of pseudonyms, group signatures and anonymous
certificates can improve privacy and anonymity. Following, Section
4 introduces how to identify and exclude misbehaving and faulty
nodes. In Section 5 several schemes for secure data aggregation are
presented. Finally, in Section 6 we present our conclusions.
2. Vehicular communications and architecture
Vehicles will be equipped with a set of processors and sensors
(Papadimitratos et al., 2009) dedicated to collect and analyze data
related to (i) mechanical and electronic components of the vehicle
(e.g., battery charge, brakes, fuel) and (ii) vehicle traveling related
information (e.g., GPS data, vehicle speed and direction, radar
data). Furthermore, vehicles will obtain data from other vehicles
in their neighborhood and from RSUs.
Vehicular communication technologies comprise cellular
(GPRS/UMTS), Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) and
the IEEE 802.11 technology family. Cellular communications can be
used as a basis for long-range communications at low data rates
(i.e., less than 2Mb/s), mainly for V2I communication. Alternatively,
WIFI IEEE 802.11a,b,g may provide short-range access (i.e., less than
100m) to RSUs at medium–high data rates (i.e., between 1 and
54Mb/s). Finally, Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE)
standards allow short-range communications (i.e., less than 1000m)
at data rates between 3 and 27 Mb/s. IEEE 802.11p WAVE
(Uzcategui and Acosta-Marum, 2009) is defined to allow both
V2V and V2I communications. WAVE comprises IEEE 802.11p and
IEEE 1609.x standards. WAVE units support multichannel opera-
tion: primary management frames and Wave Short Messages
(WSM) use a fixed Control Channel (CCH) while other management
frames and data frames (e.g., IP datagrams) use a Service Channel
(SCH). SCH exchanges require the devices to be members of the
WAVE Basic Services (WBS) that act as the corresponding service
sets in IEEE 802.11. At higher layers, the WAVE stack allows the
transport of TCP/UDP using IPv6 datagrams. In this way, legacy of
TCP/IP connectivity is ensured. Besides, WAVE also defines aWAVE
Short Message Protocol (WSMP) to accommodate high-priority,
time-sensitive traffic. It should also be considered that the WAVE
1609.2 standard defines security services for the WAVE stack,
which include confidentiality, authenticity, integrity and anonym-
ity services.
3. Techniques to achieve privacy
In the near future, VANETs are going to change the way people
drive and it will solely depend on the security measures that are
implemented if they do it for the better or for the worse. The
creation of VANETs can help improve traffic management and
roadside safety. Unfortunately, a VANET also comes with its own
set of challenges, particularly in security and privacy. As a special
implementation of mobile ad hoc networks, a VANET is subject to
many security threats, which can lead to attacks and service
abuses. For instance, an attacker could tamper with traffic applica-
tions and make its users believe that there is a traffic jam in a
particular road making them to take an alternative way, thus
freeing the original road for the attacker’s benefit. A more danger-
ous example would be for an attacker to sign liability messages
with a fake identity so that he could not be linked to a car accident
scene. Furthermore, network applications could also be used for
more subtle and equally illegal objectives such as tracking people
on their vehicles. Therefore, there is a real demand for security
mechanisms, especially for those that protect the user’s privacy.
The security architecture developed by the Vehicle Safety
Communications Consortium (VSCC) and subsequently submitted
to IEEE P1609.2 (IEEE, 2007) defines a PKI-based approach for
securing messages sent in V2V and V2I communication. The
standard, however, does not address privacy issues. Raya et al.
(2006b) propose different mechanisms for certificate revocation
and discuss privacy issues in vehicular networks. Conditional
privacy preservation must be achieved in the sense that user-
related private information, e.g., driver’s name, license plate,
position has to be protected, while at the same time authorities
have to be able to reveal the identity of message senders in case of
a traffic event dispute, such as a car accident. Therefore, it is
critical to develop a suite of elaborate and carefully designed
security mechanisms to achieve security and conditional privacy
preservation in VANETs before they can be deployed.




 pseudonyms and pseudonyms certificates.
Table 1 summarizes the privacy schemes and classifies them
according to whether a scheme uses (i) anonymous certificates,
(ii) group signatures or (iii) pseudonyms to achieve privacy.
Table 2 indicates if a work considers problems as group forma-
tion, traceability, revocation or message linkability. The dynamic
D. Antolino Rivas et al. / Journal of Network and Computer Applications 34 (2011) 1942–1955 1943
Author's personal copy
column shows if the scheme dynamically changes the message
signature keys.
Although the problem of certificate revocation is commented
when needed throughout the whole section, we add at the end a
specific subsection to point out other references in that field and
discuss the most relevant mechanisms to reduce the size of CRLs.
3.1. Achieving privacy through anonymous certificates
One solution to the privacy problem is to use a list of
anonymous certificates for message authentication, where the
relationship of the list of anonymous certificates with a vehicle’s
driver is stored in a Transportation Regulation Center (TRC). For
instance, Raya and Hubaux (2005a) introduce a security protocol
based on anonymous certificates. With a pool of approximately
43 800 certificates, every time a vehicle wants to communicate
with the network it randomly chooses one of the available
certificates to sign a particular message and then discards it. In
this way, the driver’s privacy is guaranteed, since there is no way
for an attacker to tell if two messages were sent by the same user.
To achieve conditional traceability, a unique electronic ID is
assigned to each vehicle by which the police and authorities can
verify the identity of the owner in case of any dispute. Although
this scheme can effectively meet the conditional privacy require-
ment, it is far from efficient and can hardly become a scalable and
reliable approach. Since the ID management authority stores all
the anonymous certificates for each vehicle in its administrative
region (province or country), once a malicious node is detected,
the authority has to exhaustively search in a large database
(probably 43 800 certificatesmillions of cars) to find the ID
related to the misbehaving anonymous public key. Besides, if a
node needs to be revoked all its anonymous certificates have to be
included in the CRL, which will then grow very fast.
In National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (2006) a
similar solution is proposed. They also use short-lived certificates,
although they are blindly signed by the CA. The Escrow Authority
(EA) is responsible for maintaining the link between the anon-
ymous certificates and the vehicle’s real identity using a linkage
marker, in order to deal with the ‘‘insider’’ attack. Still, they suffer
from the same problems, because in order to revoke a vehicle all
of its non-expired anonymous certificates have to be included in
the CRL.
Laurendeau and Barbeau (2007) devise a scheme following a
very different approach from the ones described above. In a
nutshell, all the nodes share a Network Authorization Key (AK),
which grants the privilege of broadcasting messages in the
VANET. In addition, every vehicle has a secret key (SK) only
known by the CA and itself. Whenever a node wants to broadcast
a message it needs to ask the CA for the AK, which as we will see
below needs to be a short-lived key. In order to enable the revo-
cation of rogue vehicles their identifier is included in the message,
although for privacy concerns it is encrypted with the CAs public
key. Let us define the OBUid of an anonymous node A as
fIdA,HSKA ðIdA9HAK ðMÞÞgCA ð1Þ
The OBUid is added to any message A wants to broadcast to
prove its authorization to transmit a broadcast message M by
hashing it with the network authorization key to produce a
message digest HAK(M).
fM,HAK ðMÞ,CA,OBUidg ð2Þ
It should also be noted that the scheme relies on CRLs to
revoke nodes from the network and the CA is the only one
qualified to include them in the list. However, the AK is not
updated until it has expired. Hence the need for a short-lived AK,
since nothing keeps the rogue node from broadcasting bogus
messages until the AK expires (vulnerability window). On the
other hand, if we consider a scheme where information messages
are transmitted from OBUs to RSUs, validated at the CA and then
issued back from the RSUs as trusted messages to the vehicles
(to which they would respond diminishing speed or stopping) the
vulnerability window disappears, because the CA has permanent
access to the CRL and can discard any message coming from a
revoked node. However, safety message applications would suffer
a great delay in comparison to schemes where the information is
actually collected and delivered directly by the vehicle’s neigh-
bors. Therefore, this solution is not the best suited for this kind of
applications.
Table 1
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Taxonomy of privacy and certificate revocation schemes (continued).
Revocation Traceability Dynamic Linkability
Raya and Hubaux (2005a) X X X
Sampigethaya et al. (2005) X
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Rass et al. (2008) X
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3.2. Achieving privacy through group signatures
The main feature of the group signature scheme is that it
provides anonymity to the group members, because any node
inside the group can verify if a certain message was sent by a
group member without knowing the sender’s real identity inside
the group.
Lin et al. (2007) integrate the techniques of Group Signature
(Chaum and Van Heyst, 1999) and Identity-based Signature
(Shamir, 1985) to solve the issues on security and conditional
privacy preservation. They divide that problem into two parts:
communication coming from an OBU and communication coming
from an RSU. The main idea is to use group signatures to address
the first part of the problem, so that messages are anonymously
signed, while the identities of the senders can still be recovered by
the authorities. In order to address the second part of the privacy
problem they introduce a signature scheme that uses Identity-based
Cryptography (IBC) (Boneh and Franklin, 2001) to digitally sign each
message sent by an RSU to ensure its authenticity.
1. Communication from an OBU: The main issue is how to solve the
contradiction between making the messages anonymous and at
the same time traceable by the authorities. A secure group
signature must be correct (honestly generated signatures can be
verified), anonymous and unlinkable to the original identity
although traceable under some circumstances (Lin et al., 2007).
By using a group signature scheme such as the one described by
Chaum and Van Heyst (1999) a verifier can judge whether the
signer belongs to a group without actually knowing the signer’s
real identity in the group. Besides, if the situation ever requires
it, the CA, which serves as a group manager, can reveal the
signer’s true identity. Lin et al. (2007) propose a role separation
between the authority that provides the keys for the group and
the law authorities that may need to trace a group member’s
real identity. Therefore, the role of the group manager is divided
into a Membership Manager (MM), whose task is to assign
private and group public keys to the vehicles, and a Tracing
Manager (TM), i.e., the law authorities.
2. Communication from an RSU: Messages sent from RSUs do not
need to remain anonymous. Therefore, the identifier string of
each RSU can be used as the public key to sign its messages. The
probably secure identity-based signature scheme described by
Barreto et al. (2005) is the one chosen by Lin et al. (2007), since
the length of the signature is greatly reduced thanks to the use
of bilinear pairing.
Figure 1 depicts how the system works. Three types of network
entities are identified: the TM, the MM and the mobile OBUs. The
main idea is that all vehicles need to be registered with the MM
and pre-loaded with the group public key and their own private
key before they can join the network. When the vehicles are on
the road, they regularly broadcast routine traffic related messages
(position, speed, etc.). Should an accident occur (or any other kind
of event that required the vehicles’ real identities to be revealed)
police officers would submit the messages collected at the time of
the accident to the TM, who is responsible for the authorization of
revealing the real identities of the wanted vehicles. The TM would
then forward recovered clues and evidences to the MM which
would search the real identity in its membership database.
In the article, the authors emphasize the need for a system that
has the ability to selectively revoke the group membership of a
compromised vehicle either by updating the group keys or by
releasing a customized version of the Revocation Lists (RLs). If the
group keys are updated, the private keys of the revoked vehicles are
distributed in an RL so that unrevoked vehicles can locally update
their private and group public keys, whereas the revoked vehicles
cannot due to the signature scheme being used (Strong Diffie
Hellman in groups with a bilinear map) (Boneh et al., 2004).
However, this option introduces significant overhead due to the
periodic changes of keys. Alternatively, a Verifier-Local Revocation
(VLR) scheme (Atenies et al., 2002; Boneh and Shacham, 2004;
Kiayias et al., 2004), similar to the traditional CRL, is very efficient
(as long as the number of compromised vehicles is low) since only
message verifiers are involved in the revocation check-up operation.
In Lin et al. (2007), a hybrid scheme is proposed, which in general
terms consists in using VLR until the number of revoked vehicles
reaches a certain threshold T and then switching to key updating.
Some aspects remain unclear in Lin et al. (2007). For instance,
the authors do not cover how the groups are formed, or if there is
communication among them, so that if a node is revoked from a
group it is revoked from all groups. Besides, if VRL relies on the
fact that only the verifiers deal with revoked nodes that means
that most of the group nodes are just dummy nodes (they do not
interpret the message information) or even all if the verifier is
the MM, which makes the whole scheme unsuitable for safety
information applications. In our view, the authors should specify
what VANETs applications can take advantage of their scheme.
Raya et al. (2006a) present a technique for secure group
formation. Although the paper is centered on secure data aggre-
gation it provides some insights in group formation techniques
that could be used to increase privacy.
3.2.1. Achieving privacy through group signatures: how groups
are formed
There are many ways to form groups in VANET applications.
For example, all public transport buses can be members of a preset
group. This is the easiest and most efficient way of group
formation, but it requires prior knowledge of all group members,
as well as a common authority over them. This is not the case
when individual drivers on a highway decide to join a platoon in
order to improve their driving experience. This requires on-the-fly
group formation where a group leader is elected and group
membership is managed dynamically. This latter category of
groups is the most useful due to its flexibility, but it is also the
most difficult to implement due to several issues, such as group
leader election, group overlap, and the related security hurdles.
Raya et al. (2006a) introduce the concept of location-based
groups, where the roads are divided into small area cells that
define the groups. In this fashion, a vehicle will automatically
Fig. 1. Secure communication system.
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know to which group it belongs, the group leader will be by
definition the closest vehicle to the center of the cell and
naturally, it will be elected dynamically. It should be noted that,
in the leader election process, vehicles do not broadcast their real
identities but rather pseudonyms for privacy purposes, so the
authors combine the use of groups with the use of pseudonyms
for intra-cluster privacy.
On the plus side of this proposal, the group formation process
is simplified and when using geographic routing determining
which groups should relay messages is straightforward. However,
for an attacker to always be elected group leader will suffice to
place himself in the center of the cell permanently.
Vehicles periodically broadcast their public keys, so upon the
formation of the group or whenever a new vehicle A joins the
group, the leader L broadcasts the group key encrypted with
the node’s public key followed by its signature:
L-A : fKgPuKASigPrKL ½fKgPuKA  ð3Þ
This technique leaves room for improvement if the vehicles
travel together in platoon formation, since the platoon may span
over more than one cell.
Also Raya et al. (2006a) propose another solution named
Dynamic Group Key Creation. The key idea is that once the leader
and members of the group are identified, the leader creates a key
request message that transmits to the CA. The CA will use that
information to generate an asymmetric group key pair and broad-
cast it to all the group members. The key pair will be encrypted with
the symmetric group key included in the key request message. In
addition, the CA assigns to each group member a unique ID for non-
repudiation purposes. Finally, once the asymmetric group key is
established, any group member can send a message signed on behalf
of the group (although accompanied by its certificate issued by the
CA to allow the receivers to verify the signature). The message also
includes the unique ID assigned by the CA to the group member that
sent the message, which implies that the privacy of the individual
vehicle is broken. Note, however, that the objective of the work
reported in Raya et al. (2006a) is to reduce the overhead with data
aggregation and does not explicitly address the problem of privacy.
3.3. Achieving privacy through pseudonyms
Pseudonymous authentication is widely accepted in the VANET
community (Gerlach et al., 2007; IEEE, 2007; Calandriello et al.,
2007; Papadimitratos et al., 2007), especially as an alternative to
anonymous authentication, which can incur in additional overhead
(Raya and Hubaux, 2005a; National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 2006).
The work reported in Gerlach et al. (2007) presents a security
architecture organized in layers. While the lowest layer is concerned
with vehicle application registration and identification, higher layers
are concerned with proper system operation, appropriate security
measures and user privacy protection. In this group of higher layers
we can find the pseudonym and the revocation layer.
The pseudonym layer provides a basic level of anonymity by
introducing the possibility to use changing pseudonyms that
cannot be linked by unauthorized parties. As pointed out by the
authors, pseudonyms shall perform the same roles as the certifi-
cate issued for the node. This scheme uses dynamic pseudonyms
to provide privacy, while at the same time an Escrow Authority
(EA) is responsible for revoking and uncovering the user’s real
identity, if required.
The revocation layer is responsible for excluding nodes from
the system. It contains a database of revoked pseudonyms and
distributes this data to all nodes in the system if necessary,
depending on the scale of the revocation decision, which can
range from only node-local to system-wide.
We should note that when a node is revoked, all its pseudo-
nyms are included in the revocation data. The authors do not
specify how frequently pseudonyms should be changed or how
large the pool of pseudonyms should be, however it is clear that
there is a scalability problem.
From the system architecture perspective, the following enti-
ties are required:
 the vehicle manufacturer and the registration authority for the
registration of nodes,
 the inspection site for test and certification of nodes,
 the ‘‘Escrow Authorities’’, entities with the authoritative power
(e.g., police and courts) to identify and revoke nodes,
 the communication security infrastructure, which includes the
communication systems, processing and databases necessary
to carry out online testing, pseudonym provision for nodes,
revocation of nodes and infrastructure based data assessment
and intrusion handling.
As far as operation is concerned, vehicles use the certificate issued
at the inspection site to request pseudonyms, which will be used to
sign application messages. It is important to note that the scheme
assumes sporadic access to the infrastructure. Some modules, such
as the pseudonym provider may need reliable and on-demand
connectivity, which could be provided by cellular technologies. As
discussed in Raya et al. (2006b), distributing revocation information
can also be achieved by simple terrestrial broadcast.
Calandriello et al. (2007) go a step further and combine the use
of pseudonyms and group signatures. They describe a scheme
which relies on the concept of pseudonymous authentication,
which they name Baseline Pseudonyms (BP). The novelty with
respect to previous works presented in this section is that it
allows on-the-fly generation of the nodes own pseudonyms using
Group Signatures, which in combination with the BP approach
they term Hybrid Scheme.
By BP we understand a system where each node (vehicle) V is
equipped with a set of pseudonyms, that is, public keys certified
by the CA without any information identifying V, where each
pseudonym is used at most for a period t and then discarded. For
the i-th pseudonym Kiv for node V, the CA provides a certificate
CertCAðK
i
vÞ, which is simply a CA signature on the public key K
i
v.
The private key kiv is used by the node to digitally sign messages.
To enable message validation, the pseudonym and certificate of
the signer are attached in each message. With skiv ðÞ denoting V’s
signature under its i-th pseudonym and m the signed message
payload, the message format is





The CA maintains a map of the long-term identity of V to the Kiv
set of pseudonyms provided to a node. When required, the CA can
extract the signer’s identity from a message.
Assuming the general availability of the public key of the CA,
upon the reception of Msg. (4) a node validates CertCAðK
i
vÞ.
It makes use of a CRL, assumed to be distributed to vehicles via
the infrastructure, as described in Raya et al. (2006c). If Kiv is not
included in the CRL and the CA signature on Kiv is valid the node
validates skiv ðmÞ.
The main idea behind the Hybrid Scheme mentioned above is
that each node V is equipped with a group signing key gskv and a
group public key gpkCA. Instead of protecting messages with the
group signature, a node generates its own set of pseudonyms Kiv
(and corresponding private keys kiv), and uses gskv to generate a
group signature SCA,V ðÞ on each pseudonym K
i
v.
Basically, the nodes generate and ‘‘self-certify’’ Kiv using SCA,V ðÞ,
hence producing CertHCAðK
i
vÞ. The H denotes the Hybrid scheme
differentiating it from the BP certificate and the subscript CA
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confirms that the certificate was generated by a legitimate node
registered with the CA. Similar to Msg. (4) we have







Upon the reception of Msg. (5) the group signature is validated
using the gpkCA and the CRL. In this case, in order to disclose the
identity of a message sender an open operation on the CertHCAðK
i
vÞ
group signature is necessary (Bellare et al., 2003, 2004).
In the article, the pseudonym lifetime t is also considered. On
the one hand, it makes the vehicles less traceable as it decreases.
On the other hand, it negatively impacts on the size of Revocation
Lists (RLs) and the revocation process performance. Varying t
from 60 down to 3 s the signing and verification costs are 4.6e3
and 2.3e3 s/msg respectively. Even though those timings may
seem low at first glance, in a densely populated area with over
100 nodes within the range it may be a problem for a safety
messaging application, as they themselves remark.
Raya and Hubaux (2005a) present an intuitive method to
compute how often should an anonymous key or pseudonym be
changed, adapting to the vehicle speed. Considering a tracking
scenario where an attacker controls stationary base stations
separated by a distance datt and captures all the received safety
messages. Assuming that the attacker can correlate two keys if
the sender moves at a constant speed in the same direction on the
same lane between two observation points.
Assuming the speed of the target V is vt, its transmission range
dr and dv is the distance over which a vehicle does not change its
speed and lane (hence, the vulnerability window). As illustrated
in Fig. 2, the vehicle’s anonymity is vulnerable over a distance
equal to dvþ2dr . Which means that it is not worth changing the
key over smaller distances since an observer can correlate keys
with high probability. This defines the lower bound on the key





However, if datt4dvþ2dr , V can avoid being tracked by changing
its key as long as it does not use the same key for a distance equal






Since V does not know datt, but knows dr and dv, it can choose a
value of Tkey that is slightly larger than minðTkeyÞ. If we denote by
rm the message rate, one key should be used for at most:
Nmsg ¼ drm  TkeyeðmessagesÞ ð8Þ
For instance, assume datt¼2 km, rm¼3.33 msg/s (1 message every
300 ms), dv¼30 s vt (i.e. V does not change its lane and speed
over 30 s), dr¼10 s vt (according to DSRC, the transmission range
is equal to the distance traveled in 10 s at the current speed), and
vt¼100 km/h. Then minðTkeyÞ ¼ 50 s and maxðTkeyÞ¼72 s. V can
choose Tkey to be 55 s; as a result, Nmsg¼184 messages.
Rass et al. (2008) elaborate on the idea of using a pseudonym
for a trip and then deriving several pseudonyms from it to use in
the messages (sample identifier). They explicitly want the sample
identifiers to be relatable to the trip identifiers, and at the same
time different trip identifiers should also be relatable among
themselves if a trip becomes interrupted by events like pauses or
leaving and entering the highways with rural roads in between.
Sampigethaya et al. (2005), Huang et al. (2005) and Chaurasia
and Verma (2008) introduce the idea of a silent period between
key changes, although each one with their own particular
approach.
For instance, Chaurasia and Verma (2008) claim that in order
to maximize anonymity, a moving vehicle V needs to continually
observe the number of neighbors that are communicating in its
vicinity. Then, after a pseudonym update a vehicle does not
actually change its pseudonym and start sending messages with
it for a short fixed period of time. After that period V observes the
number k of communicating neighbors and only if k is greater
than a predefined threshold t V transmits with the updated
pseudonym. Otherwise, it remains silent.
The approach above is not suited for safety message applica-
tions. If the vehicles in the VANET need to periodically broadcast
safety messages for cooperative navigation, then the period
between those broadcasts will be the maximum time a vehicle
can remain silent, which needs to be quite small (order of
hundred milliseconds, Sampigethaya et al., 2005) regardless of
the number of neighbors. Sampigethaya et al. (2005) introduce
the use of a random silent period between the update of
pseudonyms. They propose that vehicles form groups and that a
group leader is elected. That group leader acts as a proxy for the
rest of vehicles in the group for V2I communications, so that the
rest of nodes in the group can remain silent for a longer period of
time. Nevertheless, they direct this scheme to Location Based
Services (LBS)1 and not to safety message applications.
Opposed to the use of silent periods between pseudonyms
update are the Mix-Zones (MZs) described in Dtzer (2006).
Basically, in an MZ all the vehicles in a certain zone agree to
change their pseudonyms at the same time, which according to
the author makes any attempt to trace a certain vehicle V nearly
impossible (provided that enough nodes are in that particular
zone). However, this technique is also faulted for safety message
applications for the very same reasons described for the previous
technique.
Similarly, Gerlach et al. (2007) introduce Context Mixes, where
vehicles only change their pseudonym if they consider it is safe,
i.e., they have enough neighbors.
Contrary to the widespread belief that changing pseudonyms
protects vehicles privacy, Wiedersheim et al. (2010) conclude that
use of multiple pseudonyms may not be enough. Using Multiple
Hypothesis Tracking (MHT) (Reid, 1979) and considering an
attacker model where the attacker has the capability to capture
all beacons sent to the network, they conclude that in a scenario
with vehicles sending beacon messages at 1 Hz, changing their
pseudonyms every 10 s and considering an equipment rate of 20%
(rate of vehicles equipped with OBUs) an attacker can effectively
track vehicles with an accuracy of almost 100%.
3.4. Achieving privacy through PKI: managing certificate revocation
PKI is a widely accepted solution (Raya et al., 2006b; Lin et al.,
2007; Calandriello et al., 2007; Papadimitratos et al., 2008) as
stated by the IEEE 1609 family of standards for Wireless Access in
Vehicular Environments (WAVE) (IEEE, 2006). Vehicles in the
network need the appropriate certificates in order to participate
Fig. 2. Attack scenario.
1 LBS make use of the vehicle position to provide a service, for instance finding
the nearest hospital.
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in the system operation. Nevertheless, the certificates should only
be valid for limited periods of time after their generation and the
CA should reserve the right to revoke any nodes’ certificates,
essentially evicting them from the network. In several articles
(Raya and Hubaux, 2005a; Raya et al., 2006b, 2007), it is accepted
that vehicles will carry a trusted component or Tamper Proof
Device (TPD) where the keys and certificates for network opera-
tion are stored and protected.
One of the main concerns of using PKI systems is managing the
CRLs, with millions of users in the system, the potential size of the
CRL is huge. Raya et al. (2006b, 2007) present a way to compress
CRLs using Bloom filters (Bloom, 1970). The main characteristic of
Bloom filters is that they return a configurable rate of false
positives, but there are no false negatives (if the Bloom filter
claims that an element is not in the set, we can be sure it is not).
A Bloom filter (Fig. 3) consists of a sequence of m bits, initially all
set to zero. A key or element can be included in the filter
by hashing it with a specific number k of independent
hash-functions (each ranging from 1 to m) and by setting to
1 the vector bits that are set to 1 in the result. After having added
several keys to the filter, it is certainly possible that one bit is set
to 1 multiple times. To check if an element is contained in the
filter, the element is hashed and the status of the corresponding
bits is checked. If at least one bit that should be one is not, one can
surely affirm that the element is not contained in the filter. On the
other hand, if all necessary bits equal 1, with high probability the
element is included. However, it may also be possible that the bits
were set to 1 by a combination of several other keys, as explained
before. Therefore, the more elements added to the set, the larger
the probability of false positives. Alternatively, Papadimitratos
et al. (2008) take advantage of the multi-tier (regional) CAs setup
to decrease the size of the CRLs. Regional CAs will only manage
the certificates of vehicles in their region.
Studer et al. (2009) propose a scheme based on Temporary
Anonymous Certified Keys (TACK), used to authenticate messages
sent by the vehicles, whose CRL size is linear in terms of the
number of revoked vehicles and unrelated to the size of the
vehicle anonymous certificate set. There are three main entities:
 M: managing authority that acts as the root of trust.
 R: set of valid Regional Authorities (RAs). RAs act as intermedi-
ary authorities and can grant vehicles temporary region-
specific certificates. M issues certificates to RAs and certifies
them to be valid intermediary authorities.
 V: set of valid vehicles or On Board Units (OBUs). Any vehicle
with a valid certificate from M or a region-specific short-lived
certificate from R (while in the proper region) is considered
part of V.
 :V: set of expired or revoked vehicles.
The main idea is to apply group signatures considering a group
which comprises all of the above described entities. M is defined
as the group manager. It initializes the group signature scheme
to generate a group public key gpk and a group master key gmk.
It publishes gpk and retains gmk for itself. Each valid OBU has
a group user key guki, issued by M, which is installed during
annual vehicle inspections. It should be noted that M maintains a
history of all key/OBU pairs it has issued, so that it can later trace
misbehaving vehicles. When a vehicle enters a new region it
needs to update its TACK following these steps:
1. Randomly select new short-lived public and private keys from
the key space (K þS , K

S ).
2. Use the group user key guki to sign K
þ
S and send it to the RA.
3. RA verifies that the user is not in the RL. If it is not, the RA signs
a certificate for the OBU’s TACK public key K þS using the RA’s
secret signing key K1
RA
.
4. RA waits for d seconds to queue up all certificate requests for
that region and broadcasts the certificates.
Whenever a user wants to send a message it signs it with its TACK
private key K1S and periodically broadcasts the RA signed
certificate of its TACK public key K1S . Whenever a user misbe-
haves, to determine which OBU generated a signature c the group
manager tests c against the group user keys of OBUs in V. Once M
identifies Vi it is added to the RL and distributed to the RAs.
Similarly, Sun et al. (2010) try to achieve the same small CRL size
with a pseudonymous authentication scheme. The network archi-
tecture is composed by a Trusted Authority (TA), RSUs and vehicles or
OBUs. The TA issues a certificate CertTA,Rx for a certain RSU Rx, and a
series of pseudonymous certificates for a vehicle Vi to be installed
during periodic vehicle inspections. It should be noted that the
identities in the pseudonyms certificates are derived from two
random seeds using a one-way hash function. The TA divides the
maximum time between vehicle inspections into time windows.
For every window, the TA chooses a random secret key to sign the
vehicle’s pseudonymous certificates, so that in every window the
vehicle has to request Rx to re-sign the pseudonymous certificate for
that window. In this scenario, an RSU can be revoked by including
its only certificate in a CRL. To revoke a vehicle it would suffice for
the TA to release the random seeds from which Vi’s pseudonymous
identities are computed, so that the RSUs do not issue the
re-signature key to Vi in following windows. At the same time the
valid pseudonymous certificate of Vi should be revoked.
Nowatkowski and Owen (2010) define Most Pieces Broadcast
(MPB) technique to distribute CRLs. The first step is to break the
large CRL file down into small pieces, taking into consideration
the coding rate (rate of pieces generated from a file) and the code
overhead (number of pieces needed to recover the original file).
MPB ensures that only the node with the largest number of pieces
broadcasts in a certain area to maximize the use of the wireless
channel. It should be noted that RSUs will always be selected as
the node with most pieces. The authors show that MPB is more
effective than letting all OBUs broadcast their CRL pieces without
control, which results in a broadcast storm of unneeded CRL
pieces that slows down the CRL distribution.
3.5. Position
Three main techniques for achieving privacy have been dis-
cussed in this section: anonymous certificates, group signatures and
pseudonyms/pseudonymous certificates. All these techniques have
been widely studied throughout the literature and from our point
of view are mature enough. The use of these techniques (or a
combination of them, as we have seen) in VANETs is generally
justified by the fact that they contribute to the users’ privacy.
However, by taking a closer look at the methods described in this
section we realize that in order to keep the users’ identity
traceable under some circumstances those methods need PKI.
Therefore, the need for revoking certificates and managing large
CRLs. It has been shown that applications may face that particular
Fig. 3. Bloom filter.
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problem in different ways. Some may appoint certain nodes as
message verifiers and they will be the only ones working with
CRLs. In the global picture, that could give the impression of
efficiency (since the amount of nodes repeating work decreases)
although that is certainly not a good idea for safety message
applications because most of the network works blindfolded.
On the other hand, some other schemes may apply techniques
to compress the CRLs like Bloom filters or to directly reduce the
amount of certificates that need to be revoked, and thus included
in the CRL. We believe extensive effort will be dedicated to
reduce the CRL size as done in Sun et al. (2010) and Studer
et al. (2009) and to study the most efficient ways to distribute it
(Nowatkowski and Owen, 2010).
Special mention deserves the work of Wiedersheim et al.
(2010) for considering the effectiveness of pseudonyms change.
Privacy is a major concern in VANETs security, and so far the use
of pseudonyms seemed to be a perfect solution for the traceability
problem. We believe that extensive research should be performed
to verify if the authors’ claim of complete traceability holds for
equipment rates higher than 20%.
4. Detection and eviction of misbehaving and faulty nodes
In the previous section we have focused on schemes that
provide a secure and reliable network and try to keep attackers
from disrupting its normal operation. However, due to the
attackers ability or just to the devices aging process at some
point in time there will be misbehaving or faulty nodes in the
VANET. That is why in this section we outline several techniques
to detect and evict them from the network (Table 3).
Golle et al. (2004) develop a heuristic called adversarial
parsimony, which informally means finding the best explanation
for corrupted data. The first step is to enhance the vehicles
sensing capabilities giving them physical means to distinguish
its neighbors, for instance with cameras or exchanging informa-
tion in the infrared light spectrum to verify that a vehicle is where
it claims to be, thus preventing sybil attacks. That information
needs to be exchanged between vehicles, and once enough
evidence has been collected the heuristic will find inconsistencies,
if any. For instance, if there is a group of nodes that are linked to
the rest of the network by only one node then that link node is
probably impersonating all the others.
Xiao et al. (2006) present a solution to reliably detect sybil
attacks based on radio signal strength analysis and on the fact
that a vehicle cannot be on different places at the same time. For
clarity of description, they define three categories or roles:
1. Claimer: Each node periodically broadcasts a beacon message
at beacon intervals tb for the purpose of neighbor discovery.
In the beacon message, it claims its identity and position.
The goal of the scheme is to verify its claimed position.
2. Witness: All neighboring nodes, within the signal range of the
claimer, would receive the previous beacon message. They
measure the signal strength and save the corresponding
neighbor information in their memory. Next time they broad-
cast a beacon message, they will attach their neighbor list
including the signal strength measurements.
3. Verifier: After receiving a beacon message, a node waits for a
verifying interval tv during which it collects enough signal
strength measurements concerning the previous beacon mes-
sage from neighboring witnesses. With the collected measure-
ments, the node can locally compute an estimated position for
the claimer, for instance, by performing Minimum Mean-Square
Error (MMSE). However, to be as accurate as possible, before
actually making the computations to locate the sender of a
message the node needs to discard all the signal strength
information that comes from sybil nodes.
In order to discard sybil nodes information they rely on two
principles or rules.
1. Rule 1: An RSU or Base Station (BS) issues a position certifica-
tion for each vehicle passing by. The position certification
contains a time stamp and a location information of the BS and
therefore can prove the presence of the vehicle near the base
station at a certain time.
2. Rule 2: All witnesses for a claimer should consist of vehicles in
the opposite traffic flow.
With Rule 1, we can ensure where a certain vehicle comes from.
Looking at Fig. 4 node a can get a position certification from BS2,
when passing by BS2, and node b can also get one from BS1. When a
and b meet each other, it is easy for them to prove that they come
from opposite directions by exchanging certificates. With Rule 2, we
can ensure that each witness in the opposite traffic flow is a physical
vehicle instead of a sybil one. For instance, suppose that a malicious
node m fabricates seven sybil nodes, in which s7 is traveling in the
opposite direction and the rest in the same. When trying to verify
the positions of s1, . . . , s6, node s7 would be ignored because it
cannot prove that it comes from the upstream of the road.
On the whole, with the help of roadside infrastructure, dis-
honest sybil nodes can be detected through position verification.
Raya et al. (2007) rely on the vehicle’s TPD to execute their
protocol and even revoke itself if it detects it has been tampered
with. They also assume the existence of a honest majority in the
attacker’s neighborhood. Unfortunately, TPDs usually end up
becoming just Tampered Devices, as shown in Anderson and
Kuhn (1996, 1997) and Biham and Shamir (1997). Therefore, an
attacker could just modify their programming to impersonate
several vehicles (Sybil attack) (Douceur and Donath, 2002),
rendering the honest majority hypothesis invalid. And even if
the TPD remained tamper-proof nothing can stop an attacker
from actually stealing the physical device from another car and
once again mount a Sybil attack. Nevertheless, the authors devise
Fig. 4. A scenario with roadside infrastructures.
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Golle et al. (2004) X X
Xiao et al. (2006) X X X
Raya et al. (2007) X X X
Moore et al. (2008b) X X
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a Misbehavior Detection System (MDS) as well as a Local Eviction of
Attackers by Voting Evaluators (LEAVE) protocol to detect and
exclude misbehaving nodes.
MDS basically consists in each node using its own sensory
inputs, messages received from its neighbors and a set of evalua-
tion rules to classify the received safety messages from a given
node as faulty or correct. Messages that are outdated, received
beyond their theoretical area of propagation or contradictory to
the node’s own state are considered false. Their senders, as long as
they are neighbors of the node running MDS are tagged as
misbehaving and their identity is passed on to LEAVE.
The main principle of LEAVE is simple: the neighbors of a
misbehaving vehicle should temporarily evict it. It should be noted
that the system does not require a permanent connection to the CA
to work, as we will see below. It is not a revocation protocol, but
rather a collective warning system against misbehaving nodes.
Upon detecting an attacker, vehicles broadcast warning messages
to all vehicles in range, so that the sharing of information improves
the effectiveness of the stand-alone detection system. Besides,
those warnings can be very valuable when vehicles receive them
even before being able to observe the misbehaving node them-
selves. Any vehicle receiving a warning message adds the warned
device to an accusation list, and once enough warning votes against
a node are collected, its identifier is added to a local blacklist. After
entering the blacklist, disregard messages are repeatedly broad-
casted to the local neighborhood to ignore the attacker’s messages.
The eviction is temporarily limited to the duration of the contact
between the attacker and its neighbors running LEAVE. However,
once the connection to the CA is re-established a global-scale
revocation protocol can be initiated.
Moore et al. (2008b) devise another scheme based on suicide
attacks (Moore et al., 2008a) called Stinger, which also relies on a
honest majority. In a nutshell, should a node believe another one
has misbehaved it will send a message that will evict them both
from the network. The idea is to make the sacrifice of future
participation so costly that discourages false accusations. Stinger
deviates from a suicide attack in the following aspects:
1. Stinger temporarily prohibits devices from transmitting messages,
but allows them to continue to receive and forward messages.
Temporary removal could be used to rapidly ignore an errant
transmitter. The authors assume that most interactions are
short-lived and therefore temporary removal is as effective as
permanent removal in tackling misbehavior. While the sting
instruction prevents the bad and the good device from sending
out additional warnings, both will still receive safety instruc-
tions from other cars. The authors claim that this solution
minimizes the noticeable impact on the sacrificing vehicle
while still penalizing a malicious device. However, in our view,
when considering safety message applications the noticeable
impact is indeed noticeable since the accusing nodes will not
be able to send the information collected by their own sensors.
2. Stinger does not allow more than one node to sacrifice itself for a
misbehaving one (in a local context). Figure 5 illustrates how the
protocol works as the cars move. Misbehaving node M is detected
by A, which broadcasts stingA,M to indicate vehicles near A to
ignore M. Hence, nodes B and C add both A and M to their local
blacklists, while D and E do not because they did not receive the
sting message. As M moves into range of D and E, E issues a new
removal for M, stingE,M . D adds E and M to its local blacklist, but C
does not because it has already ignored M from A’s sting.
3. Stinger permits good devices to continue to accuse bad ones even
after having issued one sting. The authors claim this last
condition to be necessary to prevent the so-called motorway
attacker who widely broadcasts misbehavior and moves
around quickly to attract many stings and prevent good nodes
from excluding subsequent attackers. However, we think the
motorway attack is still possible just by doing the exact
opposite. Since good nodes are always allowed to accuse
misbehaving ones, it would suffice for the attacker to move
around accusing good nodes instead of misbehaving himself.
By using scheme like MDS (described at the beginning of the
section) which had only local visibility (a node only gathers
information about its neighbors), there would be no possible
way for a group of nodes that encountered the attacker for the
first time to identify him as such because of something he had
done in the previous group. This could be solved by a
misbehavior detection system which had a global vision on
all the groups in the network.
Ghosh et al. (2010) present a system, which just like MDS, uses
its sensory input to detect misbehavior. After receiving an alert
message, a vehicle V compares the sensed behavior of the
surrounding cars with a model of expected behavior under that
kind of alert and analyzes how it deviates. For example, if the
vehicles ahead of V start slowing down after he has received an
alert message claiming there has been accident that will match
the expected behavior. This kind of techniques could help an OBU
to determine whether alert messages are true or not, but they
require fine tuned models of expected behaviors for each of the
possible alerts. Something we believe to be unfeasible given the
large number of possible alert situations.
4.1. Position
Several of the articles covered in this section introduce
schemes designed to evict nodes from a VANET while there is
no direct connection to the CA, problem that could be easily
solved using cellular technologies to establish that link (as
described in Section 2). As seen in Xiao et al. (2006), Raya et al.
(2007) and Ghosh et al. (2010), roadside infrastructure and
enhancing the vehicles sensing capabilities are valuable assets
to verify other vehicle’s messages and prevent Sybil attacks. In
our view, preventing multiple identity attacks is of paramount
Fig. 5. Multiple stings for misbehaving node M as it moves over time.
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importance to protect the honest majority hypothesis on which so
many protocols rely. However, we foresee that approaches
following Ghosh et al. (2010) will be very seldom used since the
generation of models of expected sensed behaviors for each of the
possible alerts with a reasonably low rate of false positives seems
to be a daunting task if feasible at all.
5. Techniques for secure data aggregation
One way to use available bandwidth more efficiently is to
aggregate the information of several vehicles into a single
message or record, as done in the V2V traffic information system
described in Nadeem et al. (2004), where vehicles share informa-
tion about each other. Data aggregation shall be able to aggregate
events according to temporal and spatial dimensions. Moreover,
filtering old reports is an essential part of any aggregation
scheme. Thus, any aggregated record has to include an expiration
time after which the information is no longer valid. More difficult
is the definition of spatiality. In terms of aggregation, the key
question is how far a primary record (i.e., an original record) can
participate in an aggregation process.
Scheuermann et al. (2009b) prove that any successful aggrega-
tion scheme must reduce the bandwidth at which information
about an area at distance d is provided to the cars asymptotically
faster than d2. In their scheme, data aggregation is originated at
measurement points (Scheuermann et al., 2009b) and goes to
destinations (i.e., set of vehicles that are interested in information
from a measurement point). Many data aggregation schemes
consider measurement points as specific areas that can be fixed
(e.g., a road segment) or dynamic (e.g., based on the location of a
set of vehicles). Other schemes consider groups of vehicles called
clusters with a specific vehicle, the cluster-head, in charge of
aggregating the primary reports. Clusters can be organized based
on their fixed geographical area or can be dynamically formed by
mobile vehicles. Furthermore, according to Picconi et al. (2006)
data aggregation in VANETs can be classified as syntactic and
semantic. Syntactic aggregation compresses data from multiple
vehicles in order to fit the data in a unique record or frame. For
example, an application that extracts a subset of each individual
record and adds it to a single record is reducing the original
information. Semantic aggregation means that the data from
individual vehicles is summarized. For example, an application
that instead of sending the location of each vehicle, only reports
the number of vehicles in a given area.
Aggregation, however, aggravates the security problem. A mal-
icious aggregator may send aggregated records that do not corre-
spond to real data. For instance, it may falsely report a congested
road by pretending to have aggregated more records than it has
actually received from cars ahead of it. Secure Data Aggregation
(SDA) aims to ensure the integrity of the data aggregation mecha-
nisms in the presence of malicious nodes that can alter the result of
the aggregation. Forging or suppressing a single record can have
low impact in both syntactic and semantic aggregation. Thus, the
main threat (Raya et al., 2006a), in SDA is the generation of false
aggregation information. Secure data aggregation is a topic well
studied in sensor networks. However, due to the mobility nature of
vehicular ad hoc networks and the fact that nodes move following
specific paths, the re-use of wireless sensor network SDA mechan-
isms is not possible in VANETs.
Dietzel et al. (2010) propose the following generic aggregate
structure for SDA schemes:
A¼ ða1,b1Þ, . . . , ðan,bnÞ
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where the index dimensions indicate the area and time about
which an aggregate contains information. The values are the
information and the meta-information contains that additional
information used in security mechanisms. In general, most of the
SDA proposals found in the literature follow similar structures,
although there is not a consensus in a well defined aggregated
structure.
Table 4 summarizes the SDA schemes covered in this section
and classifies them according to whether a scheme (i) performs
syntactic or semantic aggregation, (ii) is cluster-based (cluster-
head responsible for aggregating reports) and (iii) is defined for
fixed or dynamic geographical areas.
Picconi et al. (2006) propose a technique to probabilistically
detect malicious vehicles that generate false aggregated informa-
tion. In particular, they focus on validating speed and location
information using syntactic aggregation although their solution is
also applicable to certain cases of semantic aggregation. The
proposal targets aggregated information from a measurement
point to a destination, without the need of creating groups or
clusters of vehicles. The main idea behind this scheme is to
challenge the aggregator to provide a proof that can be used to
probabilistically validate the aggregated record. An aggregated
record is created by combining and compressing information
contained inside several individual records. To validate the
aggregated record the aggregator is asked to provide a randomly
chosen original signed record (whose information was included in
the aggregated record) after the aggregated record has been sent.
If the corresponding record was made up it will not be possible
for the aggregator to produce the original signed record, and he
will be caught. It should be noted that the probability of a
misbehaving node being caught is directly proportional to the
amount of bogus information it includes in the aggregated record
and that for the system to work the penalty needs to be severe
enough to discourage misbehavior (e.g. permanent eviction from
the network).
In order to avoid a two-phase protocol, vehicles are equipped
with a Tamper Proof Device (TPD) which acts as a proxy for the
receiver. As a proxy, it first provides a transmit buffer (data placed
on this buffer cannot be tampered with and will be transmitted)
and second it challenges the application (aggregator) to provide a
randomly chosen original signed record to be sent with the
aggregated data. The whole process can be observed in Fig. 6.
The application extracts the data and car ID from each regular
record (a) and places it in the transmit buffer where the TPD
appends a secure time stamp and the randomly generated
number 83 (b). The application takes the regular record corre-
sponding to entry i¼(83 mod 3)¼2 (i.e. the third entry) (c) and
appends it to the transmit buffer. Finally, the TPD signs R1þR2
(d) and broadcasts the contents of the transmit buffer (e).
Even though this method may indeed prove itself to be effective
against malicious aggregators who try to insert false information in
Table 4





Picconi et al. (2006) X X D
Raya et al. (2006a) X X F




Dietzel et al. (2009) X F
Dietzel et al. (2010) X D
Lochert et al. (2010) X D
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the network, it leaves the vehicles unprotected from malicious
aggregators that leave out information from the aggregated
records. In our view, the TPD could also serve as the entry point
for received records and it should keep track that the vehicle
identities in the received messages at some point before an upper
bound t are included in an aggregated message to be broadcasted.
Raya et al. (2006a) claim that bandwidth efficiency can be
achieved using combined signature techniques. The authors
address secure group formation, where each group is composed
by those vehicles in a specified geographical area or cell. The
group leader is chosen as that one closest to the center of the cell.
Thus, the group leader is in charge of aggregating and disseminat-
ing data. Group leaders receive signed reports from vehicles
creating a new message with a combined signature. Therefore,
combined signatures is a semantic SDA mechanism since there is
only one message m signed by the combination of all vehicles that
participate in the event detection (Fig. 7). The following combined
signatures are proposed:
1. Concatenated Signatures: The idea behind this scheme is that
whenever a vehicle receives a message if it agrees with the
message information (based on its own sensors input) it
appends its signature. This form of source aggregation results
in a smaller data verification delay than destination aggrega-
tions where the receiver collects messages from different
sources and then crosschecks them. Another advantage is that
an invalid signature does not affect the whole message, in
contrast to the next scheme.
2. Onion Signatures: The signature sizes are constant, since each
message is hashed before being signed. Instead of simply append-
ing a new signature, a vehicle signs the signature of the previous
transmitter, although before retransmitting the new message, it
should also include the last signature, i.e., the one it received,
so that the vehicle at the next hope can verify the previous
signature. The improvement in signature size comes at a cost.
In this case, a single invalid signature will affect the wholemessage
and the message needs to be verified at each hop, increasing the
overall verification time. In our view, this last feature if correctly
exploited could lead to a denial of service attack.
3. Hybrid Signatures: Consists of several concatenated onion
signatures, each of a given depth. The signature depth repre-
senting the number of layers it includes. This solution looks for
a compromise between the previous two, both on their
advantages and their drawbacks.
We find that Hybrid Signatures are a very interesting possibility
to explore when considering safety message applications. We
propose that the different kinds of safety messages of the applica-
tion be assigned a degree of time criticality and needed trust and
depending on those values the appropriate depth of the Hybrid
Signature be chosen. For example, if a vehicle is on a crossing with
no visibility on the right side of the road we can safely assume its
driver will not mind waiting a few seconds before it can safely
traverse. Therefore, in that case the better suited solution would
probably be a Hybrid Signature with depth 0.
In Catch-up (Yu et al., 2008), the authors propose an aggregation
scheme for applications where a delay of tens of seconds is
acceptable, not suited for safety messaging applications but per-
fectly valid for general traffic information. Aggregation is performed
in road sections for the same frame interval of time. Their objective
is to perform semantic aggregation by generating a single secure
report with aggregation functions such as MAX, MIN, AVG. Any
vehicle can aggregate the data and thus there is not any cluster
structure created. The basic idea in this scheme is to insert a delay
before forwarding a report to the next hop. However, their scheme
makes this delay more controllable in order to increase the prob-
ability that a report can be merged with reports ahead or reports
behind. Intelligent delay-control policies are made based on local
observations of individual vehicles. They also design a future reward
model to define the benefits of different delay-control policies, and
then establish a decision tree to help a vehicle choose an optimal
policy from the perspective of long-term rewards.
CASCADE (Ibrahim and Weigle, 2008) is a cluster-based
syntactic SDA scheme. Each vehicle presents location information
based on its difference from the location of the cluster’s center
and its speed based on its difference with the median speed of
those vehicles in the cluster. The primary record is signed by the
vehicle using ECDSA and includes a timestamp to prevent replay
attacks and the vehicle’s public key. Each vehicle, then builds its
own local view from primary records. Records are grouped based
on their distance from the receiving vehicle. First each data record
Fig. 6. Secure aggregation using the TPD as a proxy for the receiver.
Fig. 7. Three different types of combined signatures. n is the total number of
signers. Ci is the certificate of i-th user.
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is compressed using differential encoding. Second, an aggregated
cluster record is built which is the concatenation of compact data
records (syntactic aggregation). The signature is calculated by the
aggregating vehicle over all fields of the aggregated frame except
the certificate which is signed by the CA and the sender’s location
that represents the last location of the last vehicle that broad-
casted the record.
Dietzel et al. (2009) argue against fixed segmentation of roads
because it contradicts the real situation. They propose a completely
structure-free aggregation mechanism, which enables to aggregate
data purely based on their correlation. On a conceptual level, all
aggregation systems have the following basic components:
 Decision criteria: Decide if two pieces of information are similar
enough to be aggregated.
 Information fusion: Once the decision to aggregate two data
items has been reached, a defined method is require to
combine them.
 Dissemination mechanism: Having aggregated to data items,
the new information is only available to the aggregator. Thus,
the node needs to disseminate the new data into the network.
The authors propose a fuzzy logic scheme to be used for the
decision criteria, which allows a dynamic fragmentation of the
road. First, all influences on the aggregation decision, i.e. location
difference of two aggregates or a maximum standard tolerable
deviation of the average speed values, are fuzzified by applying
fuzzy set theory. Then, they use fuzzy logic operations to reason
about the influences and reach a decision.
Dietzel et al. (2010) present a syntactic SDA scheme. The mechan-
ism chooses a subset of all atomic primary reports to generate an
aggregate report. The authors employ a list of criteria to selectively
choose which primary reports contribute to the aggregate report. The
criteria include the identification of those primary reports that led to
an aggregate current maximum and minimum in time and space,
defining a specific location area. The scheme is a cluster-based
mechanism where the cluster borders are defined by the location of
a subset of primary reports and those reports corresponding to
vehicles inside the borders of the area will be selected to produce
an evenly distribution that represents the whole area.
Lochert et al. (2010) introduce the concept of soft-state
sketches for probabilistic hierarchical data aggregation, which
derive from Flajolet–Martin sketches (FM sketches) defined in
Flajolet and Martin (1985). An FM sketch is a data structure for
probabilistic counting of distinct elements. It represents an
approximation of a positive integer by a bit field S¼ s1, . . . , sw
of length wZ1. The bit field is initialized to zero at all positions.
To add an element x to the sketch (an observation), it is hashed by
a hash function h with geometrically distributed positive integer
output, where PðhðxÞ ¼ iÞ ¼ 2i. The entry shðxÞ is then set to one. In
soft-state sketches, the authors use small counters of n bits
instead of single bits at each index position. These counters
represent a time to live (TTL) for a certain bit. Therefore, the
operation of setting a bit to one after an observation is replaced
by setting the corresponding counter to the maximum TTL. An
approximation C(S) of the number of distinct elements added to
the sketch can be obtained from the length of the initial,
uninterrupted sequence of ones, given by
ZðSÞ :¼ minðiAN09iow4siþ1 ¼ 0 [ fwgÞ ð10Þ
by calculating










with j 0:77351, K  1,75 and using m sketches.
Locally stored sketches are periodically broadcasted to the
vehicle’s one-hop neighbors, which upon reception merges them
with its own. For example, consider an application where the
number of free parking spots on a road segment is disseminated in
the network. Two cars, A and B, make independent observations on
the same road segment (with ID 7). A observes four free parking
places and thus hashes the tuples ð7,1Þ, . . . , ð7,4Þ into its sketch for
road 7. B observes five free parking places, and consequently adds
ð7,1Þ, . . . , ð7,5Þ. If A and B meet they will exchange sketches, as
depicted in Fig. 8 and perform a position-wise maximum opera-
tion. Previously inserted elements die out after their TTL has
expired, unless they are refreshed by a newer observation.
5.1. Position
Information aggregation is a process of paramount importance
in VANETs. Hundreds of vehicles transmitting information and
relaying that very same information to other vehicles next to
them in a multi-hop network. Besides considering the number of
samples a vehicle takes every minute is enough to make us realize
of the large traffic load involved in VANET applications (particu-
larly in safety messaging). Therefore, if there is any way to
decrease the network traffic load it should be exploited.
We find particularly relevant the contribution of Scheuermann
et al. (2009a) where the authors give an analytical measure of
scalable data aggregation schemes. We also consider intelligent delay
control policies a field were extensive research needs to be performed,
since they can help optimize the use of the wireless medium.
SDA schemes are defined according to whether the aggrega-
tion is syntactic or semantic and thus the proposed schemes are
bounded on what kind of aggregation is performed. Furthermore,
most of the schemes are bounded on whether the aggregation is
performed in fixed or dynamic areas and who is the node that
aggregates the information. A general framework for both seman-
tic and syntactic aggregation would facilitate the definition of
SDA for any kind of application and network topology. In this
direction, Picconi et al. (2006) and Dietzel et al. (2010) are the
ones that contribute to more general specifications.
Some SDAs make use of TPDs, such as Picconi et al. (2006), and
the whole aggregation process depends on their correct behavior.
As already discussed in this article, Tamper Proof Devices are not
always as tamper-proof as they should be. Therefore, we consider
protocols that place their security on TPDs to be inherently
flawed.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have surveyed the newest trends in the
research area of VANET security. The proposals that we have
Fig. 8. Aggregation of soft-state sketches.
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analyzed deal with trade-offs between complexity, response time,
privacy and non-repudiation. In this section we conclude with a
summary of which trends and approaches we foresee as the
winners of this research area and why.
1. Security: Even though the use of PKI is widespread and
generally recognized as a valid solution it still has several
issues to address, like nodes revocation (and the CRL size) and
privacy. Some of the pseudonymous authentication schemes
presented here address both issues (Sun et al., 2010; Studer
et al., 2009): the first by maintaining the CRL growth linear
while the second is solved by the use of pseudonyms. None-
theless, with millions of users in a VANET the CRL size is still
considerably large. Therefore, we believe that the use of Bloom
filters (Raya et al., 2006b, 2007) together with the pseudonyms
approach could really make an impact in the field. However, it
should also be noted that the use of pseudonyms may not be
as secure as one may assume for low equipment rates. We feel
there is still extensive research to be carried out in both
directions: minimize the CRL size and find out if pseudonyms
users are traceable for higher equipment rates.
2. Misbehaving and faulty nodes: Accepting that at some point the
security mechanisms defending your network will be over-
come is being realistic. That is why misbehavior detection and
eviction protocols need to be part of every system. In our view,
Sybil attacks together with Denial of Service are on the top of
the most dangerous attacks a VANET can suffer. Being able to
impersonate an unlimited number of vehicles increases the
attacker’s ability to disrupt network operation. That is the
reason why we consider particularly important the solution
proposed in Xiao et al. (2006) to detect multiple identities by
using roadside infrastructure and enhancing the vehicles
sensing capabilities.
3. Data secure aggregation: VANETs produce an enormous
amount of data. In addition to every vehicle collecting its
own information and broadcasting it, they also have to
forward the others messages. Hence the need for aggregation.
We consider particularly relevant the contribution of
Scheuermann et al. (2009a) for providing an analytical method
to study scalable aggregation schemes. However, as it has been
said before, aggregation must be secure, since aggregating
nodes can be tempted to include false messages or leave out
valid ones. This is where the mechanisms described in this
section need to be set into place. Moreover, in order to
optimize the use of the wireless medium techniques like
intelligent delay control policies, as described in Yu et al.
(2008), can help improve the aggregation process.
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a b s t r a c t
This article describes a scheme which to the best of our knowledge is the first one to use user
signatures to share information about Points of Interest in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks. In this
scheme, users rate restaurants, hotels, etc. and sign those rates with their private key. Then,
they broadcast that information and other vehicles store it for future use. When another user
needs a Point of Interest recommendation he queries the system for the other users stored
reviews and after he visits that Points of Interest for himself, he evaluates it and his level of trust
in the reviewers with rates similar to his own increases. In the end, a user will be able to
request tohis vehicle information ona certain Point of Interest categoryand itwill respondwith
the recommendationsmade by other users, prioritizing the ones in the user’sWeb of Trust. poi-
Sim is the tool designed to simulate this scheme. It processes a 24 hmobility trace produced by
a Multi-Agent Traffic Simulator, which realistically simulates public and private traffic over
regional maps of Switzerland. The result is a Chains of Trust simulation with over 260,000
nodes, which shows that the proposed scheme performs satisfactorily in a realistic scenario.
 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
With the massive deployment of wireless technologies on
motorized vehicles, the automotive industry has opened a
wide range of possibilities for drivers and passengers alike:
theoretically, anything from finding out the road conditions
ahead to watching a movie through streaming is possible. So
different requirements will lead to the deployment of differ-
ent kinds of applications over the network. In [1,2] applica-
tions are classified based on the service they provide:
1. Safety related applications:
(a) Traffic information messages: used to disseminate
traffic conditions over an area; they affect public
safety only indirectly (they are not time-critical).
(b) General safety-relatedmessages: used by public safety
applications such as cooperative driving and colli-
sion avoidance (in order to prevent traffic accidents
time is certainly an issue; at least they should satisfy
an upper bound delay in delivering the information).
(c) Liability-related messages: they are only exchanged
in liability-related situations such as accidents.
The senders’ identities should be kept hidden from
the other users in the network and only revealed
to the law authorities (time is not an issue).
2. Other applications (some examples):
(a) Toll applications: electronic toll collection systems
like AutoPASS in Norway allow drivers to continue
driving without having to stop at tolls.
(b) TV and other multimedia content: used to provide
users with entertainment and information (movies,
newspapers, etc.).
(c) Advertisements: businesses along the road (such as
gas-stations and restaurants) could advertise them-
selves to drivers before they reached their location,
giving themenough time to compare different offers.
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Messages from safety applications should ensure their
integrity and their non-repudiation albeit maintaining at
the same time the user’s privacy. Other applications may
also need to encrypt their traffic to transmit sensitive
information, whereas that may be unnecessary for applica-
tions in the first group.
Architecture wise, applications can also be divided in
two groups. On one hand, there are Zero-infrastructure
applications where the only hardware requirement is the
installation of On Board Units (OBUs) in the vehicles. OBUs
provide the vehicles with sensing, processing and wireless
communication capabilities for Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V)
communications, like in [3]. On the other hand, there
are applications that also need Road Side Units (RSUs) to
provide a Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) link, generally be-
cause they use Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and they re-
quire access to a Certification Authority (CA) outside the
network or to an Internet Service Provider [4–11]. How-
ever, with the recent development of cellular technologies
like GPRS and UMTS the V2I link could by provided by the
OBU itself, minimizing the dependency on road side
infrastructure.
This article presents Chains of Trust, a secured Zero-
infrastructure dissemination scheme based on a reputation
system, focused on the distribution of Points of Interest
(POIs) information.
Briefly summarized, every user or vehicle creates its
own pair of public and private keys (of length L), and is
responsible for its private key securing; the protocol does
not require a CA. When users visit POIs they evaluate them
and input their reviews into the system. The private key is
used to sign those POI reviews, whereas the public key is
attached to the transmitted information so that the rest
of the network can verify the signatures.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. In
Section 2, several solutions to distribute information in VA-
NETs are presented. Section 3 describes Chains of Trust in
further detail, followed by a description of the simulation
tool poiSim in Section 4 and the experimentation results
in Section 5. Finally, the article closes with the conclusions
drawn from those results.
2. Related work
This article introduces an information dissemination
technique, which to the best of our knowledge is the first
one to build a reputation scheme using user signatures to
distribute Points of Interest (POIs) information in a Vehicular
Network (VANET).
Nevertheless, there are other works that consider the
distribution of content in VANETs. For instance, in [12]
the authors describe a protocol for the distribution of
advertisements. They propose a virtual cash scheme where
the following actors are involved:
 Certification Authority (CA): every vehicle is loaded with
a pair of keys (public and private) issued by a CA and
with the CA’s public key.
 Vehicular Authority: entity that approves every adver-
tisement to be loaded in an Ad Distribution Point.
 Ad Distribution Point: broadcasts advertisements to the
vehicles passing by.
 Virtual Cashiers: users are rewarded with virtual cash for
forwarding advertisements. They sign each other
receipts to prove the message forwarding. Later on, that
cash can be exchanged for other services at the Cashiers.
 Road Side Units (RSU): provide a link to the CA for keys
revocation purposes.
In [13] the authors present Roadcast, a popularity aware
P2P content sharing scheme. Their technique relies on the
idea that by ensuring that popular data is widely shared
with other vehicles the overall query delay can be im-
proved. If users request popular data, which is densely dis-
seminated in the network, their queries can be answered in
much shorter time than a request for rare data, because the
chance of meeting another vehicle with that particular
piece of information is much higher. In the opportunistic
and unreliable VANET, the authors expect users to be more
willing to receive data which approximately matches their
request with a short delay than waiting for a longer time to
receive exactly what they requested. Thus the need to for-
ward the popular information with higher priority.
Data aggregation is another aspect of Chains of Trust
that should be taken into consideration, since the number
of POI and user reviews is so large. In [8], the authors detail
several signature techniques to achieve data aggregation:
1. Concatenated signatures: each user’s signature is appended
(together with his certificate) to the original message. The
greatest benefit, in contrast to other schemes, is that an
invalid signature does not affect the whole message.
2. Onion signatures: every user signs the last user’s signa-
ture and appends his certificate to the message. This
technique is very good in terms of data aggregation,
since not only the data, but also the signatures are
aggregated. However, a single invalid signature could
corrupt the whole message.
3. Hybrid signatures: several concatenated onion signa-
tures, each of a given depth. This solution looks for a
compromise between the previous two, both on their
advantages and drawbacks.
Onion and hybrid signatures achieve better aggregation,
which means that users can transmit more information in
their messages. However, whenever the number of reviews
in a message reaches its maximum size the chain of
Table 1
Percentage of received broadcasts for every simulated scenario.
Percentage of received broadcasts
Number of packets/
period
60 120 180 240 300
100 95.97 97.99 98.62 98.96 99.15
200 91.57 95.91 97.27 97.93 98.38
300 86.86 93.72 95.82 96.87 97.54
400 82.16 91.50 94.37 95.78 96.64
500 77.23 89.28 93.01 94.80 95.85
600 71.93 87.00 91.57 93.73 94.98
700 66.30 84.58 90.03 92.57 94.06
800 60.54 82.19 88.51 91.48 93.22
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signatures becomes stale, since there is no way to remove
old signatures to leave room for the new ones (and its cer-
tificates). That is the reason why Chains of Trust uses con-
catenated signatures.
As important as content distribution and data aggrega-
tion are security and privacy. The following articles rely on
the use of a Certification Authority (CA) and focus their ef-
forts on minimizing the length and efficiently distributing
the Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).
In [14] the authors introduce a pseudonymous authenti-
cation schemewhose CRL size is linear in terms of the num-
ber of revoked vehicles and unrelated to the size of the
vehicle pseudonymous certificate set. The network archi-
tecture is composed by a Trusted Authority (TA), RSUs and
vehicles or OBUs. The TA issues a certificate CertTA; Rx for a
certain RSU Rx, and a series of pseudonymous certificates
for a vehicle Vi to be installed during periodic vehicle
inspections. It should be noted that the identities in the
pseudonyms certificates are derived from two random
seeds using a one-way hash function. The TA divides the
maximum time between vehicle inspections into time win-
dows. For every window, the TA chooses a random secret
key to sign the vehicle’s pseudonymous certificates, so that
in every window the vehicle has to request Rx to re-sign the
pseudonymous certificate for that window. In this scenario,
a RSU can be revoked by including its only certificate in a
CRL. To revoke a vehicle it would suffice for the TA to release
the random seeds fromwhich Vi’s pseudonymous identities
are computed, so that the RSUs do not issue the re-signature
key to Vi in following windows. At the same time the valid
pseudonymous certificate of Vi should be revoked.
Similarly, authors in [15] try to achieve the same small
CRL size with a different technique. They propose a scheme
based on Temporary Anonymous Certified Keys (TACKs),
used to authenticate messages sent by the vehicles. There
are four main entities:
 M: managing authority that acts as the root of trust.
 R: set of valid Regional Authorities (RAs). RAs act as
intermediary authorities and can grant vehicles tempo-
rary region-specific certificates. M issues certificates to
RAs and certifies them to be valid intermediary
authorities.
 V: set of valid vehicles or On Board Units (OBUs). Any
vehicle with a valid certificate from M or a region-spe-
cific short-lived certificate from R (while in the proper
region) is considered part of V.
 –gV: set of expired or revoked vehicles.
The main idea is to apply group signatures considering a
group which comprises all of the above described entities.
M is defined as the group manager. It initializes the group
signature scheme to generate a group public key gpk and a
group master key gmk. It publishes gpk and retains gmk for
itself. Each valid OBU has a group user key guki, issued by
M, which is installed during annual vehicle inspections. It
should be noted that M maintains a history of all key/
OBU pairs it has issued, so that it can later trace misbehav-
ing vehicles. When a vehicle enters a new region it needs
to update its TACK following these steps:
1. Randomly select new short-lived public and private





2. Use the group user key guki to sign K
þ
S and send it to the
RA.
3. RA verifies that the user is not in the RL. If it is not, the
RA signs a certificate for the OBU’s TACK public key KþS
using the RA’s secret signing key K1RA .
4. RA waits for d seconds to queue up all certificate
requests for that region and broadcasts the certificates.
Whenever a user wants to send a message it signs it
with its TACK private key K1S and periodically broadcasts
the RA signed certificate of its TACK public key K1S . When-
ever a user misbehaves, to determine which OBU gener-
ated a signature w the group manager tests w against the
group user keys of OBUs in V. Once M identifies Vi it is
added to the RL and distributed to the RAs.
In [16], the authors define Most Pieces Broadcast (MPB)
technique to distribute CRLs. The first step is to break the
large CRL file down into small pieces, taking into consider-
ation the coding rate (rate of pieces generated from a file)
and the code overhead (number of pieces needed to re-
cover the original file). MPB ensures that only the node
with the largest number of pieces broadcasts in a certain
area to maximize the use of the wireless channel. It should
be noted that RSUs will always be selected as the node
with most pieces. The authors show that MPB is more
effective than letting all OBUs broadcast their CRL pieces
without control, which results in a broadcast storm of un-
needed CRL pieces that slows down the CRL distribution.
In [1,6,17–21] the authors deal with privacy issues and
tracking vulnerabilities due to use of wireless communica-
tions. They discuss several techniques to improve security,
such as silent periods, mix zones or the use of pseudonyms.
InChains of Trust that is unnecessary since there is no road side
infrastructure collecting all the transmittedmessages. If an at-
tackerwishes to track a certain user, he needs to be constantly
in range, thus physically following his victim or have enough
resources to deploy his own road side infrastructure.
On the whole, Chains of Trust distinguishes itself from
the other solutions presented in this section by using
broadcast in a completely ad hoc network as a mean of
information dissemination, by not using a CA and therefore
not having to deal with the distribution of CRLs and by per-
forming data aggregation through the use of concatenated
signatures.
3. Chains of Trust: a Points of Interest dissemination
strategy
3.1. Introduction
The vast majority of applications in VANETs use Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI), because it provides confidentiality,
integrity, authentication and non-repudiation and because
it is a well known and reliable system. However, VANETs
have their own peculiarities and if PKI does not adapt to
them security issues arise. For instance, a vehicle continu-
ously sending messages signed with the driver’s private
key becomes traceable, and thus the user’s privacy is
D. Antolino Rivas, M. Guerrero-Zapata / Ad Hoc Networks 10 (2012) 1115–1133 1117
Author's personal copy
violated. As seen in the previous section, another major is-
sue comes from managing CRLs. CAs include revoked cer-
tificates in CRLs, which have to be distributed across the
network. This poses a difficult challenge, particularly in
the early stages of a VANET deployment, if the vehicles
do not have permanent (or frequent enough) access to a
CA. Furthermore, with millions of users in the system the
potential size of the CRLs is huge.
This article presents a new technique for secure dissem-
ination of Points of Interest (POIs) information over VANETs,
which does not require a CA. Our scheme relies on a repu-
tation system or Web of Trust based on human driving pat-
terns where one users will trust another if they both give
POIs similar reviews.
The main objective is to take advantage of those pat-
terns and build a system, whose knowledge is distributed
among the users’ vehicles, which they can query for POIs
information. Those POIs could be anything from road con-
ditions to museums or restaurants.
Over the next sections the different elements of the sys-
tem are detailed, some of which being: what can be consid-
ered a POI, what information should the vehicles transmit
and store and how does the reputation scheme work. Once
the gearing of the system has been precisely defined, the
simulation tool used to prove the effectiveness of the tech-
nique (poiSim) and its simulation results will be presented.
3.2. Scheme overview
In the reputation system, every vehicle needs to store
information about other vehicles and POIs (whether re-
ceived from other users or reviewed by himself). Every
node in the network shall store:
 POI chains: they are a series of reviews of the same POI
from different users. As depicted in Fig. 1 POI chains can
be divided in:
– Unverified POI chains: they contain POI reviews that
the user has received from other users but which he
has not yet been able to verify (by visiting and rating
the POI himself), e.g., a traffic jam alert or the review
of a new restaurant. Every unverified chain is rated
based on the level of trust the user has in the known
reviewers in the chain. When a user queries his vehi-
cle, the POIs information is displayed ordered by that
rate as defined in Section 3.3.1.
– Verified POI chains: once the user has a chance to
check if there really is a traffic jam or how good that
restaurant is, he evaluates the reviewers in the
unverified chain and updates his level of trust in
them depending on how truthful they were and
marks the chain as verified. Verified chains are an
essential part of the exchange of information
between users, as will be explained in Section 3.5.
 Trust levels in other users (per category): every node
needs to remember how much he trusts other users
based on the verification of previous reviews. Besides,
nodes not only share information about POIs, but also
information about other nodes. For those recommended
nodes several other properties will have to be stored, as
will be detailed in Section 3.4.
 Information about the latest messages from every user,
both about POIs and nodes, should be stored for misbe-
havior detection, e.g., if the user is in a misbehaving
strike. Further details will be given in Section 3.7.
Since there is no CA, every user or vehicle will create its
own pair of public and private keys (of length L) and will be
responsible for its securing. Notice that Kpub is the user
identifier, therefore L should be long enough to ensure
(a) Unverified POI chains organization
(b) Verified POI chains organization
Fig. 1. POI chains organization.
(a) U1 reviews Mike’s Dinner and broadcasts
(b) U2 queries his vehicle for a restaurant.
(c) U2 follows U1 recommendation, adds his own
and updates his level of trust in
U1 according to how similar both reviews were.
opinion to the chain
the message.
Fig. 2. General behavior of the Chains of Trust protocol.
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the statistical uniqueness of identities. That is why the
scheme uses RSA with 1024 bits long keys. The private
key will be used to sign information about POIs and about
the levels of trust that a particular vehicle has in the others,
while the public key will be attached to that information so
that the rest of the network can verify the signatures cor-
rectness. For instance, consider the scenario depicted in
Fig. 2. Imagine that a user U1 goes to a restaurant A and
he likes it. U1 will broadcast a message to the other users
in the network saying that restaurant A deserves a certain
rate v, signed with his Kpriv and attaching his Kpub. All the
other nodes that successfully receive the message store
the unverified chain for future reference. When another
user U2 queries his own vehicle for a place to have lunch
the vehicle returns a list of places recommended by other
users (among which is U1’s recommendation). If U2 decides
to go to A he will afterwards input his review into the sys-
tem and if he liked it as much as U1 his level of trust in U1
will increase, or decrease otherwise. Regardless of how
much he coincided with U1’s opinion, U2 will append his
signed review to the original, together with his Kpub, and
broadcast the message. In this way, every time a user fol-
lows and verifies a recommendation he can update his le-
vel of trust in n other nodes (where n is the length of the
chain of signatures), thus increasing the speed at which
the reputation system develops.
In order to foster the development of Chains of Trust at
an early stage vehicles could be pre-loaded with a set of
POIs at the same time the application is being installed.
In this way, users could benefit from the application since
the very beginning, even compensating for a low initial
adoption rate. In addition, those pre-loaded POIs could
help users moving through a new area where they do not
know anybody else, as will be described in Section 3.6.
As mentioned above, this technique does not require a
CA, or any road side infrastructure for that matter, since
the network is completely ad hoc and there is no certificate
revocation process to manage. Every user generates his
own pair of keys (the public key being his identity) and be-
gins to play a part in the network by signing information.
In the beginning, his identity is unknown to the rest of
the users, therefore, he has to gain the others trust by tell-
ing the truth. That is how the scheme protects itself against
misbehaving. If an attacker misbehaves from the start he
will not be able to inflict any real damage since all the
nodes join the system with the lowest level of trust, and
his reviews will be mostly unnoticed. If he tries to gain
some credit and then misbehaves the Rewards and Penalties
system will recognize a misbehaving strike and punish it.
Although nothing prevents the attacker from creating a
new identity he will not gain anything from it, since any
new identity has no credit on the network. It should be
noted that the level of trust of one user in another will de-
crease if the second either lies to him by misbehaving or if
he rates a POI significantly different than the first would.
Therefore, the terms lies and disagreements shall be used
indistinctively throughout the article. More details on mis-
behavior can be found in Section 3.8.
As far as the application’s platform is concerned, we
would like to elaborate on why Chains of Trust is specifi-
cally a VANETs application and not appropriate for other
mobile platforms, e.g., smartphones, PDAs, etc. For starters,
vehicles provide enough energy for the required periodic
exchange information and for a fast enough processor to
handle RSA encryption and decryption operations.
Fig. 3. User Q chains grading process.
Fig. 4. R’s known nodes table before and after processing a Recognition Exchange message.
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Secondly, a larger amount of memory could be installed in
order to store more data about the vehicles in the user’s
Web of Trust. Finally, vehicles allow for the installation of
antennas with better gain, improving message reception
and giving us the possibility to extend the transmission
range. In addition, we believe that an application specifi-
cally conceived for smartphones would require a com-
pletely different solution. With 3g network access, users
could connect to a remote server only when they needed
to query for a POI category or submit their own POI re-
views, which would mean that this remote server should
have enough resources to store all the users’ information.
In addition, a CA would need to issue and distribute certif-
icates to allow users to securely authenticate with the ser-
ver. This a completely different scenario from our ad hoc
network proposal, which requires no infrastructure (re-
mote server or CA) and where the system knowledge is dis-
tributed among its users.
3.3. POI categories and records
Several POI categories shall be considered, and a differ-
ent level of trust for each category for each user shall be
kept by each vehicle, i.e., a user may be a good hotel re-
viewer and a terrible restaurant critic. The following is an









For each category a validity period is defined, e.g., a ho-
tel review may be valid for months whereas a traffic jam
alert may expire within hours or even minutes. That valid-
ity period is necessary to prevent unfair punishments. For
instance, if a user identifies a traffic jam and sends a mes-
sage alerting the network and several hours later another
vehicle passes by and sees no trace of it he should not de-
crease his level of trust in all the users who signed the alert
message.
Before POIs can be reviewed we first need to give them
a unique identifier consisting of common knowledge
information:
Id ¼ fCategorykPOI NamekPostal AddresskGPSCoordsg ð1Þ
The Postal Address and the GPS Coordinates fields com-
plement each other, since it is difficult to give the Postal
Address of a traffic jam or the GPS coordinates of a restau-
Fig. 7. User’s rate distribution for the real rate l = 7 and r2 = 2.
Fig. 6. Vehicle layout for the 400 nodes simulated in Ns-3.
1120 D. Antolino Rivas, M. Guerrero-Zapata / Ad Hoc Networks 10 (2012) 1115–1133
Author's personal copy
rant (unless you position your vehicle right at the door). It
should be noted that the GPS coordinates will admit a cer-
tain margin of error due to the devices positioning error.
Whenever a user wants to review a POI, he will assign a
rate to it and assemble a record R with the following
information:
R ¼ fIdkRatekTimestampg ð2Þ
Each record has a timestamp so that users are able to keep
track of the validity period per category. In addition, it
could also be used to remove old entries from the trusted
nodes table.
Once the record has been prepared, the sender needs to
sign it (by encrypting the record’s hash with his private
key) and attach his public key to it. At some point in the fu-
ture the vehicle will broadcast M.
M ¼ fR1kfHðR1ÞgKprivA
kKpubAg ð3Þ
Afterwards, when a vehicle receives a message it stores
it for future use. When a user queries his vehicle for a rec-
ommendation on a POI category in a certain area the sys-
tem answers with a list of received POIs, the ordering of
which follows the criteria defined in Section 3.3.1. If the
user follows the recommendation he will be able to write
another review about the recommended POI. The idea is
to keep the previous reviews and attach the latest to the
group, thus forming a chain of signatures that grows until
a parameter n. By keeping a chain of size n every time that
a user follows a recommendation he will be able to update
his level of trust in n other users. It should be noted that
the new added records are a slightly modified version of
the first because they contain the hash of the original POI
Id, instead of the complete identifier.







































(a) Number of unverified POI chains: for every
number of unverified POI chains is










































(b) Length of unverified POI chains: for every
mean of its unverified POI chains





















































































(c) Number of verified POI chains: for every
number of verified POI chains is
is the depicted result.
(d) Length of verified POI chains: for every
of its verified POI chains length is
those means is thecomputed, their mean
node the




Fig. 8. Evolution of the length and number of unverified and verified chains.
D. Antolino Rivas, M. Guerrero-Zapata / Ad Hoc Networks 10 (2012) 1115–1133 1121
Author's personal copy
The Id field (or its hash to be more precise) needs to be
included in each of the added records to prevent a security
vulnerability. Imagine that the messages were shortened
by removing the Id to decrease the transmission time and
to save storage space in the vehicles. Then, only the first re-
cord of the chain would be bound to the POI. As a result, it
would suffice for a misbehaving node to replace that first
record with another POI Id and broadcast that message
over the network to ruin the reputation of the other sign-
ers. A good alternative would be to use Onion Signatures
(as described in [8]) to preserve the message integrity
every time a new record is added. However, Onion Signa-
tures do not take into account that a message cannot grow
indefinitely and at some point new records will replace old
ones which deems this scheme unfeasible since in order to
preserve its integrity not a single bit of information can be
discarded.






It should be noted that the added records are not
hashed and then signed, but directly encrypted with the
user’s private key. Since R0 includes the hash of the POI
identifier, it already is a short message. Therefore, the use
of digital signatures on it would make the hash function
redundant.
3.3.1. POI chains grading
When a user Q queries his vehicle for a certain POI in its
vicinity, the system needs to display all received recom-
mendations following a certain order. In the case of veri-
fied chains that order is determined by the rate the user
assigned to a POI the last time he was there. In the case
of unverified chains the order is defined by the trusted
(and in some cases by the most trusted) nodes in the chain.
Let us define n as the number of reviews in a certain chain
POI1,U1, . . . ,Un as the users whose POI reviews are in the
chain and bU1; . . . ; bUn as the subset of those nodes known
by the user Q ; vPOI1 ;U1 as the rate that U1 gave to POI1 and
k
bU i
as the level of trust that Q has on Ui as a POI reviewer.

















It should be noted that the rates assigned by unknown
nodes are ignored as long as there is a known reviewer
in the chain. Otherwise, the chain’s rate is the arithmetic
mean of the POI rates assigned by the unknown reviewers.
Similarly, the reviews of the less trusted known nodes are
ignored when there is a known node that belongs to the
group of Q’s k most trusted nodes. In order to prevent mis-
behavior only Q’s most trusted users, i.e., the ones on the
first k positions of the list, are considered for grading the
chain. Otherwise, an attacker could create multiple low
trusted identities and reduce the weight of legitimate re-
views in Eq. (6) to obtain his desired result. By prioritizing
the opinions of a small group of reviewers over the rest an
attacker will first need to gain enough trust to belong into
that group and once he starts misbehaving he will rapidly
























(e) Rate in the verified POI chains: the mean
users assign to POIs.
Mean of the deviation
Simulation day 1 5 10 15 20 25 30
Rating freq. (review days) 1 1 1 6 1 10 1 1 1 6 1 10 1 1 1 6 1 10 1 1 1 6 1 10 1 1 1 6 1 10 1 1 1 6 1 10 1 1 1 6 1 10
Num. Unver. POI chains 59.86 63.26 63.69 33.09 36.27 37.08 31.01 33.70 34.61 30.06 32.30 33.24 29.76 31.34 32.30 29.62 30.70 31.64 29.60 29.99 31.12
Length Unver. POI chains 0.30 0.17 0.14 7.21 8.55 7.94 30.84 29.78 30.50 40.39 40.25 40.42 41.11 43.32 44.13 40.74 43.08 44.44 40.78 41.76 43.10
Num. Ver. POI chains 0.00 0.36 0.30 0.14 0.83 0.66 0.30 1.17 0.95 0.47 1.44 1.16 0.62 1.67 1.34 0.79 1.87 1.50 0.94 2.05 1.64
Length Ver. POI chains 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.81 6.21 3.97 32.05 27.09 20.65 44.28 42.12 34.37 46.98 49.37 43.25 47.57 51.74 47.99 48.01 51.87 49.93
Rate Ver. POI chains 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.35 1.91 1.24 4.35 3.11 2.23 4.34 3.73 2.91 4.34 4.03 3.38 4.34 4.19 3.69 4.32 4.26 3.91
(f) Mean of the deviation table for (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e).
of the rates
Fig. 8 (continued)
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If k is too small some good and trustable reviewers’
opinion will never reach the top of the list, and therefore
their opinion will not count as much as it should (accord-
ing to their good behavior). However, if k is too large an at-
tacker could easily gain access to the top k reviewers group
and start misbehaving. The idea behind Algorithm 1 is to
start with a low value and build-up. If the top k reviewers
as a group gain more trust as the user reviews POIs the
group can be expanded, which means more reliable infor-
mation, and the user can prioritize their opinions over the
rest of his trusted nodes. Otherwise, if one of the top k
reviewers misbehaves then his own reputation will suffer,
as described in Section 3.7, and kwill decrease to expell the
misbehaving node and minimize the impact of his future
reviews.
Algorithm 1. How k is computed.
//initial value
k :¼ 1;








































(a) Number of known nodes: mean of the






















(b) Rate or level of trust of the known nodes:























(c) Rate or level of trust of the 25% most trusted nodes:
mean of the rates users assign to other users as POI re-
viewers (only for the 25% highest rated nodes).
Mean of the deviation
Simulation day 1 5 10 15 20 25 30
Rating freq. (review days) 1 1 1 6 1 10 1 1 1 6 1 10 1 1 1 6 1 10 1 1 1 6 1 10 1 1 1 6 1 10 1 1 1 6 1 10 1 1 1 6 1 10
Num. Nodes 0.17 0.00 0.00 26.91 9.43 8.11 127.91 43.84 37.66 119.57 84.33 68.95 52.82 118.10 100.82 34.07 140.27 126.49 32.49 148.91 142.56
Nodes Rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 1.53 1.03 1.42 1.53 1.68 2.17 1.92 2.17 2.99 2.32 2.55 3.76 2.71 2.85 4.31 3.03 3.10
Nodes First 25% Rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.87 1.04 1.03 1.48 1.50 1.65 2.08 1.79 2.02 2.52 2.03 2.23 2.80 2.25 2.35 2.97 2.41 2.43
(d) Mean of the deviation table for (a), (b) and (c).
number of mean of the
as POI reviewers.
Fig. 9. Number of known nodes and their levels of trust progress.
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//every time a POI is reviewed by a user
for every POIReview
//compute the mean of the level of trust of the k
most trusted users
previousMean :¼ computeMean(trustedNodesList,k)
//process the POI review, update level of trust in
other users or create a new chain if this is a
//POI new
processPOIReview(POIReview,trustedNodesList,k)
//compute the mean of the level of trust of the new k
most trusted users
currentMean :¼ computeMean(trustedNodesList,k)
if currentMean > previousMean
//the user’s trust in the reviewers of the last POI
has increased, therefore, his list of k most
//trusted users can expand
k :¼ k + 1
else if currentMean < previousMean
//one of the reviewers in the k-top has disagreed
with the user, k needs to be decreased to
//prevent misbehavior
k :¼ k  1
end if
end for
As a result, when a user queries his vehicle, the system
replies with a series of recommendations starting with ver-
ified chains, followed by unverified chains with reviews by
its k most trusted reviewers, followed by unverified chains
with the rest of trusted reviewers and closing with unver-
ified chains with unknown reviewers. The chain’s rate
establishes its position within its category. For example,
Fig. 3 depicts the grading process of several chains by user
Q and the order in which they are presented to the user:
POI2 (verified chain), POI4, POI1 (unverified chains with
the most trusted known reviewers), POI5 (unverified chain
with the rest of known reviewers) and POI6, POI3 (unveri-
fied chains without known reviewers).
3.4. Nodes and records
The use of user chains has to be carefully crafted in order
to avoid abuse and misbehavior. Users in the network play
two different roles: POI reviewers and other users review-
ers. As POI reviewers, every vehicle has to store his level
of trust in the other known users. As node reviewers, every
vehicle needs to keep track of the nodes every other node
recommends to himand their levels of trust as POI reviewer,
because they impact on the level of trust the recommender
deserves in that role. If a recommended node misbehaves
(as POI reviewer) its recommender’s reputation (as recom-
mender) will suffer, or improve otherwise.
3.5. The information exchange
The application is designed to disseminate informa-
tion about POIs among the vehicles in the network, thus
the need for that information to flow from one vehicle to
another. On one side there are POI chains (both verified
and unverified) which represent the new information
that comes into the system in the form of reviews of
new POIs plus the re-evaluation of the already known.
On the other, there are user chains, which are lists of
known nodes and their level of trust. Basically, once
two nodes know each other, besides exchanging informa-
tion about POIs, they can exchange information about
other users, thus increasing the speed with which the
Web of Trust develops. The ideal way to exchange infor-
mation would be for a user to issue a request for infor-
mation on a certain category and its surrounding
vehicles to answer it. However, it is not unusual that
after having spent some time in a platoon formation a
vehicle is alone or only has a few trusted vehicles in
its vicinity at the time of sending the request. That is
the reason why POI information should be exchanged
periodically as well, and when the user needs a recom-
mendation his vehicle still requests it to the nearby vehi-
cles to complete what has already been gathered. As a
result, the system provides the user with a satisfactory
number of choices regardless of the trusted number of
vehicles he has nearby when the request is sent.
Some would identify this periodic exchange of informa-
tion as a tracking vulnerability. However, provided that the
period between message exchanges is long enough (as ex-
plained in [1,20–22]), if an attacker plans to track a user’s
movements he is going to need to physically follow him,
since there is no road side infrastructure to collect the mes-
sages he is going to need to be in range. Further details on
the period value are given in Section 3.9.
Messages will include POI review chains from different
categories. A smart exchange of information is also consid-
ered, where depending on external factors some categories
will be more represented on the messages than others, i.e.,
gathering information about restaurants will be prioritized
at lunch and dinner time, about gas stations when the vehicle
is running low on gas, etc.
The following three types of message exchange are
considered:
1. Requests: if a vehicle receives a review request he will
reply with several POI chains for the requested cate-
gory. Preferably, reviews that he has verified himself
and which have the highest rate in the category. If not
enough verified chains are available, he will reply with
the highest rated unverified chains (following the rating
criteria described in Section 3.3.1). When the requester
receives the reply he considers all the chains in the
message as unverified and stores them as such. Hence,
the difference between verified and unverified chains
(in the response) becomes subtle: only the verified
chains have the sender’s signature, whereas the unver-
ified are just being forwarded. A user will not be penal-
ized nor rewarded for forwarding unverified chains.
2. Periodic Exchange: vehicles should exchange POI chains
periodically with the better rated POIs in each category.
Our scheme prioritizes the recommendation of which
POIs another user should visit over which POIs it should
not. We would like to avoid a situation where a user
knows many POIs with bad reviews and only a handful
with good ones.
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3. Recognition Exchange: if during a periodic exchange, one
vehicle is recognized as a trusted user (from a previous
encounter) then recognizer and recognized will
exchange user chains and verified POI chains, although
they will be marked as unverified by the receiver.
Besides, the nodes and its level of trust included in the
node chains will be added to the list of the previously
known nodes, as explained below.
Requests and periodic exchanges of information are of
vital importance for a user that is traveling or moving
through a new area. They will both provide the user with
unverified chains and once he reviews one POI in one of
those chains he will be able to establish a level of trust
for each of the reviewers, thus staring a new Web of Trust.
Fig. 4 depicts a Recognition Exchange between a user S
and a user R, in which S sends a message M with his most
trusted nodes.
RU ¼ KpubUkLevel of TrustUðas POI reviewerÞ ð7Þ
M¼RU1k . . .kRU5kTimestampkfHðRU1k . . .kRU5kTimestampÞgKprivS
kKpubS
ð8Þ
User R adds U1 and U4 to the list of known nodes, with S
as their recommender, kRS as the level of trust R has on S as
recommender and with an initial level of trust defined by
the function:
TðUiÞ ¼ max Trust
E
Ui





After R has had a chance to receive several reviews from
U1 and U4, S will be rewarded or penalized, depending on
how similar is the level of trust that R has on them related
to what S recommended. All nodes recommended by the
same user are inextricably linked, i.e., the misbehavior of
one may affect the others. In order to deal with misbehav-
ior, trust on a certain node Ui is divided in the trust recom-
mended by another user TrustRUi
 
and the level of trust




. In this way,
when a node misbehaves its recommender is punished
and the k factor (Eq. (9)) is decreased for all nodes he rec-
ommended. However, TrustEUi will not be affected, and as a
result nodes that have earned a reputation for themselves
are no longer subject to the reputation of their
recommender.
Finally, it should be noted that for every user in the rec-
ommended nodes message the receiver only processes
those nodes he does not know: if a node knows another
user, it means he has followed one of his recommendations
and that is more important than a recommendation an-
other user could make.
3.6. The visitor scenario
Whenever a user enters a new area and he requests a
POI to the system, the system will send a request message
and will present the received information together with
the information received from periodic exchanges. If the
user is in a completely new area it may be possible that
he does not know any of the reviewers who have sent
him POI recommendations for that specific region. Should
that be the case, the system (when queried) will present
the user a list of POIs with unverified reviews and a list
of the pre-loaded POIs for that area. If the user chooses
one of the POIs with unverified reviews, when he inputs
his review afterwards he will update his level of trust on
all the reviewers in the POI chain, thus gaining information
on other users and the POIs they signed. If the user chooses
(a) Length of unverified POI chains: for every
fied POI chains
result.
(b) Length of verified POI chains: for every
is computed, the mean of those
epicted result.
Mean of the deviation
Chain type Length Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5
Unverified POI chains
75 2.17 22.24 29.13 26.15 23.82
150 1.59 25.90 47.16 59.93 54.01
225 2.09 18.80 63.11 76.52 83.49
Verified POI chains
75 1.56 22.70 31.36 28.86 24.78
150 1.64 30.11 47.73 49.21 51.95
225 1.08 30.79 49.64 72.80 80.65
(c) Mean of the deviation table for (a) and (b)
means is the depicted
its unverinode the mean of
length is computed, the mean of those
node the mean of its verified POI chains
length
means is the d
Fig. 10. Evolution of the lengths of unverified and verified chains.
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one of the pre-loaded POIs he will start a new review chain
with his review and he will not gain information on other
users. The visitor situation needs to be considered in detail,
because it may closely match a tourist profile. On one
hand, he will be completely new in the area and most or
all POI reviewers will be unknown to him. On the other,
precisely because he is a tourist he will input reviews more
frequently than the average user and that will allow him to
fastly develop a new Web of Trust.
3.7. Rewards and penalties
3.7.1. As POI reviewers
Whenever a user U receives a recommendation and fol-
lows it, he can input his own opinion in the system. Based
on that, his vehicle evaluates the recommendation chain
updating the levels of trust in other users depending on
the similarity of their rates to U’s. If U has a positive
impression of the recommended POI, all the other users
in the chain that gave a positive review to the POI are re-
warded; otherwise they are penalized. For this system to
work, the penalty always has to be greater than the re-
ward; otherwise, a user could cause as much damage to
the system as much good he had previously done.
Even though it may seem like that the sole objective of
this policy is the punishment of all those users that spread
lies and misbehavior in the system, that is inaccurate. Mis-
behaving nodes is only a part of the problem, i.e., people
tastes vary from individual to individual, thus so will their
POI reviews. The main goal is not only to build a Web of
Trust, but also a web of similar tastes, as previously stated.
There are several requirements the penalties system
should comply with:
1. If a user A has received only a few messages from a user
B and B lies to or disagrees with him, then his level of
trust should be significantly decreased.
2. If a user A has received many messages from a user B
and B lies to or disagrees with him, then his level of trust
should be decreased, but not dramatically.
(a) Number of known nodes: mean of the
node.
(b) Rate or level of trust of the known nodes:
users as POI reviewers.
everyof known nodes bynumber users assignmean of the rates to other
(c) Rate or level of trust of the 25% most trusted
users assign to other
Mean of the deviation
Data Length Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5
Nodes rate
75 2.08 4.91 5.29 5.40 4.94
150 2.11 3.94 4.51 5.02 4.14
225 1.44 3.05 3.20 3.59 3.37
Nodes first 25% rate
75 2.08 6.14 1.32 0.41 0.26
150 2.10 3.21 1.61 0.38 0.13
225 1.44 3.88 3.40 2.91 2.59
(d) Mean of the deviation table for (a), (b) and (c)
POI reviewers (only for the 25%
f the ratesmean onodes:
users as
nodes).highest rated
Fig. 11. Number of known nodes and their levels of trust progress.
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3. The system should be able to recognize misbehaving
strikes, after several lies or disagreements in a row the
level of trust in the misbehaving node should plummet.
A very good candidate for the penalties function is the
exponential curve because it has a slow growth at the
beginning and a steep increase as the rate of lies or dis-
agreements raises, which is appropriate to deal with mis-
behaving strikes. It was decided that the level of trust
should range from 0 to 15 and that after five consecutive
bad reviews the evaluator level of trust in the evaluated
should be set to the minimum. Thus, ex was discretized
from 0 to 15 into six elements (as depicted in Fig. 5) to ob-
tain the cumulative penalization function f(x), where x is
the number of lies. It should be noted that the rating sys-
tem could easily be modified to operate in another range
of values, e.g., from 0 to 10 (which might be more human
friendly). The same can be said about the number of bad
reviews. What is important is that the penalization func-
tion follows the requirements described above and every

















The value that will be subtracted from the level of trust
in the beginning of the misbehaving strike is f(strike_-
length). As described in requirements 1 and 2 the penalties
function should take into account how many good reviews
the evaluated user has sent over time, understanding by
good reviews those whose rate difference with the evalua-
tor’s does not exceed a maximum value defined in the sys-
tem, which is denoted by DOp. To that end b is included in
the equation. It should be noted that for recommended
nodes, as described in Section 3.5, the level of trust to be
decremented shall be both TrustE and TrustR.
In Algorithm 2 the pseudocode of the rewards and pen-
alties function is presented. Consider vU1 ;A as the rate user
U1 assigned to POI A. The first time that U1 finds the differ-
ence between his rate and U2’s over a certain POI A is great-
er than DOp it marks node U2 as misbehaving. The value of
TrustE is stored as the rate at the beginning of the strike
from which alength_strike will be subtracted. If a user is in a
misbehaving strike his level of trust will decrease faster.
A misbehaving strike can be broken after the evaluator ver-
ifies BREAK_STRIKE good reviews from the evaluated. How-
ever, breaking the strike does not mean that the evaluated
user goes back to its previous level of trust.
Algorithm 2. Rewards and penalties pseudocode.
if :misbehaving strike then
if jvU1 ;A  vU2 ;Aj 6 DOp then
TrustE :¼ TrustE + 1
else
misbehaving_strike :¼ true





TrustE :¼ TrustEpre strike  a




if jvU1 ;A  vU2 ;Aj 6 DOp then
TrustE :¼ TrustE + 1
(continued on next page)
(a) Number of known nodes: mean of the
node.
(b) Rate or level of trust of the 25% most trusted
users assign to
Mean of the deviation
Category #Nodes Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5
Nodes first 25% rate
0 0.94 1.90 3.49 4.46 4.21
25 0.97 4.39 2.22 2.15 1.58
50 1.78 1.99 3.89 0.98 0.94
(c) Mean of the deviation table for (b)
everynodes byof knownnumber
(only for the 25%POI reviewers




Fig. 12. Number of known nodes and their levels of trust progress.
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strike_breakers :¼ strike_breakers + 1




a :¼ a  e
1
5lnð15ÞbU2




3.7.2. As node reviewers
As node reviewers, a very similar system to the one de-
scribed in the previous section will be used. In order to be
considered a good recommender in our system, the pro-
portion of good recommendations against bad needs to
be at least 5 to 1. If it is, then the user’s level of trust as rec-
ommender will be increased. If it is less, it will be de-
creased by an (Eq. (10) with b = 0) where





It should be noted that the timestamp in both types of
reviews (POI and other users) allows the system to discard
old information and to avoid punishing the user for events
that occurred a long time ago.
Finally, as detailed in Section 3.5, by decreasing the le-
vel of trust on the user as recommender his recommended
nodes level of trust becomes more dependent on TrustE and
less on TrustR.
3.8. Misbehavior
In this section we will elaborate on the different mech-
anism Chains of Trust implements to protect itself from the
most common misbehavior or third party attacks.
 False reviews spamming: an attacker spreads good POI
reviews (e.g., to promote his restaurant) or bad (e.g., to
harm his competition). If the attacker is unknown to the
rest of the users, then their level of trust in him will be 0
and as explained in Section 3.3.1 his unverified POI chain
will gomostly unnoticed. On the other hand, if the attacker
has previously worked on gaining a certain reputation as
POI reviewer, then the penalties system described in Sec-
tion 3.7 will deal with the attack. As depicted in Fig. 5,
we can see that a few bad reviews are enough for a user
to lose all his credit, e.g., after three bad reviews its reputa-
tion is decreased by 5.08 units. As a result, it can be con-
cluded that the attack fails because the number of well
intentioned reviews the attacker needs to send to build a
reputation is much greater than the number of ill inten-
tioned reviews he can send before he loses his reputation.
It should also be noted that even if the attacker tried to use
multiple identities to increase the length of the chain the
same reasoning would apply and the attack would fail.
 Nodes recommendation: an attacker could create multiple
identities, use one to recommend the others and use the
latter to implement the False reviews spamming attack. As
stated in Section 3.5 only the nodes unknown to the nodes
recommendation message receiver are added into his list
of known nodes and they are added with a level of trust
defined by Eq. (9). If the attacker gains a good reputation
as recommender and then recommends a list of his own
identities, thus constructing a web of misbehaving nodes,
after several incorrect messages all of its recommendees’
level of trust as POI reviewers will be based on TrustE.
Unless the recommended node has earned a reputation
for himself, his level of trust as per Eq. (9) will be 0 and it
would be as if it had never been recommended, rendering
the attack unsuccesful.
In addition to what has been said above, the difficulty of
launching an attack on a mobile target should also be consid-
ered. Due to the lack of road side infrastructure the attacker
could not rely on compromisedRSUs to help him launch a glo-
bal scale attack and would have to use his own resources.
3.9. Analysis of Chains of Trust scalability
The first step to determine if Chains of Trust can suc-
ceed in real life is to simulate the data transmission pro-
tocol for hundreds of nodes. To that end, a simulation in
Ns-3 [23] was implemented defining a vehicular scenario
with 400 nodes arranged in 4 lanes as depicted in Fig. 6,
connected through a WAVE-DSRC 27 Mbps link with a
120 m range. WAVE-DSRC has the mechanisms to pro-
vide different user applications with different channels
while reserving certain channels for safety applications,
others for control and others for public safety [24]. It
should be noted that our simulation uses Ns-3 YansWifi-
PhyHelper and YansWifiChannelHelper classes, as defined
in [25].
Algorithm 3. Data transmission simulation pseudocode.
period :¼ 60,120,180,240,300 s
numPackets :¼ 100,200,300,400,500,600,700,800
for every element in numPackets








//schedules an event on time ‘time’ to send
‘numPackets’ packets of a 1000 bytes
Simulator::ScheduleEvent(time,numPackets,1000)
end function
In Algorithm 3 we can see the simulation pseudo-code.
Basically, the program schedules the broadcast of numPac-
kets 1000 bytes packets at a randomly chosen time be-
tween the start of the simulation and its ending point,
defined as period. For every scenario (numPackets/period
combination) the number of broadcasts received by each
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of the 400 simulated nodes is computed (resultsnumPac-
kets,period) and compared with how many broadcasts each
of those nodes would have received without packets loss
(referencenumPackets), considering the mean as the scenario’s
result:












Looking at the results in Table 1 it can be seen that to
ensure a delivery rate over 90% while maximizing the
amount of information being transmitted 400 packets is
the best option for a 120 s period. For a larger number of
packets there is a drop in reception due to the MAC colli-
sions. If a shorter period is considered there is a slight drop
in performance, although the major reason against trans-
mitting every 60 s is limiting the amount of information
an attacker can collect while following a target. We believe
120 s is more secure since the attacker has to be in range
twice as long, while at the same time Chains of Trust can
produce satisfactory results, as will be showed in Section 5.
4. poiSim: the simulation tool
4.1. General description
Once Chains of Trust has been defined, it needs a real-
istic simulation tool to estimate its success in the real
world. Simulation tools like Glomosim or ns-2 were dis-
carded because in order to simulate hundreds of thou-
sands of nodes they require a massive amount of
memory. Thus, we were inclined to design our own sim-
ulation tool. Like in [26], it was decided to analyze the
realistic vehicular trace produced by the Multi-Agent
Traffic Simulator (MMTS) developed by K.Nagel at ETH
Zurich. The MMTS is capable of simulating public and pri-
vate traffic over real regional road maps of Switzerland
with a high level of realism. It models the behavior of
people living in the area, reproducing their movement
(using vehicles) within a period of 24 h. The decision of
each individual depends on the area it lives in. The indi-
viduals in the simulation are distributed over the cities
and villages according to statistical data gathered by a
census. Within the 24 h of simulation, all individuals
choose a time to travel and the mean of transportation
according to their needs and environment, e.g., one indi-
vidual might take a car and go to work in the early morn-
ing, another one wakes up later and goes shopping using
public transportation, etc. All in all, with over 260,000
simulated nodes or vehicles in an area of around
250 km  260 km, this mobility trace suited the simula-
tion needs.
According to the data in [27,28] there were 4,012,690
passenger vehicles registered in Switzerland in the year
2008, which means that poiSim simulates only 6.48% of
them. Even if we took into account the number of regis-
tered vehicles which are not used, we believe the simu-
lated adoption rate of Chains of Trust would still be
considerably low.
In Section 3.1 it was described how the scheme relies on
people’s habits in order to construct a Web of Trust. The
main goal behind designing a specific simulator is to dis-
cover if those habits suffice to ensure the application suc-
cess in a real life scenario. If so, passed the first several
days each node in the network should have several POI re-
views as well as known nodes. poiSim will also be used to
analyze how the system behaves when modifying several
parameters, e.g., the length of POI chains, or to study how
it performs when user chains are not used. It should be
noted that poiSim is a high level simulator, i.e., it simulates
Chains of Trust but it does not simulate aMediumAccess Con-
trol protocol for example, it would be unfeasible to simulate
wireless communication realistically for hundreds of thou-
sands of nodes in a reasonable amount of time. That iswhy a
separate experiment was conducted in Section 3.9. In addi-
tion, the version of Chains of Trust simulated by poiSim will
be slightly different from the original scheme designed in
the previous section. The differences will allow the simula-
tor to improve its performance and will not affect the re-
sults. They will be explained in this section.
These are several of poiSim’s features: it simulates
259,977 nodes and 15,000 POIs. Every node stores:
 Levels of trust on 500 other vehicles.
 100 unverified POI chains with 225 POI reviews each.
 150 verified POI chains with 225 POI reviews each.
And for every POI:
 5000 reviews are stored in the system.
Every POI is assigned a random value ranging from 0 to
15 to be its real rate l. The rates the users assign to those
POIs will be normally distributed around l with variance
r2 = 2 (as depicted in Fig. 7).
Communication wise, a range of 120 m of coverage is
considered and every time a vehicle transmits all the vehi-
cles within range receive the message. There are two kinds
of simulated messages: periodic and recognition.
1. Periodic Messages: every 120 s a vehicle will broadcast
a message with his 25 highest rated verified POI chains,
adding unverified POI chains to complete the message if
necessary.
2. Recognition Messages: every time a vehicle recognizes
another as a trusted user it will send his 25 highest
rated verified POI reviews and his 25 most trusted
nodes, together with his level of trust in them. Unveri-
fied POI chains may be included as well to complete the
message if necessary.
It should be noted that poiSim does not include request
messages, as the original scheme did. The reason is that
their implementation would not have changed the simula-
tion experiments, since they are seldom used in respect
with periodic messages (every 120 s). As a result, the qual-
ity of the system is measured by the number of nodes
known to every user and the number and length of verified
POI chains every user stores at the end of every simulated
day. Due to computational limitations, it was decided not
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to simulate user chains as explained in Sections 3.4, 3.5
and 3.7.2, since their simulation would have required the
execution of Algorithm 4 for each of the 260,000 simulated
nodes and each of the 225 reviewers that unverified and
verified chains store. Had user chains not been removed,
they would have added a large overhead on the simulation,
thus extending the simulation execution time to weeks or
even months. As a result, poiSim does not simulate misbe-
havior (since it would not be possible to penalize bad rec-
ommenders), hence there is no need to keep track of the
recommender-recommended relation and its rewards and
penalties policy. We believe misbehavior attempts will be
dealt with the mechanisms described in Section 3.8 and
will not affect the overall performance. User chains still ex-
ist and are transmitted in recognition messages, but the
recommender will not be rewarded nor penalized for it.
In addition, recommended nodes will be added to the
known nodes list with a trust level of 1. In this way, it
can be established if the scheme performs satisfactorily
or not, and if it does it can be safely assumed that the
implementation of user chains will be an improvement,
since recommended nodes will be added to the known
nodes list with the level of trust with which they were rec-
ommended (always greater or equal than 1). It should also
be noted that our simulation only contains one POI cate-
gory, which is enough for the desired testing purposes.
Algorithm 4. User chains algorithm.
In a nutshell, poiSim processes each line of the MMTS
trace, which contains a nodeID and its corresponding x, y,
z, t coordinates and updates the vehicles position. On every
update it ensures that the vehicles send a periodic message
every 120 s, which is a long enough period to avoid causing
a tracking vulnerability, and a recognition message when
needed. In addition, once a day at most each user reviews
a randomly chosen POI from his unverified POI chains, or a
completely random POI if there are no unverified POI
chains available, as described in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5. POI review algorithm
if node.reviewedPOIToday() = false then
node.setReviewedPOIToday(true)
if random(0,1) = 1then








In order to better study the system, to observe how the
POI reviews are exchanged between users, how users build
a better reputation for themselves and the effect of several
configuration parameters on the simulation, such as the
chain length or the number of user reviews in a user re-
views message, the 24 h vehicular trace is replayed to ob-
tain a multiple days scenario. It should be remarked that
the only common element in every simulated day will be
the MMTS trace, because the POIs being reviewed are ran-
domized, and hence will be different in every run.
4.2. Message formats
In this section the message formats and sizes for the
simulation will be defined according to the results pre-
sented in Section 3.9. Considering the following format
for a periodic message M as defined in Section 3.3:













































Taking into account that the total amount of informa-
tion has to be approximately 400,000 bytes, information
about 25 POIs will be sent, each containing 107 user’s re-
views adding up to a total of 390,300 bytes. It should be
noted that periodic messages are fragmented in a 1000 by-
tes packets including certain redundancy, so that if a pack-
et is lost the rest of the message can still be read.
Recognition messages will also contain an user reviews
message M0:
//every time a POI is reviewed by the user
for every POIReview
//for every reviewer in the POI’s unverified chain
for every unverifiedChain.reviewer
//if the user and the reviewer’s opinion are too different
if junverifiedChain.reviewer.rate  user.ratej 6 DOp
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Considering that M0 contains information about 25
users the message size amounts to 3.371 bytes.
5. Experimental results
5.1. How will Chains of Trust behave in a realistic scenario?
Chains of Trust is designed so that every vehicle is pre-
loaded with a selection of a 100 POIs to provide informa-
tion to users that have arrived to a new area (as described
in Section 3.6). However, a user will not transmit a pre-
loaded POI unless he visits it for himself, at which point
he starts a new chain with his review and can be transmit-
ted. Therefore, the pre-load will not impact in the results
presented in this section.
The first test should reveal if the scheme is feasible in a
realistic scenario. The simulation will be executed for dif-
ferent reviewing rates, i.e., every user will input a review
into the system once a day on average (1/1), once every
two days (1/2), once every four days (1/4) and so on until
a review is input once every 10 days (1/10).
In Fig. 8a–b the evolution of the number and length of
unverified POI chains can be seen. After the first 5 days of
simulation the number of unverified chains and its length
(number of POIs it contains) is very similar regardless of
the reviewing rate. The fact that the average number of
unverified chains is over 90 and its length is almost 5 (con-
sidering a reviewing rate 1/6) means that there has been
interaction between the users and some have already
started to build a better reputation in the network. Consid-
ering the results after 30 days of simulation it can be seen
that they do not differ significantly.
As far as verified chains are concerned in Fig. 8c the di-
rect relation between the reviewing rate and the number
of verified chains the nodes store can be observed, which
is logical considering that every time a POI is reviewed
its unverified chain moves on to the verified state. In the
first 5 days of the simulation, the number of verified chains
for reviewing rates 1/4 and 1/6 is 1.24 and 0.83 respec-
tively. Similarly, Fig. 8d shows that the progression of the
length of verified chains is very close to the unverified de-
picted in Fig. 8b. Regarding the rate assigned to the POIs in
the verified chains, in Fig. 8e it can be observed that the
rate of the reviewed POIs varies until it stabilizes around
7, which is expected since the randomly chosen rates are
distributed around that value, as described in Section 4.1.
The different simulated reviewing rates determine how
fast the POI rate converges to that value.
The measure of the system success is given by how
many users every user knows and what level of trust
he has assigned to them. In Fig. 9a it can be observed
that after the first 5 days of simulation every user has
several other users in his known nodes list, going from
20.76 users on average for a review rate 1/1 to 2.11
users for a review rate 1/10. As expected, lower review-
ing frequencies result in a lower number of known
nodes. If a middle ground scenario is considered, review
rates 1/4 and 1/6 yield 3.85 and 3.05 known users
respectively. Results improve significantly after the first
ten days of simulation, where reviewing rates 1/4 and
1/6 result in every node knowing on average 33.24 and
26.37 nodes, respectively.
Regarding the rate or level of trust a user assigns to his
known users, in Fig. 9b it can be seen that after the first
5 days of simulation for all reviewing rates the average le-
vel of trust is almost 1. As the simulation progresses, the
level of trust may oscillate (as it can be seen for reviewing
rate 1/1) due to the randomness of the simulation,
although on the long run a larger number of chains are
reviewed and the level of trust increases due to the high-
er proportion of good reviews. After the first 10 days, con-
sidering review rates 1/4 and 1/6 result in levels of trust
of 1.31 and 1.45 respectively. In Fig. 9c we can see repre-
sented the level of trust in the 25% most trusted nodes
each user has. After the first 15 days it can be seen how
its progression differs from Fig. 9b, ending the simulation
with a level of trust slightly over 4 for review rates 1/4
and 1/6.
We believe this first experiment has proven that the
system will in all likelihood succeed in effectively dissem-
inating POIs information and building a Web of Trust
among users in a real life scenario. Considering moderate
reviewing rates of 1/4 and 1/6 we can see that just after
the first 5 days of simulation every user has on average
more than 90 unverified chains containing five user re-
views, almost 1 verified chain with five reviews and more
than three trusted nodes with trust levels over 1. It should
also be noted that results significantly improve after
10 days of simulation. Therefore, it can be concluded that
although the system will produce results from the very
start, depending on the reviewing rate the it may need
from 5 to 10 days (in the worst case scenario) to fully de-
velop a Web of Trust. Users, however, will be able to take
advantage of the application from the start by using as well
the collection of pre-loaded POIs.
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5.2. Chain size experiments
The length of POI chains is of paramount importance in
the system because every time an unverified POI chain is
reviewed the reviewer updates his level of trust in all its
signers. Hence, the longer the chain the better the system
should work. Naturally, the messages cannot be allowed
to grow indefinitely because vehicles do not have an infi-
nite amount of memory and the messages exchanged be-
tween vehicles should be relatively short due to wireless
communication limitations. In Section 5.1, poiSim was con-
figured to allow chains up to a length of 225 reviews, but
we would like to observe how does the system behave
with shorter chains and verify if there is a certain frontier
value where the benefits of increasing the length begin to
decrease. Thus, the simulator was executed with POI
chains of 75, 150 and 225 reviews. In addition, for this
experiment every user will input a new review in the sys-
tem every 1800 s. Certainly, it is not very likely that users
will input one new POI review every half an hour. How-
ever, once we have stablished the validity of the system,
we would like to modify the reviewing rate to study the
system in the long run. In Fig. 10a and b, for both unveri-
fied and verified POI chains there is a slight difference be-
tween using length 150 or 225 after 5 days of simulation.
In a 5 days simulation both lengths are high enough to
not be a limitation, but in larger runs we would definitely
see a bigger difference in the length of chains the vehicles
store. Therefore, from Chains of Trust’s point of view chains
should be as long as the wireless communication between
vehicles permits.
Fig. 11a shows a similar growth for the number of
known nodes with the three simulated chain lengths. That
is because after the first day of simulation most of this
growth is a product of the exchange of recognition mes-
sages (which do not depend on the chain length). As far
as the rates are concerned, in Fig. 11b and c there is a cer-
tain variation attributed to the randomness of the simula-
tion, rather than to the chain length. It should be noted
that user opinions of POIs are normally distributed with
a mean l that we termed its real rate. As a result, the mean
of the rates of 75 reviewers should not differ much from
the mean of the rates of 225.
In Fig. 11b and c the levels of trust progress as the simu-
lation advances, although it provides conclusive evidence
that longer chains do not lead to more trustworthy nodes.
Therefore, in a scenario where recognition messages do
not play such an important role on conveying nodes infor-
mation, POI chains assume that responsibility. Mainly, be-
cause every time a chain is verified all the reviewers levels
of trust are updated in the verifier. As a result, the length
of a POI chain should only be limited by physical require-
ments such as the size of the message to be transmitted.
5.3. POI vs nodes experiments
The purpose of this experiment is to discern how much
of the system performance can be attributed to the ex-
change of recognition messages, or in other words, how
is the system performance affected when node reviews
are not exchanged. To that end, the simulation was exe-
cuted with 0, 25 and 50 node reviews per transmitted mes-
sage and with a reviewing rate of a new review every
1800 s.
In Fig. 12a the results of those simulations are plotted. As
expected, the average number of users known by every user
increases as the number of nodes in the message increases
as well. However, it should be noted that the maximum
number of nodes to be stored (500) is reached in the three
cases during the third day of the simulation. Therefore,
the exchange of node reviews does not represent a dramatic
improvement in that aspect. On the other hand, Fig. 12b
shows that the rates of the 25% highest rated nodes improve
as a result of increasing the number of nodes in themessage.
This leads to the conclusion that recognition messages are
not critic to the system performance, although they do pro-
vide a considerable improvement.
6. Conclusions
This article presents Chains of Trust, a new POI informa-
tion dissemination scheme that builds a reputation system
based on people’s traffic patterns. From the results pre-
sented in Section 5 several conclusions can be drawn. First
and foremost, Chains of Trust performs satisfactorily in a
realistic scenario by rapidly building a Web of Trust among
its users, even for low reviewing frequencies. Secondly, the
length of POI chains is relevant in terms of the number of
nodes a user gains information of when verifying a POI re-
view. However, regardless of the length, the mean of the
known nodes level of trust remained similar, hence indi-
cating that it does not help to improve the trustworthiness
of those nodes. Finally, user chains do help improve the
development of the Web of Trust once a primary structure
of known nodes has been established.
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Simulation of points of interest
distribution in vehicular networks
David Antolino Rivas and Manel Guerrero-Zapata
Abstract
Over the last few years Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) have become a major research topic. Security mechanisms such
as Public Key Infrastructure have been customized to provide privacy, authentication, integrity and non-repudiation to vehicle
communications. Once the security foundations were established, different applications were built on top: intelligent driving
systems, parking spot finders, peer-to-peer content, advertisements distribution, etc. In order to verify the feasibility of those
applications in the VANETenvironment, simulation tools such as ns-2 or Glomosim are used, basing their mobility model on
non-uniform distributions. The major difficulty for those simulations resides in the complexity of correctly characterizing
vehicular mobility at both macroscopic and microscopic levels. This article leaves the generation of mobility traces to simula-
tors such as Multi-Agent Traffic Simulator or VanetMobiSim and focuses on the implementation of the network application
simulator poiSim. poiSim simulates Chains of Trust, a secure points of interest distribution protocol for vehicular networks.
This article discusses how, by using customized application simulators, we can obtain more realistic results than by using
general network simulators such as ns-2. poiSim processes a 24-hour mobility trace produced by a Multi-Agent Traffic
Simulator with over 260,000 nodes, which realistically simulates public and private traffic over regional maps of Switzerland.
The result is a Chains of Trust simulation, which accurately portrays reality and can be executed in a personal computer.
Finally, it should be noted that poiSim could easily be modified to simulate other protocols in vehicular networks.
Keywords
simulation, Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks, vehicular, network
1. Introduction
In the near future, Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs)
will change the way we drive. Vehicles equipped with
wireless communication devices, also known as On Board
Units (OBUs), will be able to communicate among them-
selves and with Road Side Units (RSUs). RSUs will com-
pose the road-side infrastructure that will connect the
vehicular network to a central system or to the Internet.
With the massive deployment of wireless technologies,
the automotive industry will open a wide range of possibi-
lities for drivers and passengers alike: theoretically, any-
thing from finding out the road conditions ahead to
watching a movie through streaming should be possible.
So, different requirements will lead to the deployment of
different kinds of applications over the network. In Raya
and Hubaux1 and Reichardt et al.,2 applications are classi-
fied based on the service they provide.
1. Safety-related applications.
(a) Traffic information messages: used to disse-
minate traffic conditions over an area; they
affect public safety only indirectly (they are
not time critical).
(b) General safety-related messages: used by pub-
lic safety applications, such as cooperative
driving and collision avoidance (in order to
prevent traffic accidents time is certainly an
issue; at least they should satisfy an upper
bound delay in delivering the information).
(c) Liability-related messages: they are only
exchanged in liability-related situations such
as accidents. The senders’ identities should be
kept hidden from the other users in the net-
work and only revealed to the law enforce-
ment authorities (time is not an issue).
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2. Other applications (some examples).
(a) Toll applications: electronic toll collection
systems such as AutoPASS in Norway allow
drivers to continue driving without having to
stop at tolls.
(b) TV and other multimedia content: used to pro-
vide users with entertainment and information
(movies, newspapers, etc.).
(c) Advertisements: businesses along the road
(such as gas stations and restaurants) could
advertise themselves to drivers before they
reach their location, giving them enough time
to compare different offers.
As far as safety applications are concerned, the integrity
and the non-repudiation of the transmitted messages has to
be ensured, albeit maintaining at the same time the user’s
privacy. For instance, a traffic information application
needs to make every user accountable for the traffic events
he reports, otherwise a misbehaving user would be able to
report false events (e.g., traffic jams, accidents, etc.) and
redirect traffic to his own benefit. Other applications, for
example, multimedia content distribution, may also need
to encrypt their messages to avoid eavesdropping from
non-registered users. The use of Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI) will fulfill most security requirements.
PKI is a cryptographic technique that enables users to
securely communicate on an insecure public network and
reliably verify a user’s identity via digital signatures. In a
nutshell, every user receives a digital certificate with a pair
of keys (public and private), issued and signed by the
Certification Authority (CA), which uniquely identify him
in the network. The CA is responsible for storing and
revoking all issued certificates. It should be noted that
every user’s public key is accessible to everybody else. In
this way, if Alice wants to send a message to Bob, which
only Bob can read, she encrypts the message with Bob’s
public key. In addition, if she also wants to make sure that
Bob knows the message was from her, she signs it with
her own private key and appends her certificate with her
public key. When Bob receives the message, he will first
check that Alice’s certificate is valid (i.e., not expired and
not revoked by the CA). Then, he will verify Alice’s signa-
ture using her public key and decrypt her message using
his own private key.
In order to study the behavior of applications in
VANET scenarios, extensive research has been performed
in mobility and network simulation fields. Vehicular traf-
fic simulators can be classified in macroscopic and micro-
scopic simulators. The macroscopic perspective considers
system parameters as traffic density (number of vehicles
per km per lane) or traffic flow (e.g., number of vehicles
per hour crossing an intersection) to compute road capac-
ity and the traffic distribution in the road net. In contrast,
microscopic simulators determine the movement of each
vehicle that participates in the road traffic.
As far as network simulators are concerned, there is a
wide variety of available options: ns-2,3–6 GloMoSim,7–10
OPNET,11,12 etc. They are essential tools to simulate net-
work aspects such as communications, routing protocols and
wireless propagation models. However, as far as we know,
they are not able to handle the simulation of hundreds of
thousands of nodes, unlike our simulation tool poiSim.
poiSim simulates a secure points of interest (POIs) dis-
tribution application named Chains of Trust.13 It should be
noted that almost anything that could be of interest to a
driver could be considered a POI: a museum, a restaurant,
a traffic jam, etc. Briefly summarized, in Chains of Trust
every user or vehicle creates its own pair of public and pri-
vate keys (of length L), and is responsible for its private
key securing; the protocol does not require a CA or any
road-side infrastructure. When users visit POIs they evalu-
ate them and input their reviews into the system. The pri-
vate key is used to sign those POI reviews, whereas the
public key is attached to the transmitted information so
that the rest of the network can verify the signatures.
In most research articles,14–17 the authors are aware of net-
work simulator limitations and simulate a low number of
vehicles (of the order of a hundred), moving randomly or fol-
lowing a statistical distribution. What we intend to show in
this article is that VANET application simulation should be
divided into two layers: the first will deal with network-
specific aspects such as the Medium Access Control (MAC)
layer, which can be simulated by network simulators such as
ns-2 with a comparatively small number of nodes (of the
order of a hundred) without affecting the general results, and
the second will be application specific, which can be simu-
lated by poiSim with a large number of nodes (of the order of
hundreds of thousands) while using a realistic mobility trace.
We believe that this approach will yield more accurate and
realistic results than directly using a network simulator to
simulate the application and the network-specific behavior.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. In
Section 2, vehicular traffic, network simulators and the
application being simulated, Chains of Trust, are further
explained. Section 3 introduces the application simulator
poiSim, followed by a detailed description in Section 4.
Finally, the article closes with the poiSim simulation
results in Section 5 and the conclusions that can be drawn
from them in Section 6.
2. Related work
This section introduces certain topics that are required to
better understand poiSim: vehicular traffic simulators, net-
work simulators and the application Chains of Trust.
Every VANET simulation needs to take into account
how it characterizes vehicular mobility. It is a key aspect
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of the simulation because only by working with realistic
descriptions of vehicular mobility can the simulation
results be trusted. Providing realistic vehicular mobility
descriptions is the responsibility of vehicular traffic
simulators.
As far as network simulators are concerned, they allow
us to model and simulate our own networks. Usually, they
can simulate wired and wireless communications, different
signal propagation models, different routing protocols, etc.
They are introduced to compare them against poiSim and
show how it can obtain more realistic results than them.
Finally, this section also explains Chains of Trust, since
the application-specific layer of poiSim has been tailored
to its simulation.
2.1. Vehicular traffic simulators
The main goal of vehicular traffic simulators is to realisti-
cally portray how vehicles behave on the road. The Multi-
agent Microscopic Traffic Simulator (MMTS) developed
at ETH Zurich18 is capable of simulating public and pri-
vate traffic over real regional road maps of Switzerland
with a high-level realism (vehicular traces are publicly
available from http://www.lst.inf.ethz.ch/research/ad-hoc).
The MMTS models the behavior of people living in the
area, reproducing their movement (using vehicles) within
a period of 24 hours. The decision of each individual
depends on the area it lives in. The individuals in the
simulation are distributed over the cities and villages
according to statistical data gathered by a census. Within
the 24 hours of simulation, all individuals choose a time to
travel and the mean of transportation according to their
needs and environment. For example, one person may take
a car early in the morning to go to work while another
goes shopping using public transportation in the afternoon.
The street network that is used in the MMTS was origi-
nally developed for the Swiss regional planning authority.
The major attributes of each road segment are type, length,
speed and capacity. The simulation’s result is a 24-hour
detailed car traffic trace with almost 260,000 vehicles
involved, with more than 25,000,000 recorded vehicles
direction/speed changes in an area of around 250 km ×
260 km.
Simulation of Urban Mobility (SUMO)19,20 is another
example of microscopic traffic simulation. It simulates
how a given traffic demand, which consists of single vehi-
cles, moves through a given road network. The simulation
addresses a large set of traffic management topics. It is
purely microscopic: each vehicle is modeled explicitly,
has its own route and moves individually through the net-
work. It should also be noted that it can extract road topol-
ogies from maps obtained from the TIGER database.21,22
In VanetMobiSim23 the authors take into consideration
multiple factors to produce detailed vehicular movement
traces, for example, obstacles, vehicles characteristics,
human driving patterns, intersection management, etc.
According to the authors, VanetMobiSim combines a
macroscopic and microscopic approach to produce more
realistic results. It should also be noted that, like SUMO, it
can extract road topologies from maps obtained from the
TIGER database. The authors include as well some inter-
esting results regarding the execution time on an average
computer (Intel Core2 Duo at 2.2 GHz with 2 GB of
random-access memory (RAM)). VanetMobiSim can simu-
late 5000 vehicles in a 2 km × 2 km area in over 30
minutes.
For poiSim we decided to use the MMTS traces, mainly
because they contain 24 hours of over 260,000 vehicles
moving over a real map of Switzerland and because they
are publicly available for download.
2.2. Network simulators
Harri et al.24 divide network simulators between commer-
cial based and open source. In the first group we may find
OPNET, QualNet25,26 and OMNet++ .27,28 They all con-
tain a large number of network protocols for wired and
wireless networks. In the second group we may find ns-2,
ns-329 and GloMoSim as the most representative network
simulators. ns-2 and ns-3 are discrete event simulators tar-
geted at networking research, which provide substantial
support for simulation of transmission control protocol
(TCP), routing and multicast protocols over wired and wire-
less (local and satellite) networks. ns-3 is more efficient
than ns-2 and offers new features to help program simula-
tions, although there is still an ongoing effort to port all pro-
tocols supported by ns-2. GloMoSim has basically the same
functionality as ns-2, although it simulates fewer protocols
due to the smaller GloMoSim support community.
The main drawback of the simulators described above
is that, to the best of our knowledge, none of them are able
to handle simulations of the order of hundreds of thousands
of nodes, and therefore process the MMTS traces. Naumov
et al.18 are aware of this limitation and select smaller
regions from the trace to run their simulations with ns-2.
Similarly, Ding et al.,14 Patwardhan et al.,15 Dhurandher
et al.16 and Lo and Tsai17 limit their simulations to several
hundred nodes.
Precisely, we designed our own simulation tool to over-
come this major limitation and to be able to process the
entire MMTS trace.
2.3. Chains of Trust: the application being simulated
2.3.1. Scheme overview. Chains of Trust is a technique for
secure dissemination of POIs information over VANETs,
which we presented in Rivas and Guerrero-Zapata.13 One
of its main advantages is that it does not require a CA or
any road-side infrastructure. It relies on a reputation sys-
tem or Web of Trust based on human driving patterns.
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In the reputation system, every vehicle needs to store
information about other vehicles and POIs (whether
received from other users or reviewed by him). Every
node in the network shall store the following.
• POI chains: these are a series of reviews of the
same POI from different users. Whenever a user
queries his vehicle for a POI recommendation, veri-
fied and unverified POI chains are returned as a
result. As depicted in Figure 1, POI chains can be
divided into the following.
– Unverified POI chains: these contain POI
reviews that the user has received from other
users but which he has not yet been able to ver-
ify (by visiting and rating the POI himself), for
example, a traffic jam alert or the review of a
new restaurant. When the user queries the vehi-
cle for a POI recommendation a selection of
unverified chains, ordered by how much the
user trusts the reviewers in the chains, is
returned.
– Verified POI chains: once the user has a chance
to check if there really is a traffic jam or how
good the recommended restaurant is, he evalu-
ates the reviewers in the unverified chain and
updates his level of trust in them depending on
how truthful they were and marks the chain as
verified. Verified chains are an essential part of
the exchange of information between users, as
will be explained in Section 2.3.3.
• Trust levels in other users (per category): every
node needs to remember how much he trusts other
users based on the verification of previous reviews.
Besides, nodes not only share information about
POIs, but also information about other nodes.
• Information about the latest messages from every
user, both about POIs and nodes, should be stored
for misbehavior detection.
Every user or vehicle will create its own pair of public
and private keys (of length L) and will be responsible for
its securing (making a CA unnecessary). It should be noted
that the public key Kpub is also the user identifier; there-
fore, L should be long enough to ensure the statistical
uniqueness of identities. The private key will be used to
sign POI information and levels of trust that a particular
user has in the others, while the public key will be attached
to that information so that the rest of the network can ver-
ify the signature’s correctness. For instance, consider the
scenario depicted in Figure 2. A user U1 goes to a hotel
Hotel 1 and he likes it. U1 will broadcast a message to the
other users in the network saying that Hotel 1 deserves a
certain rate ┏, signed with his Kpriv and attaching his
Kpub. All the other nodes store the unverified chain for
Figure 2. General behavior of the Chains of Trust protocol. (a)
U1 reviews Hotel 1 and broadcasts the message. (b) U2 queries
his vehicle for a hotel. (c) U2 follows U1 recommendation, adds
his own opinion to the chain and updates his level of trust in U1
according to how similar both reviews were.
Figure 1. Point of Interest (POI) chains organization. (a)
Unverified POI chains organization. (b) Verified POI chains
organization.
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future reference. When another user U2 queries his own
vehicle for a place to spend the night, the vehicle returns a
list of places recommended by other users (among which
is U1’s recommendation). If U2 decides to go to Hotel 1
and likes it as much as U1, his level of trust in U1 will
increase, or decrease otherwise. Regardless of how much
he coincides with U1’s opinion, U2 will append his signed
review to the original, together with his Kpub, and broad-
cast the message. In this way, every time a user follows
and verifies a recommendation he can update his level of
trust in n other nodes (where n is the length of the chain of
signatures), thus increasing the speed at which the reputa-
tion system develops.
2.3.2. POI categories and records. Several POI categories
shall be considered, and a different level of trust for each
category for each user shall be kept by each vehicle, that
is, a user may be a good hotel reviewer and a terrible res-
taurant critic. The following are examples of what may be
considered a POI category: traffic conditions, gas stations,
grocery stores, restaurants, etc.
For each category a validity period is defined, for exam-
ple, a hotel review may be valid for months, whereas a
traffic jam alert may expire within hours. That validity
period is necessary to prevent unfair punishments. For
instance, if a user identifies a traffic jam and sends a mes-
sage alerting the network and several hours later another
vehicle passes by and sees no trace of it he should not
decrease his level of trust in all the users who signed the
alert message.
Before POIs can be reviewed they must first be given a
unique identifier consisting of common knowledge
information:
Id= Category POI Namej jj jf
Postal AddressjjGPSCoordsg ð1Þ
The Postal_Address and the GPSCoords fields comple-
ment each other, since it is difficult to give the postal
address of a traffic jam (although possible using road mar-
kers) or the GPS coordinates of a restaurant (unless you
position your vehicle right at the door). It should be noted
that the GPS coordinates will admit a certain margin of
error due to the device’s positioning error.
Whenever a user reviews a POI, he assigns a rate to it
and assembles a record R with the following information:
R= fIdjjRatejjTimestampg ð2Þ
Each record has a timestamp so that users are able to
keep track of the validity period per category. In addition,
it could also be used to remove old entries from the
trusted nodes table. Once the record has been prepared,
the sender needs to sign it (by encrypting the record’s
hash with his private key) and attach his public key
to it. At some point in the future the vehicle will
broadcast M:
M = fR1jjfH R1ð ÞgKprivAjjKpubAg ð3Þ
Afterwards, when a vehicle receives a message it
stores it for future use. When a user queries his vehicle
for a recommendation on a POI category in a certain
area, the system answers with a list of received POIs.
If the user follows the recommendation he will be able
to write another review about the recommended POI.
The idea is to keep the previous reviews and attach the
latest to the group, thus forming a chain of signatures
that grows until a parameter n. By keeping a chain of
size n, every time a user follows a recommendation he
will be able to update his level of trust in n other users.
It should be noted that the new added records are a
slightly modified version of the first because they con-
tain the hash of the original POI Id, instead of the com-
plete identifier:
R0 = fH Idð ÞjjRatejjTimestampg ð4Þ
A message containing a chain of length 2 is of the form:
M = fR1jjfH R1ð ÞgKprivAjjfR
02gKprivBjjKpubAjjKpubBg
ð5Þ
2.3.3. The information exchange. The application is
designed to disseminate information about POIs among
the vehicles in the network, thus the need for that informa-
tion to flow from one vehicle to another. On one side there
are POI chains (both verified and unverified) that repre-
sent the new information that comes into the system in the
form of reviews of new POIs plus the re-evaluation of the
already known. On the other, there are user chains, which
are lists of known nodes and their level of trust. Basically,
once two nodes know each other, besides exchanging
information about POIs, they can exchange information
about other users, thus increasing the speed at which the
Web of Trust develops.
The following two types of message exchange are con-
sidered in poiSim:
1. Periodic Exchange: vehicles should periodically
exchange (every 120 seconds) POI chains with the
better rated POIs in each category;
2. Recognition Exchange: if during a periodic
exchange, one vehicle is recognized as a trusted
user (from a previous encounter) then recognizer
and recognized will exchange user chains and veri-
fied POI chains, although they will be marked as
unverified by the receiver.
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In addition, the nodes and their level of trust included in
the node chains will be added to the list of the previously
known nodes, as explained below.
Figure 3 depicts a Recognition Exchange between a
user S and a user R, in which S sends a message M with
his most trusted nodes:
RU =KpubU jjLevel of TrustU as POI reviewerð Þ ð6Þ
M =RU1jj . . . jjRU5jjTimestampjj
fH(RU1jj . . . jjRU5jjTimestamp)gKprivS jjKpubS ð7Þ
User R adds U1 and U4 to the list of known nodes with
the level of trust S recommended, provided that it is not
greater than the level of trust R has on S itself.
Due to the information exchange, users will tend to
have the same reputation in groups of users with the same
taste. For instance, consider a user who is a good fast food
critic but a terrible shellfish restaurant reviewer. In the
long run, this user will have a good reputation among other
users who like fast food and a bad reputation among users
that like shellfish. The Recognition Exchange accelerates
that process by allowing users to send and receive recom-
mendations of other users as POI reviewers. In the previous
example, the fast food reviewer will be recommended in
Recognition Exchanges between fast food enthusiasts, which
will make it more likely that another user follows one of his
recommendations and therefore increases his level of trust in
him. On the other hand, he will never be recommended
between users that like shellfish, which will make it less
probable that another user follows one of his reviews.
Finally, it should be noted that whenever a user receives
a Recognition Exchange message he will only process rec-
ommendations for users he does not know yet: if one user
knows another, it means he has followed one of his POI
recommendations and that is more important than any rec-
ommendation he could receive from other users.
2.3.4. Rewards and penalties. In order to build a reputation
system from the POI and users’ recommendations dis-
cussed in the previous section, a rewards and penalties
policy is required. Whenever a user U receives a recom-
mendation and follows it, he can input his own opinion in
the system. Based on that, his vehicle evaluates the recom-
mendation chain updating the levels of trust in other users
depending on the similarity of their rates to U’s. If U has a
positive impression of the recommended POI, all the other
users in the chain that gave a positive review to the POI
are rewarded; otherwise they are penalized. For this sys-
tem to succeed the penalty always has to be greater than
the reward; otherwise, a user could cause as much damage
to the system as good he had previously done.
A very good candidate for the penalties function is the
exponential curve because it has a slow growth at the
beginning and a steep increase as the rate of lies or dis-
agreements raises, which is appropriate to deal with misbe-
having strikes. By definition, the level of trust ranges from
0 to 15 and after five consecutive bad reviews the evaluator
level of trust in the evaluated reviewer should be set to the
minimum . Thus, ex was discretized from 0 to 15 into six
elements (as depicted in Figure 4) to obtain the cumulative




f xð Þ= (e(ln(15)β)=5)x ð10Þ
The value that will be subtracted from the level of trust in
the beginning of the misbehaving strike is f (strike_length).
The penalties function should take into account how many
good reviews the evaluated user has sent over time, under-
standing by good reviews those whose rate difference with
the evaluator’s does not exceed a maximum value defined
in the system, which is denoted by Op. To that end β is
included in the equation.
In Algorithm 1 the pseudo-code of the rewards and
penalties function is presented. Consider ┏U1, A as the rate
user U1 assigned to POI A. The first time that U1 finds the
difference between his rate and U2’s over a certain POI A
Figure 3. R’s known nodes table before and after processing a Recognition Exchange message.
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is greater than Op, it marks node U2 as misbehaving.
The value of Trust is stored as the rate at the beginning of
the strike from which αlength_strike will be subtracted. If a
user is in a misbehaving strike his level of trust will
decrease faster. A misbehaving strike can be broken after
the evaluator verifies BREAK_STRIKE good reviews from
the evaluated reviewers. However, breaking the strike does
not mean that the evaluated user goes back to its previous
level of trust.
Algorithm 1. Rewards and penalties pseudo-code.
if躅misbehaving_strike then
if |┏U1 ,A − ┏U2 ,A| ≤ Op then




α = eln(15)/5 – βU2




if |┏U1,A − ┏U2,A| ≤ Op then
Trust := Trust + 1
strike_breakers := strike_breakers + 1




α = α* e
ln(15)/5 – βU2




3. poiSim: the simulation tool
Once Chains of Trust had been defined, it needed a realis-
tic simulation tool to demonstrate that it performed satis-
factorily in a realistic scenario. Simulation tools such as
Glomosim or ns-2 were discarded to simulate the applica-
tion, because in order to simulate hundreds of thousands
of nodes they require a massive amount of memory. Thus,
we were inclined to design our own simulation tool. Like
in Naumov et al.18 it was decided to analyze the realistic
vehicular trace produced by the MMTS developed by K
Nagel at ETH Zurich.
In Section 2.3.1, it was described how the scheme
relies on people’s habits to construct a Web of Trust. The
main goal behind designing a specific simulator is to dis-
cover if those habits suffice to ensure the application’s
success in a real-life scenario. The quality of the system
is measured by the number of nodes known to every user
and the number and length of the verified POI chains
every user stores at the end of every simulated day. It
should also be noted that our simulation only contains
one POI category, which is enough for the desired test-
ing purposes.
poiSim is a high-level simulator, that is, it simulates the
application but it does not simulate a MAC protocol; it
would be unfeasible to simulate wireless communication
realistically for hundreds of thousands of nodes if we want
poiSim to be lightweight enough to run on a desktop com-
puter. In Table 1 we can see the features of poiSim com-
pared to the network simulator ns-3. ns-3 is better prepared
to simulate the network specifics, while poiSim is better
suited to simulate the application. What we propose is a
two-tier approach: use a network simulator such as ns-3 to
test the communication layer with a small-scale simulation
(hundreds of nodes) in combination with poiSim to
Figure 4. Progression of the function f (x) = (e(ln(15) –β) / 5) x.
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simulate the application in a full scale (hundreds of thou-
sands of nodes).
Communication wise, every node is considered to
be equipped with a Wireless Access in Vehicular
Environments–Dedicated Short Range Communications
(WAVE-DSRC) 27 Mbps link with a 120 meters range
and, every time a vehicle transmits, all vehicles within
range will receive the message. It should be noted that the
simulation of communication-related aspects is outside the
scope of this article and was already treated in Rivas and
Guerrero-Zapata.13 For instance, in Rivas and Guerrero-
Zapata13 we prepared an experiment to determine what
was the lowest packet delivery rate possible in the network
due to the MAC protocol, that is, if vehicles would be able
to communicate in a traffic jam. The results showed that
in a four-lane road scenario with 400 vehicles separated
by 1 meter the packet delivery rate was over 90%.
poiSim considers two kinds of simulated messages: per-
iodic and recognition.
1. Periodic messages: every 120 seconds a vehicle
will broadcast a message with his 25 highest rated
verified POI chains, adding unverified POI chains
to complete the message.
2. Recognition messages: every time a vehicle recog-
nizes another as a trusted user it will send his 25
highest rated verified POI reviews and his 25 most
trusted nodes, together with his level of trust on
them.
The following is a list of several of poiSim’s features:
• simulates 259977 nodes and 15000 POIs.
• every node stores:
– levels of trust on 500 other vehicles;
– 100 unverified POI chains with 225 POI reviews
each;
– 150 verified POI chains with 225 POI reviews
each.
• for every POI:
– 5000 reviews are stored in the system.
Every POI is assigned a random value ranging from 0 to
15 to be its real rate m. The rates the users assign to those
POIs will be normally distributed around m with variance
s
2 = 2 (as depicted in Figure 5).
In a nutshell, poiSim processes each line of the MMTS
trace, which contains a nodeID and its corresponding x, y,
z, t coordinates and updates the vehicle’s position. On
every update it ensures that the vehicles send a periodic
message every 120 seconds, which is a long enough period
to avoid causing a tracking vulnerability, and a recognition
message when needed. In addition, every t seconds each
user reviews a randomly chosen POI from his unverified
POI chains, or a completely random POI if there are no
unverified POI chains available.
4. Inside the simulator architecture
This section intends to give a detailed explanation on the
design of poiSim. Firstly, it explains the motivations of the
simulator; for instance, why we decided to prioritize mem-
ory over processing optimizations. Secondly, it presents the
memory structures used by the simulator and how they
were optimized to minimize the amount of memory
required. Then, this section explains how poiSim processes
the MMTS trace and simulates Chains of Trust. Finally, the
hardware requirements to execute poiSim are presented.
4.1. General overview
The simulator has been designed with efficiency in mind,
with the emphasis placed on memory rather than on reduc-
ing the computing time. The reason for this order in
Figure 5. User’s rate distribution for the real rate m = 7 and
s
2 = 2.
Table 1. Comparison of features in ns-3 and poiSim.
ns-3–poiSim comparison
Features ns-3 poiSim
MAC layer U —
Packet collision/noise simulation U —
Energy simulation U —
Wireless propagation models U —
Routing protocols U —
Processing a third party mobility trace — U
Magnitude of the simulation (in nodes) ≈ 100 ≈ 260,000
MAC: Medium Access Control
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priorities is simple if illustrated with an example. Every
simulated node must have a unique identifier and a level
of trust, the first ranging from 1 to 260,000 and the second
from 0 to 15. In order to store the nodeID, the simulator is
going to use a 4-byte integer, since 2 bytes fall short, and
to store the level of trust a single byte will suffice.
However, when memory alignment is taken into consider-
ation that single byte turns into 4 (or even 8, depending on
the architecture). As a result, every node is now 8 bytes
long. Looking at the bigger picture, every node stores the
level of trust of 500 other nodes (8 × 500 = 4000 bytes)
and over 260,000 nodes are simulated (260,000 × 4000
=1,040,000,000 bytes). Had both fields been stored in the
same 4-byte integer it would have been possible to save
half that space. It is of paramount importance to grasp the
magnifying effect of changes deep in the structure of the
simulator. Certainly, by using the same region of memory
for both fields every time they are accessed, an additional
operation will need to be performed to separate them,
which will increase the access time; the alternative, how-
ever, is not being able to run the simulation with average
computational resources.
Figure 6 provides a clear depiction of poiSim’s logical
components and processes. The components inside the
selected area make up the simulator generic layer, which can
be reused to simulate different applications. The components
outside are application dependent, and therefore would need
to be re-implemented when simulating a different application.
More specifically, to simulate a different application with
poiSim one would only need to re-implement the node’s
behavior every time its position changes and how it sends
and receives messages.
Basically, there is a thread that reads the mobility trace
from a disk, block by block, and places it in a double buf-
fer from which another thread feeds on. Those blocks are
processed line by line, which are of the form nodeID, x, y,
z, time, command. During that processing, the command
dictates if a node is created, destroyed or updated. Besides,
based on the time, the simulator checks if the node should
review a POI or prepare a message to be transmitted. If the
node needs to send a message, a group of threads is noti-
fied to look for nodes in range and process the received
message, if any are found.
All of these processes will be extensively detailed in
the following sections. However, before any further expla-
nations, it should be remarked that even though memory
management was our first priority, we were also able to
take full advantage of the multi core central processing
unit (CPU) at our disposal, by dividing tasks into indepen-
dent sub-tasks and implementing them in multiple threads
so that they could be parallelized.
4.2. Memory snapshot
The mobility trace being used largely determined the
memory structures depicted in Figure 7, and that is the
Figure 6. System processes map.
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reason why its understanding was so important. That trace
describes the traffic patterns of 259,978 vehicles over 24
hours. In that period of time trips began and were ended,
hence not all vehicles were traveling at the same time.
Several tests were performed to study the trace and it was
concluded that 55,197 is the maximum number of vehicles
traveling at the same time. As a result, the simulator is
designed to store an active vehicle’s information in mem-
ory while the rest is kept on disk. It should be noted that
the exact number of nodes allocated in memory is slightly
larger (56,000) to account as well for the simulator’s inter-
nal operations, so that vehicles can be moved in and out of
memory as required by the trace without dragging down
the performance.
The second improvement is derived from carefully
examining the goal of the application and it affects on the
way POIs are stored in chains. The main objective is the
dissemination of POIs information over the network, and
that information translates into POI chains that in their
turn are an aggregate of POI reviews. In other words,
many nodes will have common parts of POI chains, that
is, repeated POI reviews since what the Chains of Trust is
trying to accomplish leads to the repetition of information.
Therefore, a matrix is designed to hold every review ever
created in the system (Poi Reviews Matrix in Figure 7)
and instead of storing the reviews in the nodes, they only
store the indexes to the matrix. This allows the system to
save half as many bytes for every repeated review.
In addition, the system is designed to avoid the extra
bytes lost to memory alignment, when possible, by group-
ing pieces of information together. This technique was
used in the Poi Reviews Matrix to store a user identifier
and the rate he assigned to a POI and in the
Node_reviews_t table of every node to store levels of trust
and user identifiers. We would like to remark that the
identifiers and the rates (or levels of trust) are fields that,
had they not been grouped together, they would have been
accessed sequentially. Therefore, the extra selection opera-
tions are compensated by one less access to memory. It
should also be noted that the Node_reviews_t table always
has to be ordered by the level of trust (so that the most
trusted nodes can be easily found and sent in recognition
messages), hence the importance of allocating the rate in
the first byte and the identifier in the lower three. Given
Figure 7. Memory map.
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two values a and b, a > b if and only if a.highest byte >
b.highest byte. Hence, the ordering operation can be per-
formed disregarding the fact that those bytes contain dif-
ferent bits of information.
The result of those optimizations is displayed in
Table 2. It should be noted that the simulation uses over
6.9 GB of main memory (between Active Table and Poi
Reviews Matrix) and produces a volume of 31 GB of data
in disk at the end of the simulation, which contains the
state of each individual vehicle when it is not traveling.
As far as memory initialization is concerned, it is per-
formed at the beginning of the simulation, even before it
starts to process the mobility trace. Most of the memory is
allocated dynamically (unverified, verified POI tables and
nodes tables), while the rest of the system is stored in sta-
tic memory. However, nodes are not allocated and freed
every time they are created and destroyed. The Active
Table allocates dynamic regions when it is created and
until the simulation finishes it does not free them, mainly
to avoid memory fragmentation.
4.3. Processing the trace
Once the memory has been allocated, the simulator can
begin reading the trace. The file is read in blocks of 8192
bytes by a thread that copies them into a double buffer. On
the other side of the buffer another thread feeds on those
blocks and processes them, as described in Listing 1. The
idea is to minimize the wait of the Processor thread on
retrieving the data from disk by having another thread per-
form the task, while at the same time keeping them both
synchronized so that every block is processed. To that end
the double buffer is protected with what in pthreads nota-
tion are called Condition Variables, which is a combina-
tion of signals and mutexes: before writing or reading a
block from or to the memory structure each thread tries to
acquire a lock; if unsuccessful it blocks until the current
lock owner sends a signal to indicate that the lock has been
released.
Listing 1. Code excerpt to illustrate how the double buffer
works.







































The Processor thread reads the block line by line, trans-
lating each and every line into a simulated step. Each of
those steps indicates to the simulator that one of the fol-
lowing events has occurred: a trip has begun, a vehicle’s posi-
tion has changed or a trip has come to an end. In the Node
Management phase, the Processor becomes responsible for
the interpretation of those instructions, that is, it has to create
and destroy nodes as the trace dictates, bringing them from
memory to the Active Nodes table and back to memory once
the trip finishes, besides updating their position when needed.






Active Table (56,000) nodes 6.58 GB
Poi Reviews Matrix 300 MB
Opinion Table 3200 bytes
State Table 56,000 bytes
Simulation data produced in each
simulation (260,000 nodes)
31 GB
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To speed up the process of looking for nodes in the table, a
dictionary was implemented using the nodeID modMAX ACT
IVE NODES as key. As in any other dictionary, the idea is to
check if the key position is empty: otherwise move forward to
the next one and retry. Notice that, as depicted in Figure 6,
the trace and the nodes are stored in separate disks in order to
minimize the access latency.
While updating the position and the time of the vehicle,
the simulator checks if the user has to review one of his
POIs, and if so the thread enters the POI Reviewer phase.
In this step of the simulation it has to select a POIID to be
reviewed, which can either be accomplished by randomly
choosing one of the unverified chains stored in the node or
by randomly generating an identifier if no chains are avail-
able. Should that last option be the case things simplify
considerably, as detailed below.
• Random POI: this needs to create a review in the
Poi Reviews Matrix and a new verified chain in
which to store that review.
• Unverified POI chain: this needs to create a review
in the Poi Reviews Matrix too, although in this case
this is just the beginning of the process. In the
Chain Evaluation phase it compares that review
with the other reviews in the chain and increases or
decreases the node’s level of trust on the reviewers
based on how much their opinions or rates differ.
This rewards and penalties policy follows the pro-
cess previously described in Section 2.3.4. Notice
that whenever the nodes’ level of trust is modified,
the Node_reviews_t table needs to be reordered,
which as described in Section 4.2 can be done dis-
regarding the fact that two pieces of information
are stored in that region of memory.
Finally, the Processor thread verifies if it is time for the
user to transmit information to the network. If so, it pre-
pares the messages; otherwise, the processing of that parsed
line finishes here. poiSim simulates two kinds of messages.
1. Periodic messages are made of 25 POI chains; the
highest rated among the verified POI chains the
node stores. Should there not be enough, unveri-
fied chains will be selected.
2. Recognition messages are made of the highest-
rated 25 POI chains and 25 node reviews. Like in
periodic messages, verified POI chains can be
complemented with unverified chains.
Both messages will be prepared and, depending on the
situation, the receiving node will select one or the other.
Once finished with the preparations, the Processor
thread signals the Trackers threads to wake up. The Active
Table, where all the active nodes are stored, is partitioned
into four equal portions (one for each thread) and
processed by the Trackers, which search for nodes in
range. When a node is found, the thread processes one
message or the other depending on if the receiver previ-
ously knew the sender. This is why it was of paramount
importance that everything was prepared beforehand;
had it not been done that way, each time a vehicle in
range was found its thread would have had to look for
the information instead of processing it directly from the
message.
Since the messages contain different kinds of informa-
tion, different paths will be followed when processing them.
• POI chains: when a POI chain is received it is
marked as unverified and the thread looks for its
POIID in the node’s tables. If it is not found then
the received chain is stored in the unverified table.
If it is found and the POI chain has not yet been
verified, then both chains are merged. Otherwise, if
it receives a chain for a POI that it has already
reviewed, then it reviews the received chain assign-
ing rewards and penalties to the reviewers, just as
was done in the POI Reviewer phase, and merges
the chains, storing them in the verified table (Chain
Management).
• Node reviews: a node review is a nodeID and a level
of trust assigned to that node by the sender. The
receiver of the message treats those reviews as if
they were his own with two conditions:
1. the recommended level of trust for a certain
node can never be greater than the level of
trust the receiver has in the sender;
2. the recommended level of trust is always
decreased by 1, to signify one link in the chain
of trust.
Finally, when the Trackers have finished processing all
active nodes they signal back the Processor and the cycle
can begin again.
4.4. Hardware requirements
poiSim was executed on a PC running 64 bits Linux
Fedora 12, with the following hardware specifications)
• Quad Core CPU Q6600 at 2.40 GHz, with 128 kB
of L1 cache and 8 MB of L2 cache;
• 8 GB of DDR2 RAM memory at 887 MHz with
latencies 5-5-5-15 (tCL-tRCD-tRP-tRAS)
• 32 GB solid state disk (SSD) to store the operating
system (OS) and the mobility trace:
– 64 MB onboard cache;
– read maximum performance: up to 210 MB/s;
– write maximum performance: up to 75 MB/s.
• 96 GB SSD to store the simulation data:
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– read maximum performance: up to 285 MB/s;
– write maximum performance: up to 275 MB/s;
– sustained write performance: up to 250 MB/s.
With this hardware, a simulation of the 24-hour vehicu-
lar trace lasts approximately 100 minutes.
5. poiSim results: how will Chains of Trust
behave in a realistic scenario?
In order to show the validity of both poiSim and Chains of
Trust we need to study the simulation results. In this test,
poiSim will be executed for different reviewing rates, that
is, every user will input a new review into the system once
a day on average (1/1), once every two days (1/2), once
every four days (1/4) and so on until a review is input once
every 10 days (1/10). The objective of this experiment is
to discover how often a user should input a new review for
the application to succeed.
The measure of the system success will be given by
how many users every user knows and what level of trust
he has assigned to them. In Figure 8(a) it can be observed
that after the first five days of simulation every user has
several other users in his known nodes list, going from
20.76 users on average for a review rate 1/1 to 2.11 users
for a review rate 1/10. As expected, lower reviewing fre-
quencies result in a lower number of known nodes. If a
middle ground scenario is considered, review rates 1/4 and
1/6 yield 3.85 and 3.05 known users, respectively. Results
improve significantly after the first 10 days of simulation,
where reviewing rates 1/4 and 1/6 result in every node
knowing on average 33.24 and 26.37 nodes, respectively.
Regarding the rate or level of trust a user assigns to his
known users, in Figure 8(b) it can be seen that after the
first five days of simulation for all reviewing rates the
average level of trust is almost 1. As the simulation pro-
gresses, the level of trust may oscillate (as can be seen for
reviewing rate 1/1) due to the randomness of the simula-
tion, although on the long run a larger number of chains
are reviewed and the level of trust increases due to the
higher proportion of good reviews. After the first 10 days,
review rates 1/4 and 1/6 result in levels of trust of 1.31
and 1.45, respectively.
We believe this experiment has shown that the system
will in all likelihood succeed in effectively disseminating
POIs information and building a Web of Trust among users
in a real-life scenario. Considering moderate reviewing
rates of 1/4 and 1/6, we can see that just after the first five
days of simulation every user has on average more than
three trusted nodes with trust levels over 1. It should also
be noted that results significantly improve after 10 days of
simulation. Therefore, it can be concluded that although
the system will produce results from the very start, depend-
ing on the reviewing rate it may need from 5 to 10 days (in
the worst case scenario) to fully develop a Web of Trust.
In addition, these results also show the correctness of
poiSim, since the more often users input their reviews, the
higher are the average number of known nodes per user
and their levels of trust.
6. Conclusions
This article presents poiSim, a lightweight simulator for a
POIs dissemination application in VANETs. It is capable
of simulating a 24-hour trace containing almost 260,000
vehicles in approximately 100 minutes. A feat that, to the
best of our knowledge, none of the available state-of-the-
art simulators (OPNET, QualNet, OMNet++ , ns-2, ns-3
or GloMoSim) are able to achieve.
We believe that it has been demonstrated in the article
that our two-tier approach based on using a network simu-
lator to test the communication layer with a small-scale
simulation (hundreds of nodes) in combination with
poiSim to simulate the application in a full scale (hundreds
of thousands of nodes) yields more realistic results than
using a network simulator to test both the network and the
application. Whenever a simulation of a large number of
nodes is required, the implementation of a customized tool
is strongly encouraged as opposed to the use of general
network simulators, like is done in most research articles
(e.g., Ding et al.,14 Patwardhan et al.,15 Dhurandher
et al.,16 Lo and Tsai17), always keeping in mind an accu-
rate design and a rigorous memory management strategy.
It should be noted that poiSim follows a two-layer cus-
tomization design. On one hand it has been customized for
the Chains of Trust application, so that every vehicle stores
the required information. On the other, it has been custo-
mized to optimally process the MMTS trace. As a result,
to simulate a different application we would just need to
modify the information the vehicles store and the informa-
tion being transmitted, while keeping the trace processing
and node management layer intact.
7. Future work
In the future, we would like to improve poiSim by simulat-
ing more than one POI category. This will allow us to
modify Chains of Trust to implement a smart exchange of
information by prioritizing certain POI categories in the
Periodic Exchange messages. For example, gas stations
would be exchanged more often when the vehicle is run-
ning low on gas or restaurants when lunch and dinner time
are near.
Finally, we would also like to implement different
models of user misbehavior; for instance, a restaurant
owner trying to spread bad reviews of his competition or
a malicious user trying to lower the reputation of another
user.
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Abstract
This article describes a scheme which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first one to provide
anonymity in a reputation system for nodes in a mobile wireless network. The presented solution
specifically targets Vehicular Ad hoc Networks where vehicle users share information -opinions
or recommendations- about Points of Interest -such as restaurants, hotels, etc. The mechanism
used to achieve anonymity allows a user to effectively borrow the identity of another user who
trusts him by asking him to issue a recommendation on his behalf. The results show that for
moderate frequencies of Points of Interest reviewing on behalf of other users the development of
the reputation system remains unaffected.
Keywords: Security, VANETs, Chains, Trust, POI, Reputation
1. Introduction
We live in a world that produces massive amounts of information every day and in order to
thrive we need to process them and make the best decisions we can. We rely on friends and
family to deal with this complex problem, i.e., whether we are trying to decide where to go for
dinner or making a career choice we rely on the experience of other people to help us make a
good decision.
This concept lies at the foundation of reputation systems. Since it is not possible to experi-
ence everything first hand, a user of a reputation system shares his own knowledge with other
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system users and relies on some of them, preferably ones with agood reputation, to help him
make decisions.
A user’s reputation will grow with every good decision he helps others make. Naturally,
people have different tastes so what may be a good recommendation for somebody may not be
so good for somebody else. This leads to the creation of groups of users that trust each other
because they have a similar taste, what is called aWeb of Trust. On the other hand, entities
with too different views will recognize each other as not trustable and disregard each other’s
recommendations. Since what is being shared is subjective information, two people may trust
each other today and have different views tomorrow. In addition, they may not trust each other
in one area of expertise and at the same time they may share similar views on others.
Reputation systems are increasingly being used nowadays. They are a very good way to bring
some order into the chaos that can be a network of users sharing information.
They can be found almost everywhere, in P2P networks, in movie rating websites, in sites
like eBay or YouTube, etc. They can be as simple as the one used by eBay -in which after each
pair of users conducts a transaction they rate each other and a user’s reputation is the count of
positive and negative ratings- or they can be extremely complex ones.
Reputation systems, however, are vulnerable to several kinds of attacks [1, 2], one of the
most serious being the breach of users privacy. By definition, in a reputation system every user
has an identity to which all the opinions he makes public can be traced to. For this reason, an
attacker with the appropriate tools should be able to profile all the users in the system: knowing
which restaurants they go to, the books they like, having an accurate idea of the area the users
live in and even mapping their online identity to their real one.
This article presents a solution to preserve users privacy in reputation systems. In particular,
we will apply this solution to the reputation system forVehicular Ad-hoc Networks(VANETs)
Chains of Trust(CoT), which we developed in [3], although it may well apply to any reputation
system.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of reputation
systems in VANETs, including CoT. Section 3 explainsAnonymous Chains of Trustin detail,
what is its purpose and how it differs from CoT. Finally, section 4 presents the experiments we




This article introduces aPoint of Interest(POI) -such as restaurants, hotels, museums, etc.-
information dissemination technique for VANETs based on a reputation system. To the best of
our knowledge, it is the first one to build a reputation scheme that preserves user privacy, mostly
due to the fact that users generate and manage their own identities and there is not a central entity
where all the network information is stored.
Nevertheless, there are other works that consider the use of reputation systems for different
purposes not always keeping in mind users right to privacy.
2.1. Reputation systems
The authors in [4] propose a reputation system to manage traffic warning events while pre-
venting the spread of false information. In their proposal, users/vehicles are divided into different
categories according to their proximity to a traffic event and play different roles: (i)Event Re-
porter (ER) is the vehicle that witnesses an event, (ii)Event Observer(EO) is any node within
one hop distance of an ER and (iii)Event Participant(EP) is any node beyond the one hop dis-
tance from the ER. Whenever an ER witnesses an event he assigns alocal trust to it based on
the information gathered by the vehicle’s sensors. If that value is greater than a certain threshold
then he transmits that information to all neighbors in one hop (EOs). When an EO receives a
traffic event from an ER he stores it and observes the behavior of the ER. If the ER’s behavior
matches a model related to the traffic event reported the EO sends this message withing a certain
∆T time, which is enough for him to receive information from other EOs and EPs. At the end of
the process every event is assigned aglobal trustbased on the ER’s behavior and on theglobal
trust information sent by other nodes weighted by their role in the event. It should be noted that
EPs will base theirglobal trustsolely on the information gathered from EOs and other EPs since
they cannot directly observe ER.
The authors, however, do not take security into account. In their simulation scenario they
consider a single vehicle forwarding false messages, which is not realistic since an attacker could
easily report the same false event several times with different identities and successfully spread
false messages. In addition, their system considers events reputation but not ER’s; every role
has a fixed reputation or weight assigned to it, which is what is taken into consideration when
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computing the event’sglobal trust. As a result, there is no way to decrease the trust deserved by
an ER who always reports false events.
Similarly, the authors in [5] introduce a scheme to report traffic events in VANETs that re-
spects user privacy by using groups and offers security through trust and reputation. Their idea is
to use group membership to provide individual users with privacy outside of the group while the
Group Manager(GM) is responsible for adding new vehicles and evicting attackers or misbehav-
ing members. A GM is identified by a certificate issued by aCertification Authority(CA). Every
group has a reputation in the network and every user contributes to it by sending group messages
reporting traffic events. The GM has to be able to identify the real identity of the sender of a
group message in order to protect the group’s reputation against repudiation attacks. The regular
flow of events is as follows:
1. Users periodically exchange messages with information of the state of the road.
2. Each receiver verifies that the message has a valid signature from the sender’s group.
3. Each receiver computes how much he can trust the message based on the group’s reputation
and act accordingly, i.e., if he receives a trusted traffic jam alert he will take another route.
4. After taking a decision, the receiver vehicle may be able to know the real state of the road
through direct observation. In that case he will update his level of trust on the group or
groups that sent him information about this event. False messages are collected and even-
tually reported to the CA, which forwards them to the responsible GM to take appropriate
measures.
Even if the authors do not mention it in their article, we believe that users require access to
the CA every time they receive a group message because if a GM is revoked they need to be able
to check if his identity is in theRevocation List(RL). In addition, the authors do not mention any
mechanism for the group members to see if their GM is misbehaving by not evicting misbehaving
nodes. We believe too much trust is placed on GMs, which could disclose the group members’
identity to third-parties. Moreover, in the event of a traffic jam, only those vehicles which do not
heed the warning and have the opportunity to make a direct observation will know the truth. If
all users believed an attacker’s warning he would be able to completely redirect the traffic on a
road and he would not be punished because no other vehicles would be able to directly observe
the event. Finally, it should be noted that there is no security mechanism to prevent a userA from
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lying about an event reported by another userB, which would makeB’s group manager punish
B.
In [6], the authors propose a general information scheme (not necessarily directed towards
traffic events) where every user is not only responsible for the events that he reports but also for
the information that he forwards. In this scheme every vehicle is uniquely identified through the
use of cryptographically self-generated addresses [7] and the authors assume that their scheme
is immune to Sybil attacks. Information can be sent by anchored sources (trusted by default)
and by mobile devices (whose level of trust is determined by a reputation system). Mobile
devices are accountable for verifying data before propagating it. Therefore, whenever a user
receives a message or segment he checks if it was originated at one of his trusted sources, if so
that information is automatically trusted. If the segment is received from a source classified as
malicious (by reputation) it is immediately discarded. Every time a segment from an unknown
source is received averification sessionstarts. If the number of received segments from unknown
nodes reporting the same event reaches a threshold value all reporting nodes are promoted to
trusted. Similarly, if an unknown user reports the same event that a trusted user, he becomes
trusted as well.
We believe that this scheme fails to protect the users’ privacy since they always use the same
identity (an attacker could easily profile their routes). The authors do not take into consideration
that even a trusted originator of an event may be interested in spreading false information at some
point. In addition, their proposal heavily relies on anchored resources that only distribute reliable
information, which may not be realistic. Finally, the idea of only forwarding information after it
has been verified is not without its risks considering the ephemeral nature of a VANET.
The authors in [8] present another solution to distribute safety related information by broad-
casting events (traffic jams, accidents and vehicles braking) which uses a reputation system to
detect and isolate malicious nodes. Their algorithm is divided into the following phases:
1. Neighbor discovery: whenever a nodeS needs to forward an event received from one of
its neighbors, it sends a neighbor discovery request to which its surrounding nodes reply
with their identities. Each of the receiversR of that discovery request will check in its
trusted nodes table if it trustsS and respond to the discovery request only if it does. If the
identity of S is unknown toR thenR addsS to its trusted nodes table with a trust level
(MAX TRUS T− MIN TRUS T)/2. Similarly, whenS receives the discovery responses
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it will update its trusted nodes table following the same criteria.
2. Data dispatching: once a node has discovered its neighbors it broadcasts the event infor-
mation.
3. Decision making and trust updating: packets reporting events beyond a certain distance
d are discarded (far away events are considered irrelevant). The next step is to see if the
node itself is in the detection range of the event: if it is, the node will be able to judge if
this event is true or false and update his trust on the reporting node accordingly; if it is not
in range, it collects information from other neighbors for a timet and only if the number of
reporters exceeds a certain threshold the event is considered true (either way, aftert expires
the level of trust on the reporters will be updated accordingly).
4. Neighbor monitoring: the authors assume that a genuine packet will always be broadcast,
whereas false information will be unicast towards a certain node. Based on that, nodes
should monitor the network observing its neighbors behavior.
The authors are not clear on whether they usePublic Key Infrastructurewith a CA. If they
assign to unknown nodes levels of trust greater than what misbehaving nodes have, it will always
be better for an attacker to change his identity once he is discovered. A CA would be able
to prevent that by linking the identity to the vehicle’s license plate, for example. However, if
they use a CA vehicles need to be in permanent connection with it to receive updates on the
Certificate Revocation List(CRL), which requires a heavy road-side infrastructure. In addition,
using always the same identity introduces a tracking vulnerability for the users.
In [9] the authors present a scheme to distribute traffic events information. They define a two
tier approach: vehicle sensors first have to detect an event a certain number of timesTS b fore
reporting it to the driver and if they have not detected the event for themselves, they need to
receive the event warning fromTV vehicles before trusting it. Every time an event is detectedTS
times a message including how many times the vehicle’s sensors have detected the event and the
identity of vehicles detecting it is send to the vehicle’s neighbors. The receiving nodes will use
this value and the number of vehicles that detected the event to determine if it is true or not.
We believe that the major problem with this scheme is that it does not address security at
all. The authors do not consider the possibility of misbehaving nodes (intentionally or just due
to the usual degradation of components). In addition, this solution is an event reputation system,
but not a user reputation system, which means that the system has no memory over previous
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events recommended by a certain user and therefore all users can be equally trusted, which is a
unrealistic assumption.
[10] presents a solution to manage a reputation system in the early stages of VANETs. The
authors consider a scenario where the density ofsmartvehicles equipped with wireless com-
munications is too low to allow forVehicle to Vehicle(V2V) communication. As a result, their
scheme relies on the distribution ofRoad-side Units(RSUs) to handle the reputation scheme.
Ideally, vehicles will always follow the same route (to work places, schools, superstores, etc.)
and therefore be periodically in contact with the same RSUs. Depending on the desired deploy-
ment cost, the authors distinguish between two different designs:
• Isolated RSUs: if RSUs are not directly connected to each other, they need smart vehicles
to forward their messages. This format of communication is calledD lay Tolerant Network
(DTN) [11]. In a nutshell, every vehicle is assigned anAgent RSUwhich keeps track of its
reputation and provides the vehicle with a certificate with its updated reputation. The other
RSUs will monitor the vehicle behavior, i.e., forwards messages between RSUs, correctly
reports traffic accidents to the RSUs, etc. Each RSU will use smart vehicles to forward this
information to the vehicle’sAgent RSUso that it can update the vehicle’s reputation.
• Internet-accessible RSUs: in this scenario there is no need to distinguish between theAgent
RSUand the others. Since they are all communicated, a vehicle can obtain its reputation
update from any of them.
The authors also take into account the possibility that a user might take a different route which
does not pass by any of his usual RSUs, e.g., he goes to work from Monday to Friday but
Saturday and Sunday he drives to a different location. The solution they propose is to increment
the validity period of the reputation certificate, so that on Friday the user receives a certificate
valid until Monday.
We believe this is an interesting approach to the initial stage of a VANET. However, there are
several drawbacks. For instance, road condition alerts will not be delivered immediately upon
detection because there is no V2V communication. Secondly, the authors consider a scenario
where a user takes an alternative route, although they need to plan ahead so that the RSU can
give him an extended reputation certificate. In our opinion, this is not realistic since people are
only predictable up to a certain point. Finally, the Internet-accessible RSUs model brings out
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the problem of having a network of connected devices which regist r every move made by every
user, thus posing a threat to user privacy.
2.2. Chains of Trust
In [3] we introduced CoT, a secure POI distribution strategy and reputation system for
VANETs. In a nutshell, users issue reviews of POIs and broadcast them to the network. The
receiving users store them for future use so that when they need information about a certain POI
category, e.g., restaurants, museums, traffic events, etc., they can choose one recommendation
issued by another node (preferably one they already trust). Whenever they follow one of these
recommendations, they issue their own review of the POI and the system updates the level of
trust on the recommender(s) depending on how similar their reviews were. In addition, users
who trust each other not only exchange information about POIs, but also about other users, i.e.,
which ones are the most trustable.
User reviews are structured in POI chains, as depicted in Fig. 1. Fig. 1a shows userA’s
unverified POI chain forJohn′s Burger, with the reviews received from usersB, C, and D.
WhenA visits John′s Burgerand inputs his review into the system that chain turns into verified
andA’s review is appended to the rest (Fig. 1b).
Security wise, the system uses asymmetric cryptography (1,024 bits-RSA). Every user or
vehicle creates its own pair of public and private keys and is responsible for its securing. The
private key is used to sign POIs information as well as the levels of trust that one user has in the
others, while the public key (which serves as user identifier) is attached to that information so
that the rest of the network can verify the signatures correctness.
Going into detail, consider the scenario depicted in Fig. 2 where a userU1 goes to a gas
stationA. U1 will input his review into the system and the system will create a chain of recom-
mendations of length 1 for that POI.U1 will broadcast a message containing this chain (verified
chain) to the other users in the network saying that gas stationA deserves a certain rateχ, signed
with his private keyKpriv and attaching his public keyKpub. All the other nodes that successfully
receive the message store the chain (unverified chain) for future reference. When another user
U2 queries his own vehicle for a place to refuel the system returns a list of places recommended
by other users (among which isU1’s recommendation). IfU2 decides to go toA he will after-
wards input his review into the system, which will cause the unverified chain to turn into verified,
and if his review is similar toU1’s his level of trust inU1 will increase, or decrease otherwise.
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(a) Unverified POI chains organization
(b) Verified POI chains organization
Figure 1: POI chains organization.
(a) U1 reviewsMike’s Petroland broadcasts the message.
(b) U2 queries his vehicle for a gas station.
(c) U2 follows U1 recommendation, adds his own opinion to the chain and updates
his level of trust inU1 according to how similar both reviews were.
Figure 2: General behavior of theChains of Trustprotocol.
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Regardless of how much he coincides withU1’s opinion,U2 will append his own signed review
to the original (thus increasing the length of the chain of recommendations), together with his
Kpub, and broadcast the message. In this way, every time a user follows and verifies a recom-
mendation he can update his level of trust inn other nodes (wheren is the length of the chain
of signatures-recommendations), thus increasing the speed at which the reputation system devel-
ops. In addition, in order to discourage misbehavior, it is easier for a user to lose his reputation
because of a series of misbehaviors than to increase it by issuing faithful reviews. Otherwise, a
well behaved user could use his reputation to do as much damage to the network as good he had
done previously.
Every user will store in a list the identity of the nodes he trusts and what level of trust he has
in them. In this way, nodes will be divided between unknown, trusted and most trusted. The most
trusted nodes is a group ofmnodes with the highest reputation. Every user’sMost Trusted Group
(MTG) assists him in different decision making processes, e.g., if a user queries the system for a
place to have dinner the first recommendations will belong to the MTG, followed by the rest of
trusted nodes and closing with recommendations made by unknown nodes. This makes it more
difficult for an attacker to influence any user’s behavior since he first needs to gain access to the
MTG, and once he misbehaves he will immediately be expelled from it.
As far as communications are concerned, CoT considers three different mechanisms for the
exchange of information between the nodes in the network: (i) whenever a user needs infor-
mation on a certain POI category, his vehicle queries its neighbors, (ii) vehicles periodically
exchange POI chains (verified and unverified) with the better rated POIs in each category (every
120 seconds) and (iii) if during a periodic exchange, one vehicle is recognized as a trusted user
(from a previous encounter) then recognizer and recognized will exchange information about
their levels of trust in other users, i.e., user chains.
CoT completely relies on an ad-hoc network, and therefore requires no road-side infras-
tructure. This helps protect user privacy, since the reputation system knowledge is distributed
between all users. Nonetheless, an attacker could position himself at very frequented crossroads
and given sufficient time he could gather a large amount of data containing thousands of rec-
ommendations from thousands of users. This information could be used to profile users, deduce
their habits and try to link their public key with their real identity, all of which would compromise
the users’ privacy.
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3. Anonymous Chains of Trust
3.1. General overview
In this article we propose a new mechanism based on CoT to preserve users privacy based on
identity borrowing. In a reputation system, if two nodes trust each other it is because they both
have had similar views or opinions on the information they have shared in the past. Particularly in
CoT, if two users trust each other it is because they have similarly rated POIs in a given category
and therefore have similar tastes. Since their rates for a certain POI category are similar, one user
A should be able to ask another userB, who he trusts, to issue a review message with a certain
rate for a certain POI withB’s own identity, much like if he had reviewed the POI himself. For
all intents and purposes,A will be borrowingB’s identity for that single review.
Figure 3:Anonymous Chains of Trust.
Fig. 3 depicts in detail how the system works. Steps 1 and 2 are the first part of the protocol
where user A requests user B to issue a POI review on his behalf. The second part, steps 3 and
4, allows B to determine how reviewing that POI on behalf of A affects his reputation.
User A reviewsPOI1 and the system decides to request another node to issue the public
review on his behalf. How often the system asks a user to review a POI on behalf of another
is based on the system parameterα. WheneverA meets one of his trusted nodes (B) he sends
a review request containing the POI identifier (POI1), the rate he assigns to that POI and a
timestamp, everything encrypted withB’s public key (as we can see in step 1). In addition, he
signs B’sKpub with his ownKpriv so that B can verify A’s identity. In step 2, ifB recognizesA
as one of his trusted users he acknowledges the reception of the message by sending the hash
H of the received message encrypted withA’s public keyKpubA. Should that acknowledgement
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not reachA the system onA’s vehicle will request the review to another trusted user. OnceB
has accepted to reviewPOI1 on A’s behalf, he will include this review in the list of messages he
transmits periodically.
In step 3,B prepares a periodic messageM containing a chain of reviews of length 2 for
POI1, which includes the reviewR1 he is issuing on behalf ofA and another reviewR2 he has
received for that same POI from another user. For the sake of clarity, in this exampleM contains
information about just one POI, i.e., one POI chain, although in reality periodic messages may
include several concatenated chains for different POIs. Once that information is compiled,B’s
vehicle broadcasts it to the network. It should be noted thatR, which is the first element of a
chain of POI recommendations, contains a field namedIn f oreq. This bit-field will be set to let
the message receivers know thatB would like to receive their reviews of that POI. In step 4, the
receivers ofM reply with their own rate for the requested POI.B will store this information, and
once he has gathered enough data he will evaluate the reviewA sent to him and adjust his level
of trust inA accordingly (as explained in section 3.2).
It should be noted that nodes that receive the information request will reply with their own
reviews, with reviews from trusted nodes or with reviews they have issued on behalf of other
nodes. If they were only allowed to reply with their own reviews, an attacker would only need to
broadcast a POI request for multiple POIs and gather all the information to profile the users.
Incidentally, in order to minimize the repetition of information inM, the POI identifier is
only used in the first review of a chain of recommendations (R), while the rest use instead the
hashH of that identifier (R′).
The idea behind this scheme is that if enough users request their trusted fellows to review
POIs on their behalf, then a user’s individual identity is hidden by the identities of all the users
he trusts. As a result, even an all-knowing attacker will not be able to profile individual users
because he will have no way of knowing the identity of the real POI reviewers. This concept of
privacy is somewhat similar to what group signatures provide [12, 13, 14], although without the
overhead of specifically creating and managing a group.
Generally speaking, in a group signature scheme every user is part of a group, either preset
or dynamically created, and every group has a group manager in charge of making public the
information gathered by group members. In addition, the group manager needs to monitor the
group members for misbehavior and evict them from the group if they misbehave.
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3.2. Evaluation of identity borrowing
As seen in section 3.1, userB needs a mechanism to determine the impact that reviewing a
POI on behalf ofA has on his reputation. Whenever a user reviews a POI on behalf of somebody
else he sets theIn f oreq bit in the chain of reviews for that POI in the periodic message. After
having gatheredn reviews from other users (or if the time passed since he issued the review
reaches a certain valueTevaluation) B evaluatesA’s review.
Let us definen as the number of reviews sent by different users regarding a certain POI
POI1, U1, ...,Un as the users who sent their POI review andÛ1, ..., Ûn as the subset of those
nodes known by the userB, χPOI1,U1 as the rate thatU1 gave toPOI1 andλÛi as the level of trust














It should be noted that the rates assigned by unknown nodes are ignored as long as there is a
known reviewer in the chain. Otherwise, the chain’s rate is the arithmetic mean of the POI rates
assigned by the unknown reviewers. Similarly, the reviews of the less trusted known nodes are


























Figure 4:Progression of k/λA for different values of k.
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OnceB knows the value ofG, he expects the rateA sent in his review ofPOI1 to be:
G − k/λA ≤ χPOI1,A ≤ G + k/λA (2)
wherek is a parameter defined by each user depending on how strict he wants to be when
lending his reputation.k can take any value considering thatG + k/λA ≤ 15, 15 being the
maximum value for a node’s reputation in the system as well as the maximum rate for a POI, and
G − k/λA ≥ 0, 0 being the minimum. IfχPOI1,A falls outside the limits defined by (2) thenB will
stop transmittingA’s review and the level of trustB has onA, i.e. λA, will decrease by half its
value.
It should be noted that too high values ofk will allow misbehaving users to take advantage of
the system and ruin the reviewer’s reputation in the network. On the other hand, too low values
will in all likelihood unfairly decrease the level of trustB has inA. Regardless of the value
assigned tok, in Fig. 4 we can see that the allowed deviation fromG decreases for high levels of
trust between users. This responds to the fact that users with high levels of trust assign the most
similar rates to the same POIs, and that should still be true when a user is lending his identity.
In the same way thatB needs to make sure thatA is not lying to him,A needs to know ifB
is really transmitting a review on his behalf. To that endA examines the periodic messages he
receives looking for a chain of recommendations for the requested POIPOI1. If he does not find
it after a certain timeTrequest, A will request the review ofPOI1 to another of his trusted nodes.
The level of trust thatA has inB does not need to be decreased becauseA’ reputation in the
network was not damaged byB’s inaction.
3.3. Scalability analysis
In [3] we determined with a ns-3 [15] simulation that in a 400 vehicles scenario such as the
one depicted in Fig. 5, every user can broadcast 400 packets of a 1,000 bytes every 120 seconds
yielding a 91.5% rate of successfully received packets. It should be noted that in our system
every node broadcasts periodic messages to be received by all nodes within 1 hop distance.
The periodic message used in CoT has been modified to include the changes described in
section 3.1 with the goal of achieving a reception rate still over 90%. Considering the following
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Figure 5: Vehicle layout for the 400 nodes scalability scenario.
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Taking into account that the total amount of information has to be approximately 400,000
bytes, information about 25 POIs will be sent, each containing 107 user’s reviews adding up to a
total of 390,303.125 bytes. It should be noted that periodic messages are fragmented in a 1,000
bytes packets including certain redundancy, so that if a packet is lost the rest of the message can
still be read.
In addition, in order to avoid flooding the network when users reply to a POI information
request, it will only be allowed to set theIn f oreq bit for a maximum of 5 POIs in a messageM.
POIresp= {{POIId ||Rate||Timestamp}KprivS






In the best case scenario every user will have information of all 5 POIs and reply withPOIresp
(a 1,125 bytes message).
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4. Experiments
Once the system has been defined we need to determine how it will perform in a realistic
scenario. To that end, we re-designed our simulation toolp iSim[3] to simulateAnonymous
Chains of Trust.
poiSimis a vehicular application simulator which, like in [16], analyzes the realistic vehicular
trace produced by theMulti-Agent Traffic Simulator(MMTS) developed by K.Nagel at ETH
Zurich. The MMTS is capable of simulating public and private traffic over real regional road
maps of Switzerland with a high level of realism. It models the behavior of people living in the
area, reproducing their movement (using vehicles) within a period of 24 hours. The decision of
each individual depends on the area it lives in. The individuals in the simulation are distributed
over the cities and villages according to statistical data gathered by a census. Within the 24 hours
of simulation, all individuals choose a time to travel and the mean of transportation according to
their needs and environment, e.g., one individual might take a car and go to work in the early
morning, another one wakes up later and goes shopping using public transportation, etc. All in
all, with over 260,000 simulated nodes or vehicles in an area of around 250 km x 260 km, this
mobility trace suited the simulation needs.
In order to better study the system, to observe how the POI reviews are exchanged between
users, how users build a better reputation for themselves and the effect of different values ofα,
the 24 hours vehicular trace is replayed to obtain a multiple days scenario. It should be remarked
that the only common element in every simulated day will be the MMTS trace, because the POIs
being reviewed are randomized, and hence will be different in every run.
In Anonymous Chains of Trustwhenever a user reviews a POI the system needs to choose
between: (i) broadcasting that review, i.e., making it public, and (ii) waiting until the user’s ve-
hicle recognizes a trusted node and asking him to review that POI on his behalf. As explained in
section 3.1, this decision depends on the system parameterα. In the early stages of the reputation
system deployment, that delay can hamper the development of theWeb of Trustbetween users.
Determining the degree to which the system deployment is affected is our main goal.
In this experiment, every user inputs a new review into the system every 5 days and we study
different values forα: a user requests another user to review a POI on his behalf once every 2
reviews (α= 1/2), 1 review of every 5 (α= 1/5), 1 review of every 7 (α= 1/7), 1 review
of every 9 (α= 1/9) and a control sample where users do not review POIs on behalf of other
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users (α= 0). The reviews or rates users assign to POIs range from 0 to 15 and follow a normal
distribution with mean 7 andσ = 2. The evaluation of user misbehavior is outside the scope of
this simulation. It should be noted that the real measure of the system performance is given by
how many users every user knows and how much he trusts them, because (i) the more users he
knows the more information he has to choose a truthful recommendation from and (ii) the more
users he knows the more users he can ask to review a POI on his behalf and make his identity
harder to discover.
In Figs. 6a and 6b the evolution of the number and length of unverified POI chains can be
seen. After the first 5 days of simulation the number of unverified chains and its length is very
similar regardless of the reviewing rate. The fact that the average number of unverified chains is
over 90 (the simulator can store up to 100) and its length is approximately 5 (considering any of
theα’s) means that there has been interaction between the users and some have already started
to build a better reputation in the network. Moreover, the results after 20 days of simulation do
not differ significantly.
As far as verified chains are concerned, in Fig. 6c the direct relation between the reviewing
rate and the number of verified chains the nodes store can be observed. After 20 days of simula-
tion, the difference between aα = 1/5 and the control group withα = 0 is almost 1, increasing
to almost 2.5 forα = 1/2. Overall, the more often a user request another user to review a POI
on his behalf the lower his number of verified chains will be, which is logical considering that
higher request frequencies introduce a greater delay to information transmission. Fig. 6d shows
the mean of the length of verified POI chains. It is very similar to 6b, which is natural considering
that every time a POI is reviewed its unverified chain moves on to the verified state. Regarding
the rate assigned to the POIs in the verified chains, in Fig. 6e we can observe that the rate of
the reviewed POIs varies until it stabilizes around 7, which is expected since the randomly cho-
sen rates are distributed around that value, as previously described in this section. The different
simulated values forα determine how fast the POI rate converges to 7.
Figs 7a and 7b present the user reputation results. In 7a we can see that after 20 days of
simulation, nodes in the control group (α= 0) know on average 160 users, while nodes with
α = 1/5 know approximately 130 users and nodes withα = 1/2 know slightly under 100.
Regarding the level of trust in those users depicted in Fig. 7b, we can say that they are very































(a) Number of unverified POI chains: for every node
the number of unverified POI chains is computed, their






























(b) Length of unverified POI chains: for every node the
mean of its unverified POI chains length is computed,
































(c) Number of verified POI chains: for every node the
number of verified POI chains is computed, their mean






























(d) Length of verified POI chains: for every node the
mean of its verified POI chains length is computed, the






















(e) Rate in the verified POI chains: the mean of the
rates users assign to POIs.































(a) Number of known nodes: mean of the number of

















(b) Rate or level of trust of the known nodes: mean of
the rates users assign to other users as POI reviewers.
Figure 7: Number of known nodes and their levels of trust progress.
5. Conclusions
In this article we have presented a mechanism to preserve users privacy in a reputation sys-
tem. By allowing users to borrow each other’s identities an attacker can never be sure of who
was the real reviewer behind a given POI recommendation. In other words, users that trust each
other form a virtual group where any user can use anybody else’s identity, thus hiding behind
the group. Moreover, this technique should be transparent to the user reputation, since identity
borrowing can only occur between users that trust each other, which by definition implies that
their reviews for a given POI category are very similar and therefore interchangeable.
The results of our simulation tell us that regardless of the value ofα we have used (how often
a user reviews POI on behalf of another) the length of unverified and verified chains and their
rates remains very similar. Regarding the number of users known by every node and his level of
trust in them we have shown that even if the known number of users is slightly lower forα = 1/5
the difference when compared to the control group is not significant and does not constraint the
development of the reputation system. When we compare the control group withα = 0 we can
start to see a decrease in the system performance (it has a fewer number of verified chains and
knows less nodes).
Privacy wise, the fact that after just 10 days of simulation every user knows about 20 other
users which he trusts with a rate of approximately 1.5 tells us that an attacker trying to profile a
user will have to guess which of the 20 trusted nodes he relies on really issued the review. This
problem becomes increasingly harder as the days go by. For instance, after 20 days of simulation
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an attacker would have to find the real reviewer from a group of approximately 120 users.
All in all, the results show that reviewing POIs on behalf of other users with a moderate
frequency has hardly an impact on the system performance while their privacy is protected.
However, in a scenario where users review as many POIs on behalf of others as they do for
themselves the results point to the fact that borrowing identities to preserve user privacy poses a
constraint on how fast the reputation system develops.
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Abstract
Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) portray a world where every vehicle is equipped with
the means to communicate with each other, thus providing the perfect framework for the de-
velopment of applications that improve our driving experience, e.g., safety, content distribution,
liability in case of an accident, etc. The vast majority of these applications rely on the IEEE
802.11p/WAVE standard (Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments) or some other form of ra-
dio communication. This poses a security risk if we consider how vulnerable radio transmission
is to intentional jamming and natural interferences since an attacker could easily block all radio
communication in a certain area if its transmitter is powerful enough.
Visual Light Communication (VLC), however, is resilient to jamming over a wide area be-
cause it relies on visible light to transmit information. Therefore, VLC could be a perfect com-
plement to radio communication whenever the signal to noise ratio was too low. VLC research
is currently gaining momentum and although experiments have only been conducted indoors,
experts recognize the potential that this technology has in the open air.
This article is the first to realistically consider VLC as a form of communication for VANETs,
both as an alternative to radio waves and as an addition to it. Whenever the wireless physical
medium becomes too populated or in case of an emergency VLC could be used to transmit
information. In order to show its feasibility, several experiments comparing the performance of
VLC and WAVE have been performed. In these experiments our simulation tool processes a
24 hours mobility trace with over 260,000 nodes produced by aMulti-Agent Traffic Simulator,
which realistically simulates public and private traffic over regional maps of Switzerland. The
results show that VLC performs satisfactorily in a realistic scenario.
Keywords: VLC, Visual, Light, Communication, VANET, Vehicle
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1. Introduction
In the near future,Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks(VANETs) will change the way we drive.
Vehicles will be able to communicate among them and with road-side infrastructure which will
connect them to other networks,e.g., the Internet. Many applications for VANETs have been
proposed: content distribution [1, 2], advertisements [3], finding a parking spot [4], safety and
emergency applications [5], etc.
It is important to notice that most of these applications have one thing in common: the use
of radio communication. For that reason, the standard WAVE-DSRC, which defines wireless
vehicular communication, was designed. According to [6], WAVE-DSRC has the mechanisms
to provide different user applications with different communication channels while reserving
certain channels for safety applications, others for protocol operation and others for public safety.
WAVE-DSRC can transmit in short range (i.e., less than 100m) at data rates between 1-54Mbps
and at a range of less than 1000m at data rates between 3-27Mbps. Radio communication,
however, is inherently vulnerable to jamming attacks: anyone with a powerful enough radio
device can transmit in the same channel used by vehicles and distort communication over a wide
area (the radius of which depends on the power of the radio device), thus causing aDenial of
Service(DoS). The impact of such an attack ranges from a minor inconvenience for content
distribution applications to a potential car accident for safety applications.
Recent research has begun to focus onVisual Light Communication(VLC) [7, 8] as an al-
ternative form of communication. In VLC, the communication takes places between aLight
Emitting Diode(LED) used as a transmitter and photodiode that acts as a receiver. In the past
few years, there has been significant progress in this area, e.g., in [7] the authors were able to
reach a transmission speed of a 100Mbps in indoor conditions. Extensive research still needs
to be conducted before the technology becomes available to the general public. Efforts in that
direction are backed by the recently created IEEE 802.15.7 Visible Light Communication Task
Group [9] and the Visible Light Communications Consortium [10].
LED illumination is becoming widespread for indoor lightning due to its lower power con-
sumption compared to the regular light bulb. In addition, it is also becoming increasingly popular
in the automotive industry for indicator, tail and even headlights, as well as being used in traf-
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fic lights and signs. By the time VLC technology is mature enough to be used outdoors, LED
illumination will be widespread and a great range of possibilities will open for VANETs.
In this article, we define a 24 hour scenario where a 260,000 vehicles VANET uses VLC (as
explained in section 3) and simulate it with a modified version of our own simulation tool [11,
12]. The vehicles mobility is determined by the trace produced by the realisticMulti-Agent Traffic
Simulator(MMTS) developed by K.Nagel at ETH Zurich [13]. We will compare the performance
of VLC and WAVE (considering their different ranges of transmission) under certain situations
in order to determine if VLC could be a valid form of communication in VANETs.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. In sections 2.1 and 2.2 a background in
VANETs and VLC is given respectively. Section 3 describes in detail what is our proposal for
VANET communication and subsections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 present the simulation results. Finally, the
article closes with the conclusions drawn from those results.
2. Related work
2.1. Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
Vehicles equipped with wireless communication devices, also known asOn Board Units
(OBUs), will be able to communicate among themselves and withRoad Side Units(RSUs).
RSUs will compose the backbone of the roadside infrastructure which will connect the vehicular
network to a central system or to the Internet.
With the massive deployment of wireless technologies, the automotive industry will open a
wide range of possibilities for drivers and passengers alike: theoretically, anything from finding
out the road conditions ahead to watching a movie through streaming should be possible. So
different requirements will lead to the deployment of different kinds of applications over the
network. In [14] and [15] applications are classified based on the service they provide:
1. Safety related applications:
(a) Traffic information messages: used to disseminate traffic conditions over an area;
they affect public safety only indirectly (they are not time-critical).
(b) General safety-related messages: used by public safety applications such as coop-
erative driving and collision avoidance (in order to prevent traffic accidents time is
certainly an issue; at least they should satisfy an upper bound delay in delivering the
information).
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(c) Liability-related messages: they are only exchanged in liability-related situations
such as accidents. The senders’ identities should be kept hidden from the other users
in the network and only revealed to the law authorities (time is not an issue).
2. Other applications (some examples):
(a) Toll applications: electronic toll collection systems likeAutoPASSin Norway allow
drivers to continue driving without having to stop at tolls.
(b) TV and other multimedia content: used to provide users with entertainment and in-
formation (movies, newspapers, etc.).
(c) Advertisements: businesses along the road (such as gas-stations and restaurants)
could advertise themselves to drivers before they reached their location, giving them
enough time to compare different offers.
In [16] the authors present a scheme to distribute traffic events information. They define a
two tier approach: vehicle sensors first have to detect an event a certain number of timesTS
before reporting it to the driver and if they have not detected the event for themselves, they need
to receive the event warning fromTV vehicles before trusting it. Every time an event is detected
TS times a message including how many times the vehicle’s sensors have detected the event and
the identity of vehicles detecting it is send to the vehicle’s neighbors. The receiving nodes will
use this value and the number of vehicles that detected the event to determine if it is true or not.
As far as safety applications are concerned, the integrity and the non-repudiation of the trans-
mitted messages has to be ensured, albeit maintaining at the same time the user’s privacy. For
instance, a traffic information application needs to make every user accountable for the traffic
events he reports, otherwise a misbehaving user would be able to report false events (e.g., traffic
jams, accidents, etc.) and redirect traffic to his own benefit. Other applications, e.g., multime-
dia content distribution, may also need to encrypt their messages to avoid eavesdropping from
non-registered users. The use ofPublic Key Infrastructure(PKI) will fulfill most security re-
quirements.
In [2] the authors present Roadcast, a popularity aware P2P content sharing scheme. Their
technique relies on the idea that by ensuring that popular data is widely shared with other ve-
hicles the overall query delay can be improved. If users request popular data, which is densely
disseminated in the network, their queries can be answered in much shorter time than a request
for rare data, because the chance of meeting another vehicle with that particular piece of infor-
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mation is much higher. In the opportunistic and unreliable VANET, the authors expect users to
be more willing to receive data which approximately matches their request with a short delay
than waiting for a longer time to receive exactly what they requested. Thus the need to forward
the popular information with higher priority.
In [11] we introducedChains of Trust, a securePoints of Interest(POI) distribution strategy
and reputation system for VANETs. In a nutshell, users issue reviews of POIs and broadcasts
them to the network. The receiving users store them for future use so that when they need in-
formation about a certain POI category they can choose one recommendation issued by another
node (preferably one they already trust). Whenever they follow one of these recommendations,
they issue their own review of the POI and the system updates the level of trust on the recom-
mender(s) depending on how similar their reviews were. In addition, users who trust each other
not only exchange information about POIs, but also about other users, i.e., which ones are the
most trustable.
Regarding advertisements distribution, in [3] the authors describe a protocol based on a vir-
tual cash scheme where the following actors are involved:
• Certification Authority(CA): every vehicle is loaded with a pair of keys (public and pri-
vate) issued by a CA and with the CA’s public key.
• Vehicular Authority: entity that approves every advertisement to be loaded in anAd Dis-
tribution Point.
• Ad Distribution Point: broadcasts advertisements to the vehicles passing by.
• Virtual Cashiers: users are rewarded with virtual cash for forwarding advertisements. They
sign each other receipts to prove the message forwarding. Later on, that cash can be
exchanged for other services at theCashiers.
• Road Side Units(RSU): provide a link to the CA for keys revocation purposes.
It should be noted that even though VANET applications may differ on their goal or their
design, almost all of them (if not all) rely on the use of some sort of radio communication.
2.2. Visual Light Communication
The predecessor of modern VLC was the photophone invented by Alexander Graham Bell
and Charles Sumner Tainter [17]. The device consisted of a transmitter which modulated a
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light beam with a person’s voice and a parabolic receiver on the o er end which converted the
light back into sound. The transmitter used a mirror which vibrated with voice, thus alternating
between convex and concave forms and dispersing and focusing the light. The receiver had
selenium cells at its focal point, which made possible to convert the light back into voice due to
its photovoltaic properties (its electrical resistance is higher when in the dark and lower when
exposed to light). The invention was successfully tested over a distance of approximately 213m
using plain sunlight as their light source.
VLC uses visible light, with a wavelength between∼400nm (750THz) and∼700nm (428THz),
to transmit information. It is based on the usage of a white LED emitter and a photodiode as a
receiver.
The authors in [8], classify white LEDs into two types: (i) devices that use separate red-
green-blue (RGB) emitters and (ii) blue emitters used in combination with a phosphor that emits
yellow light. The former has a greater bandwidth while the latter has lower complexity.
As far as data rate is concerned, in [8] the authors present their results building a VLC link
between an emitter and a receiver using a pre-equalized 45MHz bandwidth white LED, reaching
a speed of 80Mbps withOn-OffKeying Nonreturn-to-zero(NRZ-OOK) over a link of 10cm (a
distance which could be extended by using an array of transmitters, according to the authors).
Similarly, in [7] the authors present their experiment using post-equalization, which reaches
100Mbps over a 10cm link, although the range could also be extended by using an array of
transmitters.
The Visible Light Communications Consortium shows in [18] a wide variety of applications
for VLC:
• a prototype which transmits sounds through RGB lights, where each RGB light has the
sound of a different instrument: guitar, keyboard, etc.
• usage in restricted areas like aircrafts and hospitals.
• in a supermarket, product information could be acquired by the visible light receiver in-
stalled on the shopping cart
• indoor navigation systems
• wireless LANs
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As the technology matures it will be possible to extend optical wireless networks to the
outdoors. For instance, in [19, 20, 21, 22] the authors use lasers to transmit information and, in
particular, to solve a problem commonly referred to as thefirst/last mile problem[19, 22]. In
the early days of optical fiber deployment, the fiber connected a telecommunication company’s
different switching stations while consumers connected to those stations through twisted-pair
wiring, which in effect limited the network access rates. Optical wireless proposed to bridge
this gap and connect consumers directly to their closest switching station with a laser link, thus
improving data rates and minimizing deployment costs.
In our view, in the next decade we will see vehicles transmitting information with their head-
lights or receiving information from traffic signs, as envisioned in [18, 23, 24]. However, there
are several aspects that need to be addressed first, like the low transmission speed over a long link
(speed rapidly decreases as the distance increases, from 100Mbps in a 2 meters link to 115Kbps
for approximately 5 meters [18]) and how to transmit in movement. In addition, in order to
succeed in the open air it must overcome the interferences caused by meteorological conditions
(e.g., fog, rain, etc.).
On the plus side, VLC has important advantages over radio communications such as: prac-
tically unlimited bandwidth (unlike the hyper-regulated radio spectrum), a relatively low power
consumption and resilience against jamming and DoS attacks.
3. Visual Light Communication in VANETs
The main goal of this article is to determine whether VLC could be an effective way to
transmit information in a VANET (either on its own or in collaboration with WAVE-DSRC).
However, the fact that the technology is not yet fully developed has to be taken into consideration.
In addition, current research is focused on indoor applications because of its lower complexity.
As a result, our experiments will only focus on the transmission range and we will consider 5m to
be the maximum VLC range, because beyond that distance the data rate decreases dramatically.
Notice how 5m should be enough to allow a vehicle to at least communicate with its immediate
neighbors.
In the simulated scenario every vehicle is equipped with a set of VLC emitters and receivers
distributed as depicted in Fig. 1. Even though the emitter’s transmission cone is yet to be de-
fined by manufacturers, we do know that LEDs are relatively inexpensive, which allows us to
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install several emitter-receiver sets in array to maximize the chance of a successful transmission
regardless of the vehicles’ position.
Figure 1: Emitter-receiver sets positioned in a vehicle and their transmission cone.
In order to determine how VLC would perform in a real VANET we need a realistic simu-
lation tool. Simulation tools like Glomosim or ns-2 were discarded because in order to simulate
hundreds of thousands of nodes they require a massive amount of memory. Thus, we were in-
clined to use a modified design of our own simulation tool [11, 12]. Like in [25], it was decided
to analyze the realistic vehicular trace produced by theMulti-Agent Traffic Simulator(MMTS)
developed by K.Nagel at ETH Zurich. The MMTS is capable of simulating public and private
traffic over real regional road maps of Switzerland with a high level of realism. It models the be-
havior of people living in the area, reproducing their movement (using vehicles) within a period
of 24 hours. The decision of each individual depends on the area it lives in. The individuals in
the simulation are distributed over the cities and villages according to statistical data gathered by
a census. Within the 24 hours of simulation, all individuals choose a time to travel and the mean
of transportation according to their needs and environment, e.g., one individual might take a car
and go to work in the early morning, another one wakes up later and goes shopping using public
transportation, etc. All in all, with over 260.000 simulated nodes or vehicles in an area of around
250 km x 260 km, this mobility trace suited our simulation needs.
The mobility trace roughly consists in ax, y,zposition update for every node everyt seconds
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(different periodst for every node). It has 3 different types of updates: node starts a trip, node
updates its position and node finishes a trip. Every time the trace provides an update on a vehi-
cle’s position, the simulation tool computes a rectilinear trajectory between the previousx, y,z
and the newx′, y′, z′ coordinates for the updated node, as depicted in Fig. 2. Then, its trajectory
is compared to the trajectory of every active node (every vehicle currently on the road) and it
determines if their paths cross and should that be the case if the crossing point falls within the
segment delimited by thex, y,z andx′, y′, z′ coordinates. Finally, it also takes into consideration
the speed of both vehicles and the transmission range of VLC to determine if the vehicles are in
range of one another and if the transmission succeeded.
Figure 2: In range detection based on vehicles R, G, B trajectori s.
In the next sections we present the results of our simulations. VLC can transmit at 115Kbps at
approximately 5m [18], although in order to account for future improvements on the technology
we will also consider ranges of 10m and 15m and compare those results to the results yielded by
the range of WAVE-DSRC (120m). It should be noted that the vehicles or nodes being simulated
spend an average of 3,134.17s on the road (slightly less than an hour) and make 1.99 trips. Our
simulations were designed with the following goals in mind:
• compute the mean of the number of packets received by each node and its distribution.
• study the transmission of information over an area with a gossip protocol.
• identify the limitations of WAVE-DSRC on the usage of the physical medium.
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3.1. Average number of received packets
As depicted in Fig.3, the average number of packets received by every node is computed.
For ranges 5m, 10m and 15m it can be seen that a similar number of packets was received
(443.38 packets, 458.55 packets, 473.88 packets). However, when compared with the 120m
range of WAVE (1,491.60 packets) the difference in performance is quite evident. If we look at
the distribution of the mean, it can be observed that the VLC ranges share similar results: over
150,000 nodes receive between 0 and 499 packets, while over 300 receive 2,500 or more. With
a range of 120m, over 70,000 nodes in the WAVE VANET receive between 0 and 499 packets,
























































Figure 3: Mean and distribution of the number of packets receiv d by each node.
Solely looking at these results it can be firmly stated that VLC cannot replace WAVE-DSRC
without a decrease in the network’s throughput. That being said, the results also show that even
with a range of 5m 443 packets were received, which means that VLC may be able to work
together with WAVE to protect VANETs from DoS attacks.
3.2. Received packets over an area
In order to find out how important the transmission range is to propagate a message over a
certain area another experiment was designed. Considering the results from the previous section,
a node which received an average number of packets was selected as a representative sample of
the network population. In the new simulation, that node will broadcast a packet every time its
position is updated, at the same time the rest of the network will remain silent until they receive
that message. From that point onwards they too will broadcast the message to its neighbors and
so on until the simulation finishes.
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Figure 4: Distribution of packets transmitted in the traveled area.
In Fig. 4 we can see the result of the described scenario in the number of packets that were
transmitted. The three different ranges for VLC (5m, 10m and 15m) obtained very similar results
both in number of packets and their distribution. As far as WAVE is concerned, even though it
produced approximately 300,000 transmissions more than VLC it did so with a very similar
distribution. These results show that shorter transmission ranges can be compensated by the use
of gossip broadcast protocols.
3.3. Analysis of WAVE scalability
In order to analyze the scalability of WAVE-DSRC a simulation in ns-3 [26] was imple-
mented defining a vehicular scenario with 400 nodes arranged in 4 lanes as depicted in Fig.5,
connected through a WAVE-DSRC 27Mbps link with a 120 meters range. This scenario rep-
resents a traffic jam, which is the worse possible situation for radio communication due to the
high density of vehicles. It should be noted that our simulation uses ns-3YansWifiPhyHelperand
YansWifiChannelHelperclasses, as defined in [27].
In a nutshell, the simulation schedules the broadcast ofnumPackets1000 bytes packets at a
randomly chosen time between the start of the simulation and its ending point, defined asp riod.
For every scenario (numPackets/periodcombination) the number of broadcasts received by each
of the 400 simulated nodes is computed (resultsnumPackets,period) and compared with how many
broadcasts each of those nodes would have received without packets loss (re f erencenumPackets),
considering the mean as the scenario’s result:
11










Looking at the results in table 1 it can be seen that for 400 packets every 30s the percentage
of received broadcasts drops to 60.52%; the general tendency is that for a high number of packets
transmitted over short periods the network throughput decreases. It should be noted that in this
simulation we considered a scenario where every node broadcasts a message and there are no
acknowledgements or retries. Had we considered bidirectional communication between vehicles
and a road side unit the network throughput would have been even lower due to the number of
retries. We strongly believe that VLC could help improve the delivery rate because in VLC users
do not have to compete for the physical medium.
4. Conclusions
In this article we have explored the future possibilities of VLC replacing or complementing
the current standard for communication in VANETs (WAVE-DSRC). Several experiments were
prepared, each with a different objective in mind: (i) determine how many packets are received
by each node (on average), (ii) how the transmitted information is distributed when VLC and
WAVE are compared and (iii) analyze the success data rate of a worst case scenario (traffic jam)
with WAVE.
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Percentage of received broadcasts
Number of packets/ Period (s) 10 20 30 40 50 60
100 71.82 87.08 91.48 93.66 95.03 95.93
200 36.23 71.79 82.08 87.04 89.71 91.46
300 15.77 54.50 71.75 79.71 84.06 87.05
400 9.45 36.71 60.52 71.88 78.14 82.21
500 6.83 23.43 48.62 63.59 72.13 77.26
600 5.28 15.89 36.77 54.55 65.24 71.99
700 4.28 11.88 27.18 45.53 58.29 66.44
800 3.64 9.51 20.41 36.85 51.05 60.65
Table 1: Percentage of received broadcasts for every simulated scenario.
The first experiment shows that every node receives at least three times as many packets with
WAVE as they receive with VLC in any of its different transmission ranges. For the second sim-
ulation we choose a node which receives an average number of packets and make him transmit
in an epidemic way (at the beginning of the simulation he is the only one transmitting, but once
a node receives that packet he starts transmitting as well). The results show that even though
WAVE-DSRC obtained a higher number of transmitted packets, i.e., infected more nodes, the
distribution in the x, y, z space was very similar. Which leads us to the conclusion that the short
range of VLC can be made up for with the use of epidemic or gossip protocols. Finally, the
third simulation shows at which point WAVE-DSRC stops getting information through due to
the high competition for the medium and the resulting packet collisions. At that point, the net-
work throughput could be improved by using VLC to transmit as well, since in VLC nodes do
not need to compete for the physical medium due to the nature of light communication.
In addition, we also need to consider the fact that while WAVE, like all radio communication,
is subject to jamming VLC is not. With WAVE, an attacker with a powerful enough radio device
could easily cause a blind spot in the network (which would lead to a DoS) with dimensions
depending on how good is his equipment. However, in order to jam the transmission of informa-
tion in VLC the attacker would have to physically block the beam of light from the emitter to the
receiver.
All in all, we believe that once VLC is ready to be deployed in the open air it will be an
important addition to VANET communication. Working together with WAVE-DSRC, it will
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provide an extra link which can be used by public safety applications and whenever the WAVE-
DSRC performance is below a certain threshold either due to the medium congestion or to an
attack.
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